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ABSTRACT
From the end of  1980s the Baltic  States:  Estonia,  Latvia and Lithuania 
successfully moved towards re-independence. At that stage referendums 
were a useful tool to carry through the transition peacefully. Today, each 
constitution  of  the  Baltic  Republics  provides  for  instruments  of  direct 
democracy that have been used in different ways. It is assumed that the 
possibility of a referendum introduces the people into the decision-making 
process as an additional veto player whose participation is needed for a 
change  in  the  legislative  status  quo.  It  is  further  expected  that  direct 
democratic instruments empower the citizens, forming a broader spread of 
power.  The  results  reported  in  this  paper,  however,  challenge  these 
assumptions. Regardless of the mechanism employed, direct democracy 
fails  to  fulfil  the  desired  effect  of  allowing  citizens  to  take  political 
decisions  directly  and  over  the  heads  of  their  representatives.  Rather, 
referendums have been used strategically for partisan interest. The poor 
performance of direct democracy in the Baltic States to date is not only a 
result  of  strategic choices made by the authorities,  but also of  citizen-
unfriendly procedural designs. In all three countries there are many formal 
constraints diminishing the will of the people.
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1 Introduction
Within the last decades there has been a considerable rise in the use of 
direct democratic institutions around the world. And provisions for direct 
democracy have increasingly been added to the constitutions of new or re-
established democracies1.  Such an increase in the importance of  direct 
democracy has also been seen in the Baltics States of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania2.  For  these  countries  referendums  were  essential  to  gaining 
independence from the Soviet Union at the end of  the communist  era. 
Until that time, for over fifty years (1940-1991), these countries had been 
constituent republics within the Soviet Confederation and subject to the 
Soviet  Union’s  ideological  discourse.  Not  nationality,  but  class  was  the 
source of legitimacy for all government decisions relating to political and 
economical life3. In 1991 and in the immediate post-independence period, 
referendums served to  restore  the  statehood  of  the  Baltics  and  to  re-
1 BUTLER DAVID/RANNEY AUSTIN (eds.),  Referendums  around  the  World.  The 
Growing  Use  of  Direct  Democracy  (Washington  D.  C.  1994);  AUER 
ANDREAS/BÜTZER MICHAEL (eds.),  Direct  Democracy.  The  Eastern  and  Central 
European  Experience  (Aldershot  et  al.  2001);  AUER ANDREAS,  National 
Referendums in the Process of European Integration: Time for Change, in: 
ALBI ANNELI/ZILLER JACQUES (eds.),  The  European  Constitution  and  National 
Constitutions.  Ratification  and  Beyond  (Amsterdam  2007),  p.  261–271; 
PALLINGER ZOLTAN TIBOR/KAUFMANN BRUNO/MARXER WILFRIED/SCHILLER THEO (eds.), Direct 
Democracy  in  Europe.  Developments  and  Prospects  (Wiesbaden  2007); 
KAUFMANN BRUNO/WATERS M.  DANE (eds.),  Direct  Democracy  in  Europe.  A 
Comprehensive Reference Guide to the Initiative and Referendum Process 
in  Europe  (Durham  2008),  (cit.  KAUFMANN/WATERS)  ALTMAN DAVID,  Direct 
Democracy  Worldwide  (Cambridge  2010)  (cit.  ALTMAN);  HUG SIMON/TSEBELIS 
GEORGE,  Veto  Players  and  Referendums  around  the  World,  in:  Journal  of 
Theoretical  Politics  14(4)/2002,  p.  465–515  (cit.  HUG/TSEBELIS);  SERDÜLT 
UWE/WELP YANINA,  Direct  Democracy  Upside  Down,  Taiwan  Journal  of 
Democracy 8(1)/2012, p. 69–92 (cit. SERDÜLT/WELP).
2 RUUS JÜRI, Estonia, in: AUER ANDREAS/BÜTZER MICHAEL (eds.), Direct Democracy. The 
Eastern and Central European Experience (Aldershot et al. 2001), p. 47–62 
(cit.  RUUS, Estonia);  UŠACKA ANITA, Latvia, in: AUER ANDREAS/BÜTZER MICHAEL (eds.), 
Direct Democracy. The Eastern and Central European Experience (Aldershot 
et  al.  2001),  p.  94–108  (cit.  UŠACKA); KRUPAVICIUS ALGIS/ZVALIAUSKAS GIEDRIUS, 
Lithuania,  in:  AUER ANDREAS/BÜTZER MICHAEL (eds.),  Direct  Democracy.  The 
Eastern and Central European Experience (Aldershot et al. 2001), p. 109–
128 (cit. KRUPAVICIUS/ZVALIAUSKAS).
3 MOLE RICHARD C. M., The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the European 
Union. Identity, Discourse and Power in the Post-Communist Transition of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (London/New York 2012), p. 81–119; see also 
HOFFMANN THOMAS,  Sachunmittelbare  Demokratie  im  Baltikum  (Estland, 
Lettland,  Litauen),  in:  NEUMANN PETER/RENGER DENISE (eds.),  Sachunmittelbare 
Demokratie  im interdisziplinären  und internationalen  Kontext  2010/2011 
(Baden-Baden 2012), p. 309–327 (cit. HOFFMANN, Baltikum).
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establish  their  cultural  identity.  Since  then,  for  the  most  part,  direct 
democratic  tools  have  been  used  by  the  political  parties  to  promote 
particular interests.
Today,  a  large  set  of  direct  democratic  instruments  is  available  to  the 
people of the Baltic States, and within the last two decades they have 
been variously applied. Of the referendums held between 1991 and 2012, 
only a small part succeeded and the majority were ineffective in bringing 
about a policy change. The literature on referendums in the Baltics has 
contributed some possible explanations for such kinds of  uses and the 
efficiency of referendums4. But, in many cases a confusing classification of 
referendums  has  been  used,  and  less  attention  has  been  paid  to  the 
institutions regulating direct democracy in the Baltics. 
In  this  respect  the paper intends to  present  a  comparative analysis  of 
direct democratic instruments from a legal perspective and specifies the 
political  actors  controlling  these.  The  paper  further  pays  attention  to 
specific  rules determining the procedures and practices of  referendums 
and gives some possible explanations by comparing these rules.
In order to meet this objective, at first a theoretical conceptualisation of 
direct  democracy  and of  its  three mechanisms –  automatic,  top down, 
bottom  up  –  in  combination  with  the  veto  player  model5 is  needed 
(Chapter  II).  Following  this  conceptualisation,  a  systematic  legal 
framework of all  existing direct democratic institutions at national  level 
and their practical use from 1991 to 2012 is provided for each Baltic State. 
Here,  also  possible  causes  of  variation  in  the  use  and  efficiency  of 
referendums  are  discussed  (Chapters  III-IV-V).  To  assess  a  better 
understanding of the performance of direct democracy, the paper further 
makes a comparison of referendums held in the Baltics. Here, by referring 
to  Switzerland,  also  a  rough  quality  check  of  direct  democracy  in  the 
Baltics  is  undertaken  (Chapter  VI).  Thereafter  the  paper  makes  some 
concluding remarks (Chapter VII).
4 See  HOFFMANN,  Baltikum,  p.  312  f.;  FELDHUNE GITA,  Latvia,  in:  KAUFMANN 
BRUNO/WATERS DANE M. (eds.), Direct Democracy in Europe. A Comprehensive 
Reference  Guide  to  the  Initiative  and  Referendum  Process  in  Europe 
(Durham 2004), S. 77–83 (cit. FELDHUNE); MØLLER LUISE PAPE, Moving Away from 
the Ideal: The Rational Use of Referendums in Baltic States, Scandinavian 
Political Studies, 23(3)/2002, p. 281–293 (cit. MØLLER).
5 HUG/TSEBELIS, p. 465–515.
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2 Definition and classification of direct democracy
2.1 Popular sovereignty through referendums
The  modern  concept  of  democracy  is  based  on  the  idea  of  popular 
sovereignty. Popular sovereignty means that actions and institutions of the 
state must be legitimised by the people6. In a representative democracy 
this legitimation generally occurs at parliamentary  elections. Thereafter, 
for period of four or five years, the will of the people is represented by the 
elected national legislative body. By contrast, within a direct democracy 
the  people  exercise  their  sovereignty  directly.  It  enables  the  people  to 
devolve their sovereignty to the political decision-making process in the 
most direct manner.
A referendum is an institution of direct democracy which empowers the 
citizens to reach political decisions on issues with which a political elite 
may disagree.  More precisely,  it  is  a  right  of  eligible  citizens to  either 
accept or reject a specific public issues that may originate from a decision 
or proposal of the authorities or from a citizens’ initiative7.  Here, a link 
between  representative  and  direct  democracy  is  made,  wherein  the 
citizens not only share the decision-making process but also have the final 
say.  Thus,  direct  democracy  introduces  the  people  as  an  additional 
political  actor  into  the  decision-making  procedure  whose  agreement  is 
required to make a policy change possible8. Whether the popular decision 
on the public issue submitted to vote is positive or not, referendums have 
a legitimising effect, since they reflect the will of the people. In addition, 
referendums  work  as  correctives  and  serve  as  instruments  of  power 
sharing. This is especially crucial for those minorities whose interests are 
represented either inadequately or not at all through the representative 
organs9. But, here, in order to assess such a desired effect it is important 
to  consider  which  direct  democratic  mechanisms  are  available  to  the 
people and how well designed their procedures are.
6 MARXER WILFRIED/PÁLLINGER ZOLTÁN TIBOR, System Context and System Effects of 
Direct  Democracy  –  Direct  Democracy  in  Liechtenstein  and  Switzerland 
compared, in: PÁLLINGER ZOLTÁN T. [et al.] (eds.), Direct Democracy in Europe. 
Developments and Prospects (Wiesbaden 2007), p. 13;  HANGARTNER YVO/KLEY 
ANDREAS,  Die  demokratischen  Rechte  in  Bund  und  Kantonen  der 
Schweizerischen  Eidgenossenschaft  (Zürich  2000),  p.  132  (cit. 
HANGARTNER/KLEY).
7 INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INSTITUTE EUROPE (IRI), Guidebook to Direct Democracy in 
Switzerland and beyond (Marburg 2008), p. 240 (cit. IRI).
8 see following explanations, HUG/TSEBELIS, p. 465–515. 
9 IRI, p. 71. 
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2.2 Mechanisms of direct democracy and veto player
How and to what extent the people’s will could be converted into legal 
norms of a state depends on the institutional arrangements (rules in form) 
that a country provides for direct democracy. There are several ways, and 
yet it has to be taken into account that direct democracy does not always 
enhance democratisation in public politics. Depending on the mechanism, 
it  can  also  serve  politicians  as  legitimation  of  their  own  power.  A 
mechanism of direct democracy is a set of procedures allowing citizens to 
make political decisions directly10. Within these procedures it is important 
to  determine  who  controls the  vote,  because  the  common  term  of 
referendum is often used to describe all kinds of popular decision-making 
processes. As AREND LIJPHART states, a referendum can be grouped according 
to its initiator, which can either be controlled or uncontrolled11. A controlled 
mechanism occurs if  citizens have to decide – through a facultative or 
mandatory  referendum –  on  a  parliamentary  decree  which  it  had  pre-
passed.  And  an  uncontrolled  mechanism  may  take  place  if  a  certain 
number of people can initiate and submit their own proposal to a popular 
vote, irrespective of the state authorities.
To give a more systematic comparison of direct democratic institutions and 
procedures in the Baltic States and to show their possible effects,  it  is 
essential  to  classify  direct  democracy  according  to  its  possible 
mechanisms. My classification is based on  DAVID ALTMAN’s typology, which 
groups direct democracy into three main mechanisms according to their 
initiator  (automatic,  from  above,  from  below),  character  (binding, 
nonbinding) and intention (proactive, reactive)12. Here it should be noted 
that in some cases these three mechanisms can overlap. In addition to 
ALTMAN’S conceptualisation,  I  also  pay  attention  to  the  normative  level 
(constitution, law, statutory), or to the subject matter (policy issues) of a 
referendum that can vary within a single mechanism. Further, I combine 
ALTMAN’s ‘procedural typology’ with the ‘controlling-model’ of SIMON HUG and 
GEORGE TSEBELIS that  is  based  on  the  theory  of  the  veto-player.  As  the 
authors note, it is the information about the control options that is crucial 
in order to assess the effect of institutions allowing for referendums. The 
‘controlling-model’13 explains  differences  between  referendums, 
depending on who is empowered to ask the question, or, rather, to frame 
10 SERDÜLT/WELP, p. 70.
11 AREND LIJPHART,  Democracies.  Patterns  of  Majoritarian  and  Consensus 
Government in Twenty-One Countries, (New Haven/London 1984), 203 f.
12 See also ALTMAN, p. 8–18.
13 I use this term for their «multi-dimensional model of referendums on the 
basis of veto player theory».
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or determine the content of the popular vote, and who exactly triggers the 
process  of  a  referendum14.  And  according  to  this  classification  we can 
generally  distinguish  between  four  main  direct  democratic  institutions, 
which  are required  referendums,  authorities’  referendums (e.g. 
plebiscites,  parliamentary  referendums  or  extraordinary  referendums), 
citizens’  facultative  referendums (popular  veto)  and  the  citizens’ 
initiatives (popular initiative)15. 
2.2.1 Initiator of referendums
2.2.1.1 Referendums required by the constitution
Referendums required by the constitution, or ‘mandatory referendums’, as 
they are also called, belong to the first mechanism of direct democracy. 
Here a popular vote on an amendment to the constitution or law must be 
held  automatically  since  the  referred  issue  cannot  otherwise  be 
amended16.
Theoretically,  constitutional  or  legal  regulations  are  the  ‘initiators’  of 
automatic direct democratic mechanisms. Nevertheless, the activation of 
the referendum procedure does not occur automatically, as the name of 
the mechanism per se states. It has to be asked by a political actor. In 
general,  framing  the  question  in  the  sense  of  adopting  a  new  law, 
amending, or repealing an existing law is a political result of a legislative 
activity that is caused by current economical, societal or political events 
within and outside the borders of a state. The framing of the question can 
further depend on the willingness of the political establishment to carry 
out a revision of the constitution or a law. Also, a group of citizens that 
may wish to effect an alteration to a specific constitutional norm or a law 
can be the source of legislation. Therefore, required referendums can also 
be linked with two other mechanisms.
Automatic referendums mainly apply to constitutional amendments since 
they refer to the most significant issues concerning the existence of the 
state and the nation. But also international treaties can belong to this type 
of  referendum.  And  in  some  states  or  at  some  second  tiers  (regions; 
states; cantons; Länder) of federal systems there are also specific laws or 
14 HUG/TSEBELIS, p. 477–488.
15 HUG/TSEBELIS, p. 478.
16 In the federal system of Switzerland, for instance, any amendment to the 
constitution  but  also  joining  an  organisation  for  collective  security  or  a 
supranational community,  urgent federal  legislation without the required 
constitutional basis require an obligatory referendum. And for an approval 
both  the  majority  of  the  participant  electorate  and  the  majority  of  the 
cantons (double majority) in favour are needed.
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other public issues that can only be altered by a popular vote. In addition, 
a required referendum can also be held if a legislative resolution has not 
been approved by a qualified parliamentary majority17.
Within an automatic mechanism, it is essential to note what central role is 
given to the citizens automatically.  As the authors  SIMON HUG and  GEORGE 
TSEBELIS state correctly, the possibility of a [automatic] referendum enables 
the citizens to become a veto player and thus to have the final say in 
decision-making18.
According to GEORGE TSEBELIS, veto players are individual or collective actors 
whose agreement is required for a change in the legislative status quo19. 
Depending on the model of political system, the number of veto players 
(presidential  or  parliamentary  regimes,  uni-cameral  or  bi-cameral 
parliament  with  equal  competencies,  parties,  citizens,  federalism)  can 
vary. It should be noted that the possibility of a referendum in a political 
system  introduces  the  people  as  an  additional  veto  player  into  the 
decision-making  process.  And  as  the  number  of  these  actors  and  the 
ideological gaps between them increase, a significant change in the status 
quo becomes more difficult and policy stability increases.
Required referendums automatically add the hurdle of popular support. In 
other direct democratic mechanisms (referendums from above or citizen-
initiated referendums) the formation of the popular veto player is optional 
and, depending on the criterion of a referendum, the nature of the popular 
veto player can vary. As HUG/TSEBELIS state, a veto-player may only trigger a 
referendum on  a  proposal  that  was  framed  by  another  actor,  such  as 
parliament. Another option is that a referendum is framed and triggered 
by the same veto player. If he or she controls both asking the question of 
the popular vote and triggering the process of the referendum, he or she 
would become at the same time the one actor who individually determines 
the outcome, because others would lose their ability to veto it20. However, 
it has to be taken into account that the referred actor has still to make 
17 So  in  some  Swiss  cantons  as  Canton  of  Aargau,  Art.  62  par.  1  lit.  b, 
Constitution of Canton of Aargau of June 25, 1980 (Cst-AG) and Canton of 
Solothurn, Art. 35 par. 1 lit. d, Constitution of Canton of Solothurn of June 8, 
1986 (Cst-SO). 
18 HUG/TSEBELIS, p. 479.
19 TSEBELIS GEORGE,  Decision  Making  in  Political  Systems:  Veto  Players  in 
Presidentialism,  Parliamentarism,  Multicamerialism  and  Multipartyism, 
British Journal  of  Polictical  Science 25/1995,  p.  289 (cit  TSEBELIS Decision 
Making);  TSEBELIS GEORGE,  Veto  Players.  How  Political  Institutions  Work 
(Princeton 2002), p. 17 f. (cit. TSEBELIS, Veto Players).
20 HUG/TSEBELIS, p. 466 f., 477–487.
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every effort (e.g. campaign) to ensure that the majority of the deciding 
body is convinced by his/her position. And he or she has also to consider 
that within a legal framework there can be some further specific rules and 
provisions that may restrict his or her power as well. 
2.2.1.2 Referendums from above
The second type of direct democratic mechanism includes referendums 
that  are  derived  from  top  down.  Top-down  referendums  refer  to 
‘plebiscites’  or  to  ‘authorities’  referendums’.  In  contrast  to  a  required 
referendum, they are optional. In other words, they depend on the will of 
the authorities in power (executives or legislators) that are in full control of 
both the formulation of the question (adoption, alteration, repeal) and the 
triggering of the referendum. Generally, it is the parliament or a part of 
the parliament that both frames the proposal and triggers the referendum. 
But, this is not necessarily always the case. The asking and triggering of a 
top-down referendum can also be carried out by two different actors of the 
political establishment, namely by the president and parliament. And in 
some few cases the triggering of a referendum by a public authority can 
also  take place  in  combination  with  signature  collection  by the  people 
(joint action with citizens).
For some scholars it is disputable how far a plebiscite can be part of the 
realm of direct democracy. According to BRUNO KAUFMANN and M. DANE WATERS, 
‘plebiscites have nothing to do with referendums and initiatives; on the 
contrary, they are often used by governments who want to get a special 
legitimacy on their policies by bypassing laws and constitutional rules’21, 
or to avoid the consequences of political responsibility, which may result 
from the adoption of  a  sensitive  issue.  Thus,  plebiscites would  have a 
greater legitimising than a democratizing effect, as they do not empower 
the citizens. Their reservation towards plebiscites may be rather confirmed 
if  plebiscites are being used within a political  regime with authoritarian 
tendencies, and if the constitution contains such provisions that empower 
a single (executive) state authority, such as the president, to formulate 
any proposal and at the same time to trigger the referendum on it. There, 
he would clearly bypass the parliament,  which is in fact the legislative 
authority. Within a state with a weak civil society, ambiguous separation of 
powers and missing principles of rule of law, this would open a Pandora’s 
box.  The  consequences  are  clear:  abuse  of  power  and  being  far  from 
anything like popular sovereignty.
21 KAUFMANN/WATERS, p. XIX; see also IRI, p. 91.
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In  more  democratic  countries  with  well-framed  systems of  checks  and 
balances it may still be advisable to consider plebiscites as a part of direct 
democratic mechanisms, especially if the resolution is being drafted and 
submitted by two different authorities. First of all, citizens will get involved 
to challenge the legislative status quo and, depending on the issue, they 
may  prefer  another  outcome  than  that  of  the  actor  who  triggers  the 
referendum. There is  still  a  lack  of  a  guarantee that  the  voters  would 
follow the state authority by launching a popular vote. And there might 
also be specific constraints on the authority itself (e.g. a negative outcome 
leads to a premature ending of term) that limits its behaviour to trigger a 
referendum.
Besides plebiscites, also the authorities’ referendums belong to top-down 
initiated referendums. Such a vote occurs due to an initiative on part of 
the parliament or parliamentary minority. An authorities’ referendum as an 
oppositional instrument in favour of the status quo mainly happens if a 
specific  part  of  the parliament votes  against  a  policy  accepted by the 
governing majority and if the same group can force (trigger) a referendum 
on  that  parliamentary  decree  that  is  itself  object  of  an  optional 
referendum22.  Here,  the  actor  asking  and  triggering  the  referendum is 
indeed  the  parliament,  but  it  is  not  the  same  parliamentary  group. 
Therefore, it is very essential to distinguish who precisely formulates the 
question and who triggers the process of a referendum23.
22 For  instance,  in  the  Canton  of  Zurich  (Switzerland)  one  fourth  of  the 
members  of  parliament  (45/180)  are  entitled  to  launch  a  referendum 
(Kantonsratsreferendum)  on  parliamentary  decrees  that  are  subject  to 
facultative referendums, if they so wish, Art. 33, par. 2, lit. c, Constitution of 
Canton of Zurich of February 27, 2005 (Cst-ZH). Also in other Cantons, such 
as the Canton of Zug, not less than one-third of the members of parliament 
can trigger a referendum (Behördenreferendum) on a decree that has been 
passed by the parliamentary majority ante, § 34, par.  4,  Constitution of 
Canton of Zug of January 31, 1894 (Cst-ZG). Another six cantons that also 
have such an instrument are the Cantons of Aargau, Thurgau, St. Gallen, 
Fribourg, Appenzell-Ausserrhoden and Obwalden. 
23 The so-called extraordinary referendums (ausserordentliches Referendum) 
in  some  Swiss  Cantons,  such  as  Basel-City,  Glarus,  Graubünden,  Jura, 
Schaffhausen,  Solothurn,  Thurgau  and  Uri,  have  rather  plebiscitary 
character because they are triggered by parliamentary majorities.  Here, 
the parliamentary majority triggers ad hoc a referendum on its own decree 
that  is  otherwise  not  subject  to  a  referendum  and  submits  the 
parliamentary  draft  directly  to  popular  vote  (extraordinary  obligatory 
referendum). Or the parliament allows the citizens to trigger a referendum 
on  the  parliamentary  proposal  that  was  not  subject  to  a  referendum 
(extraordinary optional referendum).
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Despite some criticism on plebiscites, it should be noted that these can 
also  have  a  democratising  effect,  especially  if  such  a  vote  has  been 
triggered  by  a  parliamentary  minority.  Thus,  it  is  advisable  to  include 
plebiscitary  referendums in  the  system of  direct  democracy.  Here,  the 
inclusion is necessary in order to achieve the paper’s aim, because only 
then can an adequate comparison of direct democratic mechanisms and 
instruments in the Baltic States be made.
2.2.1.3 Citizen-initiated referendums
The third  direct  democratic  mechanism refers  to  referendums that  are 
being derived from bottom up.  One can  distinguish between two main 
types  of  citizen-initiated  referendums:  the  citizens’  facultative 
referendum24 and the citizens’ initiative. Both institutions are triggered by 
the  people  and  hence  require  a  collection  of  a  certain  amount  of 
signatures from the electorate. However, citizens’ facultative referendums 
and citizens’ initiatives have different functions: a reactive one to sustain 
policy stability and a proactive one to change the status quo.
The  citizens’  facultative  referendum is  a  direct  democratic  instrument 
enabling a certain number of citizens to call  – by a formal demand – a 
popular  vote  on a relevant  decree on a  constitutional  provision or  law 
which has been adopted, altered or repealed (framing of the question) by 
the parliament. In other words, the citizens’ facultative referendum is a 
popular veto that is used by a group of the electorate to sustain policy 
stability by breaking the policy change effectuated by the representative 
body. Besides constitutional or legal provisions, also other public issues, 
such as public finances (Finance Referendum to grant public expenditures) 
or international treaties, can be subject to a popular veto. It is a reactive 
popular instrument allowing latent veto players like the people to veto a 
resolution of the parliament in order to force a return to the status quo 
ante.  Within  this  procedure  authorities  keep  the  responsibility  for  the 
formulation  of  the  referendum  question  (which  is  the  parliamentary 
resolution on a law or other public issue) whilst triggering the referendum 
remains  a  matter  for  citizens.  Therefore,  the  facultative  referendum 
causes nothing else than a switch of  final  decision-making on a public 
issue from the parliamentary to the popular arena. The outcome of the 
ballot is either that of confirming or rejecting.
24 To avoid confusion I use this terminology because facultative referendums 
can also emanate from a state representative body, such as parliament, 
government or the president. Then we speak of optional plebiscites.
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In the sense of substantive law, an adoption by means of the referendum 
means that the majority of the citizens who participated in the ballot give 
their consent to parliament’s resolution regarding the adoption, alteration 
or repeal of the specific law. It is a final signal to go ahead for the policy 
change launched by the parliament. A negative outcome of the ballot, by 
contrast, is a popular confirmation for the proponents who had triggered 
the citizens’ facultative referendum to bring a final decision on the issue to 
the  popular  arena.  Such  a  result  is  a  final  answer  in  favour  of  the 
proponent’s preferred status quo and a rejection of parliament’s proposed 
policy,  which  can  thereby  not  come  into  force.  Nevertheless,  some 
confusing results can appear if the referendum question put on the ballot 
paper is formulated in a confusing or ambiguous manner. Hence, to avoid 
such results the questions to be decided via referendum should be clearly 
formulated.
The second instrument of  bottom-up mechanism refers  to  the  citizens’ 
initiative. By contrast to citizens’ facultative referendums, a full control of 
a popular vote with regard to its asking and triggering properties is gained 
through this direct democratic institution. It is a proactive instrument that 
enables a certain number of the electorate both to put their own proposal 
on  the  political  agenda  (framing  the  question)  and  to  submit  it  to  a 
referendum (triggering). Citizens’ initiatives can be distinguished between 
the citizens’ constitutional initiative and the citizens’ legislative initiative25. 
However,  as  in  the  Baltic  States  it  is  also  possible  to  held  citizens’ 
initiatives  on other  public  issues.  A popular  initiative aims to alter  the 
status quo by adopting a new law, or by amending or repealing an already 
existing law. Independently of the parliamentary majorities, theoretically it 
should enable certain minorities to push forward a specific issue that the 
authorities  would  otherwise  not  do  of  their  own  volition.  And  as  the 
citizens’  initiative  is  framed  and  triggered  exclusively  by  the  people 
theoretically  it  should  cancel  out  the  remaining  veto  players  in  the 
legislative arena26. It is one of the reasons for which a citizens’ initiative 
has  also  been  called  the  radical  institution  of  direct  democracy27. 
25 In  Switzerland  popular  initiatives  have  also  to  comply  with  the 
requirements  of  consistency  of  form  (an  initiative  has  to  be  submitted 
either as a general suggestion or formulated draft, tertium non datur) and 
of subject matter (parts of the text of the initiative shall not contain issues 
that have no connection to each other, there must be a relation with regard 
to its content), see Art. 139, par. 3, Swiss Federal Constitution of April 18, 
1999 (Cst-CH).
26 see also HUG/TSEBELIS, p. 489.
27 HANGARTNER/KLEY, p. 156 f.
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Nevertheless,  factually,  in  most  cases  the  radical  institution  of  direct 
democracy is been used by organized interest groups or elites themselves.
As in the case of automatic referendums, the people continue to be a veto 
actor with final  decision-making authority,  also within a citizen-initiated 
mechanism. Within this mechanism, however, they can be called  latent 
veto players since they avail themselves of the instruments of the popular 
veto and popular initiatives, optionally. 
Besides the facultative referendum and the citizens’ initiative, there is a 
third institution, namely the recall, which can be included in the group of 
referendums  from  below.  However,  it  has  to  be  noted  that  direct 
democracy  makes  decisions  about  substantive  issues  and  not  about 
people or public bodies. The right of recall is an instrument to dissolve the 
parliament or to recall another state authority before the end of its term of 
office. It is important to note that such an institution has therefore also to 
be triggered from below by gathering an amount of popular signatures28. 
The outcome of a recall is more than an adoption, alteration or repeal of a 
certain issue; it is aimed at single authorities or whole public bodies and 
has larger consequences for the political establishment29. 
Further democratic institutions such as the ‘citizens’ agenda initiative’ are 
excluded from the third mechanism of direct democracy. Agenda initiatives 
permit a group of citizens to force the parliament to consider a proposed 
action or a bill. However, as a petition it has no legally binding force to 
obligate the parliament to adopt the proposal or to let it be submitted to a 
popular vote.
2.2.2 The character of referendums
Besides the three main mechanisms that have been classified according to 
their  initiators,  further  attention  must  be  paid  to  the  character of 
referendums. The outcome of a popular vote can either be consultative or 
binding30.  Binding  decisions  are  final  and  mandatory  for  all  state 
authorities. The appropriate state body is legally compelled to implement 
the passed proposal.  By contrast,  nonbinding referendums do not have 
any  legal  consequences  even  if  the  majority  of  the  electorate  has 
approved them. Such decisions are indeed non-decisions since they create 
an uncertain and unfair democratic procedure31. Here, the final word on 
28 See also SERDÜLT/WELP, p. 71.
29 ALTMAN, p. 16.
30 ALTMAN, p. 8.
31 INITIATIVE &  REFERENDUM INSTITUTE EUROPE (IRI),  Initiative & Referendum Monitor 
2004/2005 (Amsterdam 2004), p. 23 (cit. IRI, Monitor).
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the  approval  of  public  issues  still  depends  on  the  volition  of  the 
parliament. But, in order to limit the power of such state organs, binding 
decisions  on  referendums  are  absolutely  necessary  within  a  direct 
democratic system.
A  distinction  between  binding  and  nonbinding  referendums  is  also  of 
eminent significance for the application of the veto-player approach that 
has been integrated into the classification of referendum mechanisms. It 
should  be  noted  that  there  is  no  additional  veto  player  as  long  as 
referendums are consultative, even if  the referendum has been framed 
and triggered by the same political actor.
Regardless of whether a referendum is binding or not, to avoid disruptive 
consequences,  popular  votes  face  an  important  hurdle,  namely  the 
constitutionality check. In general, referendums have to be in accordance 
with the constitution of a country and, depending on the country, also with 
some  international  treaties  of  preeminent  importance  that  cannot  be 
terminated. Basically, constitutional courts are therefore permitted to test 
referendums. However, in some countries, such as Switzerland, the formal 
review of referendums is carried out by the parliament. Another aspect 
that one may also take into account is the timing of a compatibility check. 
In some countries referendums, to be allowed to proceed, are submitted to 
the court or to the parliament before the ballot. In other states, such as 
California  (USA),  a  judicial  review  can  also  be  implemented  after  an 
approval of referendum. This may also occur in Swiss cantons.
2.2.3 The intention of referendums
It is also important to pay attention to the third criterion of referendums, 
namely their intention, which can either be proactive or reactive. Proactive 
referendums are used to alter the status quo by submitting a new idea to 
a popular vote. By contrast,  reactive referendums aim to sustain policy 
stability32.  There  are  two types  of  reactive  referendums.  The  first  type 
refers  to  facultative  referendums,  as  described  above.  Facultative 
referendums  can  be  requested  by  a  group  of  citizens  or  by  another 
representative body as a reaction to a policy change introduced by the 
governing  majority.  It  is  a  democratic  tool  to  veto  the  parliamentary 
resolution in favour of the status quo. The second reactive referendum is 
related to counter-proposals, which are very common in Switzerland.
A counter-proposal is a reaction of the establishment to an alteration of 
the status quo initiated by the citizenry. However, in some cases counter-
32 ALTMAN, p. 8, 14.
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proposals can also originate from a given number of citizens as a response 
to  a  parliamentary  decree,  which  is  subject  to  the  facultative 
referendum33. Indeed, a counter-proposal must be seen as an alternative 
rather than an opposite vote to a referendum. It aims to alter the status 
quo too, but in a different and mostly less radical way than the original 
initiative.  For  the  decision  a  counter-proposal  is  presented  to  the  vote 
together with the citizens’ initiative (or with a parliamentary decree that is 
subject  to  a  facultative  referendum),  and  the  electorate  has  a  choice 
between the  original  initiative,  counter-proposal  or  both  proposals,  but 
with a tiebreak question that is used to determine which version should be 
implemented,  should  both  proposals  be  approved.  In  this  case,  the 
participants on the ballot have either to decide in favour of the initiative or 
in favour of the counter-proposal.
Herewith it should be noted that an option of a counter-proposal is a clear 
sign  of  the  existence  of  an  indirect  initiative  procedure  wherein  the 
parliament and proponents of the citizens’ initiative interact together. At 
this procedural stage a link between direct and representative democracy 
is established, which is indeed to be welcomed since direct democracy can 
thereby  better  realise  its  full  potential34.  In  such  a  procedure  the 
parliament as well as the government are obliged to debate the citizens’ 
initiatives before they are  placed on the ballot. The parliament is free to 
accept or to refuse a citizens’ proposal. In case of a rejection, the initiative 
has to be submitted to the popular vote. And in case of parliamentary 
approval of the popular proposal, there is no popular vote on the citizens’ 
initiative unless the popular proposal is subject to required referendums, 
for which a popular vote is then mandatory.
Another effect that an indirect initiative procedure causes is the possibility 
of  a  withdrawal  of  the  citizens’  initiative.  Depending  on  the  formal 
institutionalisation  of  citizen-initiated referendums (e.g.  availability  of  a 
withdrawal clause), the parliament may propose a counter proposal and 
that may lead the proponents of the initiative to withdraw their proposal 
due to the partial fulfilment of their demand by the legislature. And even if 
a counter proposal by the authorities does not cause a withdrawal of the 
citizens’  initiative  by  the  initiative  committee,  voters  can  still  choose 
between at  least  three substantive options:  citizens’  initiative,  counter-
proposal or tie-break question in support of one of these two options.
33 The  so  called  ‘Volksvorschlag’  in  Canton  of  Bern,  see  Art.  63  par.  3, 
Constitution of Canton of Bern of June 6, 1993 (Cst-BE).
34 ROHNER GABRIELA,  Die Wirksamkeit von Volksinitiativen im Bund. 1848–2010 
(Zürich/Basel/Genf 2012), p. 249–257 (cit. ROHNER).
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In contrast to the described indirect procedure, within a direct initiative 
procedure the citizens’  initiative bypasses the legislature and is  placed 
directly  on  a  ballot;  there  is  no  mutual  give  and  take  between  the 
parliament and citizens35.
2.2.4 The normative level of referendums
Referendums  generally  refer  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  parliament.  This 
means an issue can only be subject to a popular vote if it is within the 
remit of the parliament. Regardless of the initiator of a single mechanism, 
the issue of a referendum can affect an amendment of constitutional or 
statutory (law) provisions. In some countries referendums are also used for 
other issues. Referendums can be held to dissolve the parliament, to recall 
the president or even for questions on the budget, and to grant public 
credits.
2.3 Constraints on mechanism of direct democracy
After these theoretical explanations, it can be summarised that the current 
model of direct democracy is a set of legislative processes on public issues 
that  enables  citizens  to  make  political  decisions  in  conjunction  with 
(plebiscites,  authorities’  referendums,  mandatory  referendums),  against 
(citizens’ facultative referendums) or without their elected representatives 
(citizens’ initiative). It can be argued that the more citizens are able to 
control  a referendum mechanism (asking and triggering) and the more 
binding its result, the more popular sovereignty is realised in a democracy. 
Which different mechanisms of direct democracy a country has,  if  any, 
depends on its constitutional arrangements (rules in form). And how some 
of  these  tools  are  being  used (rules  in  use)  results  from the  strategic 
context wherein political actors act. The effect of referendums differs not 
only according to their initiator, character, intention, normative level and 
controlling  features  but  also  according  to  their  further  precise  formal 
arrangements. Some procedural provisions can affect the implementation 
so  strongly  that  even  a  veto  player  (mainly  the  citizenry,  by  citizens’ 
initiative) who is in full control of the referendum (asking/triggering) loses 
the ability to veto the legislative outcome even before it  is possible to 
cancel out the other veto players from the political game. In other words, 
procedural details can create an additional institutional framework wherein 
a veto player’s nature of full control becomes superfluous. It is therefore 
important  to  note  that  within  a  single  type  of  mechanism  of  direct 
democracy  further  procedural  differences  and  formal  hurdles  with 
35 See also: IRI, p. 232, 233, 234, 237; IRI, Monitor, p. 28.
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significant consequences can exist. To say it in  DAVID ALTMAN’s words, the 
devil is in the institutional detail36. And any detailed institutional provision, 
such  as  restrictions  on  turnout  and  approval,  time  limits,  signature 
collection,  specific  rules  for  consideration  of  a  referendum  (e.g. 
preliminary or legality check37), or even the exclusion of some policy areas 
from being subject of a popular vote, might be a further cause diminishing 
the potential for policy change. And the more formal restrictions there are 
within  a  direct  democratic  mechanism,  the  greater  the  constraints  on 
popular sovereignty.
It  can  therefore  be  assumed  that  any  additional  obstacle  to  direct 
democratic  procedure  leads  to  disappointment  and,  consequently,  to  a 
lack of interest in direct democracy among the people. In some countries 
obstacles such as the quorums, for instance, are established to foster both 
the participation and the legitimacy of the vote. However, they are more 
contraproductive than conducive to referendums and to direct democracy 
as a whole, as well. For the opponents of a referendum, quorums create an 
incentive to not participate in the corresponding ballot in order to void the 
outcome. Further, they impede every fertile political discourse that could 
arise  between two political  poles,  and  that  could  have  strengthened a 
participatory culture, since democracy relies on a diversity of opinion that 
are potentially controversial. Within a direct democratic system not only 
the  result  of  the  referendum has  to  be  legitimate  but  also  the  whole 
procedure, since a legitimate procedure that allows every single eligible 
citizen to be part of direct legislation automatically generates legitimate 
outcomes.
Thus, in the following chapters I do not only consider the mechanisms of 
direct democracy in the Baltic States according to their initiator, character, 
intention, normative level and controlling features but also according to 
further precise formal requirements that may diminish the people’s will. 
Tables  have  been  created  to  outline  all  possible  direct  democratic 
institutional  arrangements  for  each  Baltic  State.  Each  table  gives  a 
structured  overview  of  both  the  formal  rules  and  the  use  of  direct 
democracy since the beginning of 1990s. 
36 ALTMANN, p. 18.
37 By the parliament, committee or courts.
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3 Legal  framework  and  practice  of  direct  democracy  in 
Estonia
3.1 Direct democratic instruments in Estonia
Direct democracy is not a new occurrence in Estonia. At national level the 
right of referendums and even of citizens’ initiatives were already provided 
by  the  1920  constitution,  but  in  1935  the  interim  president  abolished 
these  from the  constitution,  and  only  the  provision  of  the  presidential 
plebiscite was left38. In the end of 1980s, as the disengagement from the 
Soviets  began,  Estonian  direct  democracy  underwent  a  revival.  The 
implementation act of the 1992 constitution also contained provisions for 
citizen-initiated referendums, but only for a limited time of three years39. 
The wave of transition was not strong enough to maintain it beyond this 
period. Today, it is true that the current constitution requires the supreme 
power to be exercised by citizens with the right to vote by electing the 
Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu) and through a referendum40. However, a 
referendum as it has been framed in the new constitution can merely be 
activated automatically or top down (see Table 1)41. The constitution does 
still not provide for referendums initiated by citizens. The people (around 
913,000  eligible  citizens42)  are  introduced  into  the  decision-making 
process as an additional veto player as long as there are parliamentary 
plebiscites or referendums that are required by the constitution. How and 
according  to  which  procedure  such  referendums  have  to  be  held  is 
provided by the Estonian ‘Referendum Act’ (ERA) that entered into force 
April  6,  200243.  This law itself  may be passed and amended only by a 
majority  of  the  members  of  the  Riigikogu44.  The  management  of  the 
administration  of  direct  democracy  mechanisms  is  conducted  by  the 
National Electoral Committee (NEC)45. It should be noted that for all kinds 
38 RUUS JÜRI, Estonia, in: KAUFMANN BRUNO/WATERS DANE M. (eds.), Direct Democracy 
in  Europe.  A  Comprehensive  Reference  Guide  to  the  Initiative  and 
Referendum  Process  in  Europe  (Durham  2004),  S.  54  (cit.  RUUS in 
KAUFMANN/WATERS).
39 Art. 8, par. 2, Law on the Application of the Constitution of June 28, 1992 
(LAC);  MIKKEL EVALD/PRIDHAM GEOFFREY,  Clinching  the  'Return  to  Europe':  The 
Referendums on EU Accession in Estonia and Latvia, West European Politics 
27(4)/2004, p. 728 (cit. MIKKEL/PRIDHAM).
40 Art. 56, par. 1 and 2 of the Constitution of Republic of Estonia of July 3, 
1992 (CE).
41 See also RUUS, Estonia, p. 48 f.
42 See,  http://www.vvk.ee/voting-methods-in-estonia/engindex/statistics 
(accessed on 24.04.2012).
43 See, Art. 106, sec. 2 CE.
44 Art. 104 CE.
45 Art. 12, par. 1, sec. 1 Estonian Referendum Act of April 6, 2002 (ERA).
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of referendums there are some restrictions concerning the time. As the 
ERA states, it is forbidden to initiate or to hold a referendum during a state 
of emergency or a state of war. Neither should a referendum be held at a 
time when fewer than 90 days remain before parliamentary elections46.
Before we consider the particular referendum mechanisms, it should be 
noted  that  Estonia  is  a  uni-cameral  parliamentary  system  with  101 
representatives47. The president of the state is elected by the parliament48. 
However, he/she has a ceremonial role and the executive power is rather 
vested  in  the  government  of  the  republic49.  In  connection  with  direct 
democracy there is  a particular  function that  the judicial  power has to 
adopt. The Supreme Court is able to repeal the resolution of the Riigikogu 
concerning  submission  of  a  draft  act  or  other  national  issue  to  a 
referendum50.  According to the article 152 of the Estonian Constitution, 
‘the Supreme Court shall declare invalid any law or other legislation that is 
in conflict with the provisions and spirit of the Constitution’. Further, if the 
president  of  the  republic  refuses  to  proclaim  a  law  passed  by  the 
parliament,  he can return it  together with a reasoned resolution to the 
Riigikogu for a new debate and decision, as is indicated in art. 107 CE. If 
the parliament again passes the returned law unamended, the president 
shall  then  proclaim  the  law  or  shall  propose  that  the  Supreme  Court 
declare the law unconstitutional.
3.1.1 Referendums required by the constitution
3.1.1.1 The mandatory constitutional referendum 
The Estonian mandatory referendum is a proactive tool with the purpose 
of changing the status quo at the utmost normative level. According to 
article 162 CE, any change of provisions of chapter I (Art. 1-7) ‘General 
Provisions’,  which  establish  the  legal  basis  of  Estonia  as  a  democratic 
independent state, and any amendment of provisions of chapter XV (Art. 
161-168) ‘Amendment of  the Constitution’  of  the constitution require a 
mandatory referendum. This means that the Riigikogu is obliged to submit 
such modifications to a popular vote automatically. Indeed, the automatic 
referendum introduces the people into the political game as one additional 
veto player. However, it does not authorise them to ask the question nor 
does it enable them to trigger the referendum. It should also be noted that 
46 Art. 3, par. 3 ERA, see also Art. 161, sec. 2 CE.
47 Art. 60, par. 1 CE.
48 Art. 78 CE.
49 Art. 86 CE.
50 Art. 8, par. 1 first sentence ERA.
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the range of Estonian automatic referendums, which are open to a direct 
democratic process, is relatively narrow. As mentioned before, only few 
constitutional provisions have to be submitted to popular vote. At least, 
there  are  no  further  procedural  restrictions  that  would  constrain  the 
sovereignty  of  the  people.  No  specific  threshold  is  needed  for  the 
participation, and the decision of the people in favour of the referendum 
has to be supported by a majority (over 50 %) of those who participate in 
the voting51. The decision of the citizenry is binding for all public bodies52. 
In case of a negative outcome of the ballot the corresponding issue cannot 
be initiated within one year after its rejection53.
3.1.2 Referendums from above
Beside  the  mandatory  referendum  that  is  needed  for  amendments  of 
chapter  I  and  XV  of  the  constitution,  there  is  also  a  top-down  direct 
democratic  mechanism  (three  different  institutions)  in  Estonia,  namely 
parliamentary  plebiscites  for  draft  acts  to  constitutional  amendments, 
draft acts and other national issues54. As the article 105, sec. 1 CE states, 
it is the parliament that is entitled to submit a bill or other national issue 
to a referendum55.  Following this wording the referendum can either be 
proactive to allow a policy change or reactive to keep the status quo56. In 
conjunction  with  article  65,  par.  2  CE,  the  authority  over  triggering  a 
referendum remains exclusively with the parliament. That means it is up 
to the Riigikogu to decide whether to  hold a referendum or not57.  This 
optionality of the top-down referendums further becomes obvious when 
we consider article 163 CE. Due to this provision, the constitution – other 
chapters  than chapter I  and XV58 –  shall  either be amended by an act 
which has been passed by a referendum or by two successive sessions of 
the parliament. For all three types of plebiscites, the parliament is the one 
public authority that is also enabled to frame the proposal. One exception 
51 See Art. 2, par. 1 third sentence ERA.
52 Art. 4 ERA.
53 Art. 168 CE.
54 See Art. 1, par. 1 second sentence ERA.
55 See also Art. 65, par. 2 CE; LIIVIK ERO, Legitimacy through Direct Democracy 
in  the  EU  Member  State.  Direct  Democratic  Initiatives  in  the  Estonian 
Parliament, Proceedings of the Institute for European Studies 8/2010, p. 89 
(cit.  LIIVIK,  Legitimacy);  MIKKO LAGERSPETZ/MAIER KONRAD,  Das politische System 
Estlands, in: ISMAYR WOLFGANG (eds.), Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas, 3rd 
edition (Wiesbaden 2010), p. 95 (cit. MIKKO/MAIER).
56 See also Art. 128, par. 2, sec. 2 of the Riigikogu Rules of Procedures and 
Internal Rules Act of February 11, 2003 (RRPIRA).
57 Art. 6, par. 1 ERA.
58 See HOFFMANN, Baltikum, p. 311.
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to this rule is the right of the president. According to the constitution, the 
right to initiate (in the sense of asking) a constitutional amendment is also 
vested with the president59.
Despite  the  possibility  of  holding  parliamentary  plebiscites  over  those 
further issues, there are still some restrictions on the range of its objects. 
‘Issues regarding the budget, taxation, financial obligations of the state, 
ratification  or  termination  of  international  treaties,  the  declaration  or 
termination  of  a  state  of  emergency,  or  national  defence’  as  declared 
under article 106 CE shall not be submitted to a referendum60.
For  the  approval  of  parliamentary  plebiscites,  formally  there  is  no 
minimum participation requirement necessary61.  A law that passes by a 
majority of the participants in the voting has promptly to be proclaimed by 
the president of the republic. The decision of the referendum is binding on 
all state institutions62 and it cannot be changed, nor can it be declared null 
and void through the parliament63.
3.1.2.1 The parliamentary constitutional plebiscite
The parliamentary constitutional plebiscite is an instrument to amend the 
constitution by popular vote in regular  cases.  According to article 161, 
section 1 CE, initiating constitutional amendments rests with not less than 
one-fifth of the membership of the Riigikogu and with the president of the 
republic64.  One should be aware that initiating a constitutional draft act 
does  not  necessarily  mean  submitting  it  at  the  same  time  to  a 
referendum. The triggering can automatically happen if such an initiated 
draft act is subject of ‘General Provisions’ and of the Chapter ‘Amendment 
of the Constitution’65. Otherwise three-fifth of the parliamentary votes are 
necessary  to  submit  the  proposal  to  amend  the  constitution  to  a 
referendum66. A popular vote has to be held not earlier than three months 
after  the passage of  a  resolution to  this  effect  by the Riigikogu67.  The 
constitutional  plebiscite  has  to  be  adopted  by  the  majority  of  the 
participants. An amendment to the constitution regarding the same issue 
59 Art. 161, sec. 1 CE.
60 See Art. 1, par. 1 and 2 ERA.
61 MIKKEL/PRIDHAM, p. 728.
62 Art. 105, sec. 2–3 CE, see also Art. 2, par. 1 and Art. 4 ERA.
63 LIIVIK, Legitimacy, 89.
64 See also Art. 78, par. 8 CE, Art. 103, par. 5 CE and Art. 122, par. 1 RRPIRA.
65 See Art. 162 CE.
66 See Art. 164 CE.
67 Art. 164 second sentence CE.
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that has been rejected by the parliament or by a referendum may not be 
re-launched within one year68.
As stated,  constitutional  amendments can also asked by the president. 
However, he or she is not entitled to submit the proposal to a referendum. 
For the triggering he/she needs the cooperation of the parliament. This 
division  of  controlling  the  parliamentary  constitutional  plebiscite  is  an 
essential characteristic of a system of checks and balances. The mutual 
control  even  exists  within  the  parliamentary  constitutional  plebiscite 
mechanism, as the framing and triggering require two different quotas of 
members of parliament.
3.1.2.2 The  parliamentary  plebiscite  for  other  draft  acts  and  
national issues
Except constitutional plebiscites, the Riigikogu can also submit other draft 
acts or national issues to a referendum, as indicated above69. Initiating a 
referendum in order to pass a draft act or decide on other national issues 
rests with members, factions and committees of the parliament70. Besides 
parliamentary organs, also the government of the republic is entitled to 
initiate laws71.  In order to submit a draft  act for laws or other national 
issues to a  referendum, a majority of the votes of the members of the 
parliament  in  favour  is  required72.  As  in  the  case  of  parliamentary 
constitutional  plebiscites, there is no unique political  actor who has full  
control over the referendum procedure. Asking and triggering are made by 
two different parliamentary groups.
A plebiscite for draft acts and other national issues has to be supported by 
the majority of the participants in the vote73. However, there is a confusing 
provision for a referendum on draft acts. The fourth section of the article 
105 CE establishes ‘if a bill which is submitted to a referendum does not 
receive a majority of votes in favour, the president of the republic shall 
declare extraordinary elections to the Riigikogu’74. This means, in case of a 
negative  outcome  the  whole  parliament  has  to  be  dissolved  and  new 
elections set.  Such a provision does not exist for referendums on other 
national issues75.
68 Art. 168 CE.
69 Art. 105, sec. 1 CE.
70 Art. 128, par. 1, section 1–3 RRPIRA; see also Art. 103, par. 1–3 CE.
71 Art. 103, par. 4 CE.
72 Art. 129, par. 7 and Art. 130, par. 2 RRPIRA.
73 Art. 105, sec. 2 CE.
74 see also Art. 78, par. 3 CE and Art. 64 ERA.
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As LIIVIK and many Estonian scholars correctly note, section 4 of article 105 
CE curbs the parliament’s enthusiasm and leads to a hesitation of its will 
to  put  any  draft  acts  to  a  referendum76.  From a  political  viewpoint,  a 
deputy  avoids  supporting  such  referendum  intentions  because  of  the 
uncertainty of the re-election. It is risky to hold a referendum if the issue 
put to it might not reach the majority of the participants who would be in 
favour of it in the voting, and new parliamentary elections may have to be 
held. Estonian legal scholars agree that such a rule as mentioned above 
will make the rest of the article 105 CE superfluous77. It is also important 
to note that this provision, which causes extraordinary elections, clearly 
goes  far  beyond  any  sense  of  direct  democracy.  Such  large  political 
consequences  of  a  negative  outcome  of  a  single  referendum  do  not 
appear to be appropriate, especially if it refers to an amendment to a law.
3.1.3 Citizen-initiated referendums
Citizen-initiated  referendums  were  present  in  the  Estonian  constitution 
before 194078. Article 87 of the constitution of 1920 foresaw some bottom-
up mechanisms for the Estonian people. Due to the authoritarian regime, 
however, it had never worked in practice79. Also, the implementation act of 
the  constitution  enabled  the  10,000  eligible  citizens  to  initiate 
amendments  to  the  constitution  during  the  three  years  following  the 
adoption of the constitution by a popular vote in 199280. Within this period 
one  draft  act  on  amending  the  constitution  with  two  aims  (fixing  the 
retirement and popular elections of the president) was proposed by the 
Estonian citizens. However, the parliament rejected their proposal81 since, 
legally, it was not obliged to submit it to a popular vote82.
There is no such provision in the current constitution. The Estonian people 
do not possess the right to initiate proposals. According to the article 162 
CE,  general  provisions  and  the  chapter  on  ‘Amendment  of  the 
Constitution’  must  be  put  to  a  referendum.  However,  the  Estonian 
constitution  contains  no  explicit  rules  about  popular  initiatives  from 
75 LIIVIK ERO,  Referendum  in  the  Estonian  Constitution:  Historical  and 
Comparative Constitutional Aspects, Juridica International XVIII/2011, p. 26 
(cit. LIIVIK, Referendum).
76 LIIVIK, Legitimacy, p. 89; LIIVIK, Referendum, p. 25.
77 See LIIVIK, Legitimacy, p. 89.
78 LIIVIK Referendum, p. 19.
79 RUUS in KAUFMANN/WATERS, p. 54.
80 Art. 8, par. 2 LAC.
81 LIIVIK, Legitimacy, p. 91.
82 Art. 8, par. 1 and 2 LAC.
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below83. As noted before, pursuant to article 103, par. 1–5, CE the right to 
initiate a law is exclusively limited to a member, a faction or a committee 
of the Riigikogu, as well as to the government and the president of the 
republic.  And  the  right  to  initiate  a  referendum  is  limited  to  a 
parliamentary member, a faction and committee84. From this point of view, 
it can be assumed that the Estonian people have limited authority over 
direct democratic politics. Indeed, due to required referendums or possible 
parliamentary  plebiscites,  Estonians  are  introduced  into  the  legislative 
procedure as one additional veto player. But, the arrangements of direct 
democratic  rules  in  the  Republic  of  Estonia  are  not  strong  enough  to 
exercise  the  supreme  power  in  full,  and  hence  Estonians  continue  to 
remain theoretical holders of political power.
Several attempts have been made by different parts of the parliament to 
re-introduce  citizen-initiated  referendums or  to  use  plebiscites,  as  they 
already exist, but all these attempts have been blocked by the governing 
parties or a lack of interest85. As LIIVIK' notes, three attempts (2003, 2005, 
2008) have been made to legalise the popular initiative. In the third case, 
24 deputies of the Estonian Centre Party initiated a draft act to amend the 
constitution  in  a  way  that  would  make  popular  initiatives  possible. 
According to the draft,  25,000 eligible citizens would have the right  to 
initiate an act. An amendment of the constitution by the popular initiative 
was not foreseen. And as for parliamentary plebiscites for draft acts, some 
issues as listed under art. 106 CE would also have been excluded from the 
range of issues of a popular vote. Nevertheless, the draft act to legalise 
the  popular  initiative  has  been  rejected  by  previous  members  of  the 
Estonian Parliament86.
83 RUUS, Estonia, p. 49.
84 Art. 129, par. 6 RRPIRA.
85 LIIVIK, Legitimacy, p. 91 ff.
86 LIIVIK, Legitimacy, p 91 f.
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INSTITUTION SUBJECT MATTER
SUBMITTED 
DUE TO CHARACTER INTENTION
POL. ACTOR / VETO-PLAYER1 FORMAL RESTRICTIONS FOR USE











to alter the 
provisions of 
chapter I and 
XV of the 
constitution










to amend the 
constitution in 
regular cases
parliament binding proactive / reactive
>1/5 of the 
parliament9 or 
president
>3/5 of the 
parliament no
>50% of 
participants3 – – – yes









>1/2 of the 
parliament no
>50% of 
participants4 – – – yes





to initiate a 






>1/2 of the 
parliament no
>50% of 
participants – – – yes
8 0 / 0 / 0
BOTTOM-UP5
– – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Total Votes 4 / 3 / 0
Remarks
1: The possibility of a referendum introduces the citizens as one additional veto player into the public legislative process. A veto player is an individual or collective actor whose agreement is needed for a change in the legislative  
status quo. If an existing or latent veto player controls both the framing of the proposal and the triggering of the referendum, other veto players lose their ability to veto outcomes, the number of veto players decreases and potential  
of policy change increases (HUG/TSEBELIS, 2002)
2: q / a / ai = quantity of referendums / approved / approved but invalid due to precise formal restrictions
3: In case of a negative outcome the corresponding issue cannot be initiated within one year after its rejection
4: If a bill submitted to referendum does not receive the majority of the votes in favour, the president shall declare extraordinary elections to the parliament. This legal provision is deemed a further formal restriction.
5: The implementation act of the 1992 constitution provided under Art. 8, sec. 2 the right of popular initiative for constitutional amendments for three years
6: One of them refers to the referendum on independence (1991)
7: Time limits: no referendums during a state of emergency or a state of war. And no referendums should be held when less than 90 days remain until parliamentary elections
8: Issues according to Art. 106 CE
9: The Estonian single-chamber parliament has 101 members (Art. 60 CE)
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3.2 Estonian direct democracy in practice
Estonia  is  a  weak  practitioner  of  direct  democracy.  According  to  the  c2d 
database87, from 1991 to 2012 four referendums have been held there (see also 
Table 1 and Figure 1). It should be noted that only one referendum has been held 
after the approval of the new constitution; the other three referendums had been 
held before. Of these four referendums, three succeeded in full, while one popular 
vote failed.
Figure 1:
The  referendum  on  independence  and  two  referendums  concerning  the 
constitutional  draft  during the transition period were parliamentary plebiscites 
that were framed and submitted to a vote by the parliament. By contrast, the EU 
accession referendum in 2003 was a mandatory constitutional referendum that 
had to be submitted automatically to a popular vote, as prescribed by article 162 
CE.
The number of  referendums that  have been held  in  the  last  twenty  years  is 
obviously very limited and none of them were bottom-up initiated. Issues that the 
four referendums mainly dealt with refer to the organisation of the state, such as 
national  identity,  citizens’ rights,  and the political  system or to foreign policy, 
namely, European integration. All four referendums are subject to constitutional 
norms. No proposal below constitutional normative level has been submitted to a 
referendum, although according to the article 105 CE the parliament would have 
the right to put a bill to a popular vote.
3.2.1 The referendum of 3 March 1991 on Estonia’s independence
The parliamentary plebiscite  on independence that  was held  in  a critical  and 
volatile time shows that the Baltic States did not want to be a part of the new 
87 Results on c2d database: www.c2d.ch (accessed on 19.12.2012).
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Soviet  Union.  In  the beginning of  1990s,  Michael  Gorbachev was increasingly 
squeezed between democrats,  reformers, and independence-oriented republics 
on the one side and a sceptical and recalcitrant party and ‘apparat’ on the other 
side. To obtain the authority he needed to keep the Soviet Union intact he turned 
to the public. Gorbachev tried to exert pressure on the fifteen Soviet Republics88 
to sign a new ‘Union Treaty’ by holding a referendum on the preservation of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 17 March 1991. But, the parliaments of the 
Baltic States, Georgia, Armenia and Moldavia demonstrated their ability to avert 
this  Muscovite  claim  by  adopting  resolutions  against  the  union  referendum. 
Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Georgia  and  Armenia  went  even  further  and  held 
referendums  on  independence  in  their  own  way89.  And  Moldavia  boycotted 
Gorbachev’s referendum that intended to keep the Soviet Union in one piece90. 
The nine other republics took the more moderate but still disruptive step of either 
changing the question of Gorbachev’s union referendum or adding questions of 
their own91.
In Estonia, the question that was put to the referendum was: ‘Are you in favour of 
re-establishing  the  national  independence  of  the  Republic  of  Estonia?’  The 
required  turnout  of  50  percent  had  been  exceeded,  with  82.9  percent 
participating in the vote. 78.4 percent of the voters voted in favour of national 
independence and a no-vote was cast by 21.6 percent of those answering the 
question92. The percentage of those voting against independence shows the loyal 
and pro-union forces among the adult population of Estonia93. The fact that more 
than 20 percent of the citizens voted against the independence of Estonia is too 
large a minority to be ignored. Insofar, it is an essential task for the new Estonian 
State to integrate them peacefully into the legal and social life.
3.2.2 The referendum of 28 June 1992 on the constitution
After  Estonia  regained  independence,  a  constitutional  assembly,  which  was 
composed of 30 members elected by the Estonian Congress and 30 members 
elected by the Supreme Council, prepared a draft constitution to restore Estonia’s 
statehood of the basis of legal succession. The question was to define what kind 
of nation-state Estonia should be, what form of government it should have and 
what policies should be followed. With regard to the form of government, four 
proposals  were  discussed.  At  the  end,  the  general  assembly  decided  for  a 
parliamentary system with a moderate presidency. The constitution was put to 
the  people  on  28  June  199294.  To  be  approved,  a  minimum  of  50  percent 
88 Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Georgia,  Armenia,  Moldavia,  Kazakhstan,  Kirghizia, 
Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan.
89 RUUS,  Estonia,  p.  51;  RUUS in  KAUFMANN/WATERS,  p.  56; see also  BRADY HENRY E./KAPLAN 
CYNTHIA S., Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, in: BUTLER DAVID/RANNEY AUSTIN 
(eds.),  Referendums  around  the  World.  The  Groving  Use  of  Direct  Democracy 
(Washington D.C. 1994), p. 186–201. (zit. BRADY/KAPLAN).
90 The Referendum Scorecard, The Economist [London, England], 23 March 1991, p. 
62.
91 BRADY/KAPLAN, p. 187 f.
92 Detailed results on c2d database, http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=38754 
(accessed on 21.06.2012).
93 RUUS, Estonia, p. 52.
94 RUUS, Estonia, p. 53 f.; RUUS in KAUFMANN/WATERS, p. 57;  MOLE RICHARD C. M., The Baltic 
States from the Soviet Union to the European Union. Identity, Discourse and Power 
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participation was required. Around 67 percent of all eligible voters went to the 
polls  and  the  parliamentary  plebiscite  was  approved  by  a  majority  of  92 
percent95.
3.2.3 The referendum of 28 June 1992 on voting rights for those who 
do not yet have citizenship status
In addition to the referendum question on the Estonian constitution that was put 
to the people, eligible Estonian citizens were also asked whether people who had 
applied for citizenship before 5 June 1992 should obtain the right to participate in 
the  first  parliamentary  and  presidential  elections  after  the  ratification  of  the 
constitution. The parliamentary plebiscite, however, was defeated by a vote of 53 
percent96.
Putting the additional question to the vote and the subsequent rejection by the 
people caused some domestic and foreign policy conflicts. The West interpreted 
the no-decision of  the voters  as  a discrimination against  Russians residing in 
Estonia and as a violation of their human rights97. Concerning integration of the 
minorities, as already mentioned above, the additional question may not have 
been a wise step towards fostering a peaceful coexistence.
3.2.4 The referendum of 14 September 2003 on the accession to the 
European Union
Since the constitution came into force, the referendum on Estonia's accession to 
the European Union has been the only official popular vote. Before Estonia joined 
the  European  Union  some parts  of  the  constitution  had  to  be  altered98.  The 
Estonian parliament submitted one single question and enacted a constitutional 
law for the accession to the European Union according to the articles 105, 162, 
163,  164  and  167  of  the  constitution.  The  ballot  question  of  the  mandatory 
constitutional referendum that was put to popular vote stated: 'Are you in favour 
of accession to the European Union and the amendments to the Constitution of 
the  Republic  of  Estonia?'  Only  Estonian  citizens  had the  right  to  vote  and  a 
significant number of Russian minorities were left out99. A yes vote was cast by 
66.8 percent, with a turnout of 64.1 percent100. According to some opinion polls, 
the Estonian people were initially sceptical about joining the EU101. The final result 
in the Post-Communist Transition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (London/New York 
2012), p. 96 (cit. MOLE).
95 c2d database, http://  www.  c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?  
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=37908 
(accessed on 21.06.2012).
96 Results on c2d database, http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=38964 
(accessed on 22.06.2012).
97 RUUS, Estonia, p. 55; Leftovers, The Economist [London, England], 18 July 1992, p. 
41.
98 LIIVIK, Legitimacy, p. 89.
99 MIKKEL/PRIDHAM, p. 729.
100 see c2d database, http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=37874 
(accessed on 22.06.2012).
101 Compare  PETTAI VELLO,  Estonia,  European Journal of Political  Research 43/2004, p. 
997 (cit. PETTAI); VETIK RAIVO, Elite vs. People? Eurospceptic Public Opinion in Estonia, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 16(2)/2003, p. 258 (cit. VETIK).
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of 66.8 percent yes votes could however be seen as a solid approval of European 
Integration102.  Liivik’s  answer to  this  change of  voter  opinion is  based on the 
referendum’s essential function itself. According to him, the referendum, for one, 
substantially  increased the  citizens’  factual  knowledge about  the  EU and the 
country’s real  political  choices through debates or newly available information 
sharing. And secondly, it was the instrument that had legitimized the process of 
decision-making about integration into the EU. It should also be mentioned that 
there  was  a  huge  pro-accession  campaign  made  possible  by  considerable 
financial resources spent by the Estonian government and the local EU delegation 
office103.  Compared  to  other  EU  citizens,  Estonians  now  are  more  optimistic 
concerning the EU, as the Eurobarometer survey (No. 73, Spring 2010) shows. 
They have a great deal of confidence in the EU104.
3.2.5 Rejected draft acts in the Estonian parliament
In addition to the referendum on EU accession, the parties of the Riigikogu put 
forward two other draft acts. But, the majority of the parliament rejected both 
proposals. One draft act concerned legalizing direct presidential elections and the 
other aimed to hinder the privatisation of the Estonian electric power plants by 
international investors105.
Since  then  there  have  been other  attempts  by  different  parties  to  put  some 
issues  to  a  referendum,  but  these  have  also  been  rejected:  policies  about 
developing nuclear energy or holding extraordinary elections of the parliament. 
The Estonian Green Party managed to get into the Riigikogu in 2007, and two 
years later they initiated a draft bill  to enact local popular initiatives, by both 
submitting new bills and vetoing the acts in force. The Estonian Green Party is 
one of the strongest supporters of direct democracy, aiming to contribute to the 
people’s  participation  in  the  local  decision-making  process,  and  by  doing  so, 
reducing the people’s alienation from power and the governing processes106.
3.3 Explanations for the Estonian practice
After the overview of the existing practice of direct democracy, it can be argued 
that referendums have only rarely been held within the last two decades. There 
are two main factors that explain the low frequency of this direct democratic 
instrument. From a structural  view, it  is  the institutional  legal  framework that 
constrains  the  citizens’  ability  to  be  directly  involved  in  the  public  decision-
making procedure. And from an informal approach, it is the political culture of 
elites  and  voters.  Those  with  political  influence  and  governing  parties  in  the 
parliament showed little interest in applying and extending direct democracy, as 
yet.  Post-communist  elites  have  been  extremely  hesitant  about  using 
referendums107.  Generally,  the  use  of  direct  democratic  instruments  and  the 
extension of newer institutions depend on how the political elite and the recent 
constitutional framework interact.
102 MIKKEL/PRIDHAM, p. 716.
103 PETTAI, p. 997.
104 LIIVIK, Legitimacy, p. 90 f.
105 LIIVIK, Legitimacy, p. 92.
106 LIIVIK, Legitimacy, p. 92 f.
107 MIKKEL/PRIDHAM, p. 728.
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3.3.1 Legal constraints
Structural  factors,  such  as  formal  institutions,  are  legal  rules  that  shape  the 
public  actors’  behaviour  within  a  procedure  in  different  ways.  With  regard  to 
direct democratic mechanisms in Estonia there are four main factors affecting the 
citizens’ participation in legislation. The first shaping factor stems from the type 
of direct democracy mechanism itself. As shown above, in Estonia referendums 
are either initiated by constitution or by parliament top down. Hence, Estonian 
direct  democracy  is  a  parliamentary  plebiscite,  wherein  the  majority  of  the 
Riigikogu decides if and, if yes, when and which issue shall be submitted to a 
referendum.  The  lack  of  citizen-initiated  referendum  arrangements  in  the 
constitution apparently constricts the use of direct democracy and thus the will of 
the people. All attempts from the opposition parties to modify the constitution in 
order  to  legalise  the  popular  initiative  nationwide  have  been  rejected  by 
governing majorities in the Riigikogu.
A second constitutional constraint concerns the subject matter of a referendum. 
There are many restrictions on the range of issues. Indeed, referring to the article 
162, an automatic referendum happens if the chapters ‘General Provisions’ and 
‘Amendment of the Constitution’ have to be amended. Estonian legal provisions 
on referendums not only exclude a certain number of constitutional issues from 
being  subject  to  a  popular  vote  but  also  further  statutory  issues  concerning 
budget, taxation, financial obligations of the states, ratification and termination 
of international treaties, the declaration or termination of a state of emergency or 
national defence108. Some of these issues would presumably deserve to be part of 
a  direct  democratic  mechanism  as  they  directly  shape  the  daily  life  of  the 
citizens.
A third limitation of the application of direct democracy concerns the interaction 
of the legal framework with governing elites. Indeed, the Riigikogu could submit a 
bill or other national issues to a referendum as indicated in Art. 105, sec 1 CE. 
But at the same time the fourth section requires the dissolution of the parliament 
if  such a draft  put to referendum does not receive a majority of  the votes in 
favour. The analysis of the Estonian practice thus approves the assumption that 
‘no parliament would risk holding a referendum if the issue put to it may fail and 
new parliamentary elections may have to be held’109. The last restriction caused 
by institutional arrangements refers to time limits. On the one hand, there is a 
waiting  period  of  one  year  for  the  same  constitutional  issue  that  has  been 
rejected by the parliament or by a referendum110. On the other hand, for any kind 
of referendum it is prohibited to hold a popular vote when less than 90 days 
remain until parliamentary elections111. Regarding formal restrictions, Estonia can 
in any case be commended for its turnout and approval requirements. At least 
these  legal  provisions  do  not  make  the  citizens’  access  to  direct  democracy 
difficult. Both required and referendums from above do not have to meet high 
approval requirements in order to be valid. Nor has a participation quorum to be 
met. The status quo can already be overturned if the majority of the participants 
are in favour of a policy change.
108 See, Art. 106 CE.
109 LIIVIK, Legitimacy, p. 89.
110 Art. 168 CE.
111 Art. 3, par. 3 ERA.
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3.3.2 Informal constraints
Although  the  Estonian  constitution  constrains  the  use  of  direct  democracy 
formally,  the  Estonian  political  parties  in  parliament  were  free  to  open 
constitutional provisions towards more direct democracy. But, after independence 
Baltic  elites  established  a  new  political  and  societal  order  wherein  no  direct 
democratic procedures were present to constrain their legal preferences. They 
were relatively free to define the legal framework wherein they wanted to act as 
a  political  authority.  This  was  also  the  case  in  Estonia.  Nowadays  the  new 
institutions have become more useful  for  the political  parties and not  for the 
Estonian people112. In other words, Estonian institutions of direct democracy that 
have been generated are restrictive and they continue to exclude some political 
actors, such as the voters, from the direct decision-making process. By contrast, 
political  establishment  is  continuing  to  gain  advantage  from  the  existing 
arrangements.
As  ERO LIIVIK points out,  political elites in Estonia have showed little interest in 
strengthening  direct  democracy,  as  yet;  they  rather  support  representative 
parliamentary democracy. Moreover, as he notes, the Estonian proportional party 
system is working rather in a majoritarian decision-making style. Negotiating with 
the  opposition  to  find  a  consensus  is  considered  as  a  sign  of  weakness  in 
Estonian  political  culture113.  On  the  other  hand,  most  political  parties  still 
perceive, in an elitist  sense, that more progressive policies would be attained 
within  a  framework  of  representative  institutions114.  Finally,  a  major  issue 
impeding direct democracy is  a political  question:  Any enhancement of  direct 
democracy  such  as  legalising  citizen-initiated  referendums  (e.g.  citizens’ 
facultative  referendum  and  citizens’  initiative)  by  the  political  elite  would 
simultaneously imply a restriction of their own existing authority. Hence, even if 
there is a stronger civil society than twenty years ago and even if there are some 
democratic  shifts  towards  a  new  political  culture  after  the  break  with  the 
communist past, the current constitution as it is framed and the majority of the 
elite are still denying their citizens access to a more radical direct legislation.
112 MØLLER, p. 291 f.
113 LIIVIK, Legitimacy, p. 94 ff.
114 RUUS, Estonia, p. 60.
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4 Legal framework and practice of direct democracy in Latvia
4.1 Direct democratic instruments in Latvia
The  current  constitution  (Satversme)  of  the  unitary  parliamentary  (100 
representatives115)  Republic  of  Latvia,  which  had  been  adapted  by  the 
Constitutional  Assembly of Latvia on 15 February 1922 and renewed in 1993, 
confers on the Latvian citizens not only the right to participate in parliamentary 
elections but also to take part in national referendums, as stated by article 80 of  
the  constitution  of  Latvia  (CLv).  Compared  to  Estonia,  there  are  not  only 
automatic or top-down referendums but also some arrangements for bottom-up 
direct democracy mechanism by which the citizens of Latvia are able to stimulate 
legislation process actively116. According to the article 64 of the Satversme, ‘the 
Saeima [Latvian Parliament] and also the people have the right to legislate, in 
accordance  with  the  procedures,  and  to  the  extent  provided  for  by  [the] 
Constitution’117.  All  specific  techniques  and  procedures  of  Latvian  direct 
democracy are regulated by the ‘Law on National Referendums and Legislative 
Initiatives and European Citizens' Initiative’ (LoNRLIaECI), which was adopted by 
the parliament on 31 March 1994. Since then, this law has been altered several 
times. The last extensive revision, caused inter alia by the introduction of the 
European Citizens’ Initiative, was made in November 2012. Pursuant to article 3 
of the LoNRLIaECI, the Central Election Commission of Latvia (CECLv) prepares 
and supervises national referendums.
The contemporary Latvian constitution provides a total of eight different direct 
democratic  tools (see  Table  2).  They are all  legally binding.  However,  as  GITA 
FELDHUNE notes,  neither  the  constitution  nor  the  LoNRLIaECI  provide  any  legal 
obstacles that could prevent the parliament from readopting a law that has been 
repealed by the  citizens.  In  fact,  also  a  popular  initiated  issue  adopted  by  a 
referendum could be amended by the parliament thereafter118. But, this should 
not necessarily be considered as negative. It rather reflects a vital legislation that 
can be corrected every time by both the parliament and citizens.
The eight different direct democratic instruments can be categorised into three 
mechanisms of direct democracy as follows: 
4.1.1 Referendums required by the constitution
The  Latvian  constitution  contains  two  types  of  mandatory  referendums:  a 
mandatory referendum for some specific constitutional amendments and another 
one for the accession to the European Union. Generally, such referendums are 
framed by the parliament and triggered automatically since the law prescribes its 
submission  to  a  popular  vote  for  it  to  become legally  binding.  However,  the 
framing of a mandatory referendum can also be initiated by the Latvian citizens 
since there is a proactive citizen-initiated mechanism in Latvia. In such cases we 
refer rather to citizens’ constitutional referendums.
115 Art. 5 Constitution of the Republic of Latvia of February 15, 1922 (CLv).
116 Art. 2 of  Law on National Referendums and Legislative Initiatives and European 
Citizens’ Initiative of March 31, 1994, (LoNRLIaECI) lastly amended on 8 November 
2012.
117 See also Art. 65, 78 CLv.
118 FELDHUNE p. 80.
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4.1.1.1 The mandatory constitutional referendum
The  mandatory  constitutional  referendum is  a  proactive  popular  vote  that  is 
called  automatically  under  specific  circumstances,  as  defined  in  the  Latvian 
constitution.
In  general,  any  amendment  of  a  constitutional  provision  requires  a  qualified 
majority of two-thirds of the members of parliaments who are present. And for 
any alteration, three sittings are required, wherein at least two-thirds of the total 
members  should  participate119.  A  higher  qualified  majority  than  these 
requirements  is  prescribed  for  an  amendment  of  such  issues  that  are  stated 
under article 77 CLv. According to this article, ‘if the Saeima has amended the 
first, second, third, fourth, sixth or seventy-seventh Article of the Constitution, 
such amendments, in order to come into force as law, shall be submitted to a 
national referendum’120.
The first chapter of the constitution of Latvia concerns the General Provisions. It 
constitutes the fundaments of the state, such as the form of government of the 
state  (Art.  1  CLv),  the  people's  sovereignty  (Art.  2  CLv),  domestic  territorial 
borders (Art. 3 CLv) as well as the language and national symbols of the Republic 
(Art.  4  CLv).  Any  amendment  concerning  those  articles  requires  a  national 
referendum in order to come into force as law (required referendum). This rule 
also  applies  to  the  stated  sixth  article,  which  defines  the  procedure  of  the 
parliamentary  elections  and  the  pattern  of  the  electoral  system.  Any  other 
constitutional provision is excluded from being a subject of required referendums.
A mandatory constitutional referendum on such issues has to be held not earlier 
than one month before and not later than two months after the date when the 
Saeima has adopted any of  these articles121.  According to the first  section of 
article 79 CLv, a constitutional amendment shall be adopted if at least half of the 
electorate has approved it.  There are around 1,545,000 electors122 in  Estonia. 
Without a doubt, this quorum is a very high approval  restriction that strongly 
limits  the  sense  of  direct  democracy.  Indeed,  there  is  no  formal  participation 
threshold. Nevertheless, to reach an approval of 50 percent of all voters a factual 
turnout arises and, depending on the approval quorum, it can theoretically range 
from at least 50 percent to even 100 percent. Compared to Estonian approval 
prescription (majority of the participants), the Latvian quorum for a constitutional 
amendment to be adopted is in this respect much stricter.
4.1.1.2 The mandatory referendum on EU-Accession
Until 2003 the constitution did not include any legal provisions for referendums 
on  international  matters.  With  the  aim  of  providing  a  clearer  legal  basis  for 
referendums  on  joining  the  European  Union  (EU)  or  changing  the  terms  of 
participation in the EU, and for the reason that a membership of Latvia in the EU 
would formally modify the sense of the concept of independence and sovereignty 
as they are expressed in articles 1 and 2 (CLv)123, the parliament had to amend 
119 Art. 76 CLv.
120 Art. 77 CLv; see also Art. 1, par. 1 and Art. 4, par. 1 LoNRLIaECI.
121 Art. 4, par. 2 LoNRLIaECI.
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articles  68  and  79  of  the  constitution  and  the  corresponding  law  on  8  May 
2003124.  But  this  was not  the only  reason to amend the law.  As  GATE FELDHUNE 
states, by changing the acceptance quorum the government also wanted to avoid 
risking the accession decision125. The revised article 68 CLv now stipulates that a 
‘membership  of  Latvia  in  the  European Union  shall  be decided by  a  national 
referendum, which is proposed by the Saeima’126. The new formulation of article 
68 CLv is also a legal foundation specifying that withdrawal from the EU would 
also be subject to this mandatory referendum127.
In order to be accepted, the number of the participants in the ballot must at least 
be half of the voters who had participated in the previous parliamentary election, 
and  the  referendum in  favour  of  membership  of  Latvia  in  the  EU  has  to  be 
supported  by  the  majority  of  these128.  Although  the  membership  formally 
modifies the sense of independence and popular sovereignty, the turnout and 
approval quorum for the accession referendum are less strict than the quorum for 
mandatory  constitutional  referendums  that  are  required  for  any  alteration  of 
article 1 (independence) and 2 (popular sovereignty) of the constitution.
4.1.2 Referendums from above
The Latvian constitution contains three different types of referendums that can 
optionally be asked by the public authorities. All three referendums are legally 
binding,  but with different intentions and aims.  There is  also a variation with 
regard to the actor who asks and triggers the referendum, and also with regard to 
further formal restrictions.
4.1.2.1 The parliamentary plebiscite for changes in EU membership 
The parliamentary plebiscite for changes in EU membership is the first popular 
vote  procedure  that  is  launched from above.  It  is  an  authorities’  referendum 
triggered by the parliament to confirm legal significant alterations related to EU 
membership. In addition to the automatic ‘Referendum for EU-Accession’ article 
68,  sec.  4  CLv  states  that  ‘substantial  changes  in  the  term  regarding  the 
membership  of  Latvia  in  the  European  Union  shall  be  decided  by  a  national 
referendum  if  such  a  referendum  is  requested  by  at  least  one-half  of  the 
members of the Saeima’129. With regard to its intention, this referendum can be 
both  proactive  and  reactive:  proactive  to  get  popular  legitimation  for  a 
corresponding policy change launched by the one half of the parliament and a 
reactive  plebiscite  triggered  by  the  parliamentary  opposition  to  find  popular 
support for a return to the status quo.
To  be  approved,  the  constitution  states  ‘substantial  changes  in  the  terms 
regarding  such  membership  submitted  for  a  national  referendum  shall  be 
deemed adopted if the number of voters is at least half of the number of electors 
that participated in the previous Saeima election and if the majority has voted in 
favour  of  the  draft  law,  membership  of  Latvia  in  the  European  Union  or 
124 IKSTENS JANIS,  Latvia,  European  Journal  of  Political  Research  43/2004,  p.  1056; 
MIKKEL/PRIDHAM, p. 730.
125 FELDHUNE, p. 77.
126 Art. 68, sec. 3 CLv; Art. 1, par. 5 and Art. 11, par. 3 LoNRLIaECI.
127 FELDHUNE, p. 82.
128 see Art. 79, sec. 2 CLv.
129 see Art. 68, sec. 4 CLv; Art. 1, par. 6 and Art. 11, par. 4 LoNRLIaECI.
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substantial  changes  in  the  terms  regarding  such  membership’130.  These 
requirements  are  the  same  as  asked  for  a  mandatory  referendum  on  EU 
accession.
4.1.2.2 The Semi-plebiscite on repealing a law
The semi-plebiscite on repealing a law is a direct democratic institution to abolish 
parliamentary resolutions that are below the constitutional normative level. It is a 
reactive referendum intending to sustain the status quo. In the terms of article 72 
CLv, ‘the President has the right to suspend the proclamation of a law for a period 
of  two  months.  The  President  shall  suspend  the  proclamation  of  a  law  if  so 
requested by not less than one-third of the members of the Saeima. This right 
may  be  exercised  by  the  President,  or  by  one-third  of  the  members  of  the 
Saeima, within ten days of the adoption of the law by the Saeima. The law thus 
suspended shall be put to a national referendum if so requested by not less than 
one-tenth  of  the  electorate.  If  no  such  request  is  received  during  the 
aforementioned two-month period,  the law shall  then be proclaimed after the 
expiration of such period. A national referendum shall not take place, however, if  
the  Saeima  again  votes  on  the  law  and  not  less  than  three-quarters  of  all 
members of the Saeima vote for the adoption of the law’131.  In other cases a 
national referendum for repealing the suspended law has to be held not earlier 
than  one  month  before  and  not  later  than  two  months  after  the  day  of  the 
announcement of the referendum132.
The ‘repealing referendum’ could either be considered as a plebiscite or as a 
citizens’  facultative referendum to veto a law which has been framed by the 
parliament.  However,  due  to  its  different  triggering  actors  it  is  neither  a  full 
plebiscite nor a full citizen-initiated facultative referendum. To some extent there 
is an overlapping of two mechanisms of direct democracy. On the one hand, it 
has to be triggered either by the president or by one-third of the members of the 
parliament  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  national  voting  takes  place  only  if  so 
requested by not less than one-tenth of the electorate133. It is, therefore, a joint 
action  of  oppositional  public  authorities  and  the  electorate134.  However,  since 
triggering of the referendum by the citizens can only occur if the authorities have 
called for the suspension of the proclamation of a law, I rather allocate this type 
of  referendum  –  by  naming  it  a  semi-plebiscite  –  to  the  direct  democracy 
mechanism that is launched from above. 
In case of a request to repeal the suspended parliamentary law, a limit of 30 days 
is set to collect signatures of one-tenth of the electorate135. Signatures can be 
collected  at  collection  stations  that  are  set  up  in  each  city  and  municipality. 
Legally, at least one station per 10,000 voters must be available136. However, 30 
days for collecting ten percent of the electorate’s signatures is a relatively short 
time. After the expiration of 30 days the Central Election Commission of Latvia 
(CECLv)  counts  signatures,  records  results  and  notifies  the  president  of  the 
130 Art. 79, sec. 2 CLv.
131 see also Art. 1, par. 3 LoNRLIaECI.
132 Art. 10, par. 2 LoNRLIaECI.
133 Art. 72, sec. 2 CLv; Art. 1, par. 3 LoNRLIaECI.
134 FELDHUNE, p. 80.
135 Art. 7, par. 1 LoNRLIaECI.
136 Art. 7, par. 2 LoNRLIaECI.
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results.  And if  not less than one-tenth of the eligible citizens have signed the 
signatures sheets, the CECLv then announces a national referendum within three 
days137.
Concerning the definitive abolition of such a suspended law, article 74 CLv states, 
‘a  law  adopted  by  the  Saeima  and  suspended  pursuant  to  the  procedures 
specified  in  article  seventy-two [of  the  constitution]  shall  be repealed  by  the 
national  referendum if the number of voters is at least half of  the number of 
electors that participated in the previous Saeima election and if the majority has 
voted for a repeal of the law’.
With regard to the policy area of ‘repealing referendum’, there are some issue 
restrictions,  as  required  by  article  73  CLv.  Namely,  ‘the  Budget  and  laws 
concerning  loans,  taxes,  customs duties,  railroad  tariffs,  military  conscription, 
declaration and commencement of war, peace treaties, declaration of a state of 
emergency  and  its  termination,  mobilisation  and  demobilisation,  as  well  as 
agreements with other nations may not be submitted to national referendum’. 
And  further,  also  urgent  laws  according  to  the  article  75  CLv  may  not  be 
submitted to a national referendum.
4.1.2.3 The presidential plebiscite on recalling parliament
The presidential plebiscite on the recall of the parliament is the last tool of a top-
down initiated mechanism of Latvian direct democracy. With regard to subject 
matter, it is a proactive referendum, but it causes neither an amendment of a law 
nor does it create or veto a legal norm. Its outcome has rather a wide political 
consequence for authorities of the state, namely for either the parliament or the 
president  himself.  According  to  article  48  CLv,  the  president  is  enabled  to 
‘propose  the  dissolution  of  the  Saeima.  Following  this  proposal  a  national 
referendum [not earlier than one month before and  not later than two months 
after presidents notification] shall be held138. If in the referendum [independently 
of the number of participants] more than half of the votes are cast in favour of 
dissolution, the Saeima shall be considered dissolved, new elections called, and 
such elections held no later than two months after the date of the dissolution of 
the Saeima’. It should be noted that the recall is asked and triggered by the same 
actor, which means that the referendum is fully controlled by the president. But, 
at least it takes place on a single issue, such as the dissolution of the parliament. 
It could otherwise lead to an abuse of power.
Although the president is the single actor with full control of competencies over 
the referendum regarding the dissolution of the parliament, and who could, thus, 
reduce the number of other political actors who might veto the outcome139, there 
is a specific formal restriction existing that would still  forestall  the president’s 
attempt to launch the dissolution of the parliament. This becomes much clearer if 
we consider article 50 CLv, which stipulates that ‘if in the referendum more than 
half  of  the  votes  are  cast  against  the  dissolution  of  the  Saeima,  then  the 
President shall be deemed to be removed from office, and the Saeima shall elect 
a new President to serve for the remaining term of office of the President so 
removed’. Due to the uncertainty about the outcome of a plebiscite on recalling 
137 Art. 10, par. 1 LoNRLIaECI.
138 see also Art. 5, par 1 and par 2 LoNRLIaECI.
139 see HUG/TSEBELIS, p. 466 f.
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the parliament, it is to be assumed that the president will hesitate to avail himself 
of this institution. Until 2011 not a single president had used his or her right to 
recall the Saeima. However, on 28 May 2011, for the first time in Latvian history, 
the former president VALDIS ZATLERS, before his term had ended, acted according to 
the constitutionally given right and called for the dissolution of the Saeima (see 
Chapter IV-B-9).
4.1.3 Citizen-Initiated referendums
In Latvia there is a major difference to Estonian direct democracy, namely the 
right  of  the  Latvian  people  to  initiate  legislation  from  bottom  up140.  Indeed, 
bottom-up mechanisms existed already from 1923 to 1934. It took more than fifty 
years until  it was re-established at the end of the communist period in 1989. 
Thanks  to  the  citizens’  initiative,  which  is  a  proactive  direct  democratic 
instrument, the people not only become an additional veto player in the decision-
making  process,  but  also  an  innovative  actor  to  change the  public  policy  by 
proposing  a  law  or  an  amendment  to  the  constitution141.  In  addition  to  the 
citizens’ initiatives that create laws, there is also the popular initiative to recall 
the parliament142.
In  the  theoretical  part  of  this  paper  (Chapter  II-B-1-c)  it  was  stated  that  the 
‘citizens’ facultative referendum’ to veto laws would be the second instrument of 
citizen-initiated direct democratic mechanisms. Indeed, as shown under ‘Chapter 
IV-A-2, Referendums from above’,  in Latvia, such a reactive instrument (semi-
plebiscite  on  repealing  a  law)  exists.  However,  due  to  its  specific  triggering 
feature, this direct democratic mechanism bases on a joint action of both public 
authorities  and  the  citizens  (multiple  actors),  wherein  the  latter  cannot  start 
colleting signatures unless the authorities have requested the suspension of the 
law ante. For this reason, I assigned this veto instrument rather to the top-down 
mechanisms of direct democracy. Therefore, the Latvian direct democracy from 
below is only partially completed.
A total of two different citizens’ initiatives – citizens’ constitutional initiative and 
citizens’ legislative initiative – to alter the state’s legal settings and one initiative 
right to recall the parliament are available to the Latvians. Indeed, in all three 
cases the citizens are in complete control of the referendum, both with regard to 
framing  the  proposal  (e.g.  adoption,  alteration  or  repeal  of  a  law  /  recall  of 
parliament) and triggering the relevant referendum. Nevertheless, there are still 
numerous constraints preventing Latvians from exercising their  sovereignty to 
the full. Due to some formal procedural rules, such as quorums and collection 
provisions, their ability to control the vote is restricted. But, also due to the fact 
that citizens’ initiatives cannot be framed (asked) on matters of policy, as stated 
in article 73 CLv. These policy issues are excluded from the initiative process143.
140 Art. 64 CLv and Art. 22 LoNRLIaECI.
141 see also Art. 1, par. 4, Art. 11, par. 1 LoNRLIaECI.
142 Art. 14 CLv; Art. 1, par. 7 and Art. 11, par. 5 LoNRLIaECI.
143 Art. 73 CLv; see also  AUERS DAUNIS, An Electoral Tactic? Citizens’ Initiatives in Post-
Soviet  Latvia,  in:  SETÄLÄ MAIJA/SCHILLER THEO (eds.),  Citizens’  Initiatives  in  Europe. 
Procedures and Consequences of Agenda-Setting by Citizens (Basingstoke 2012), 
p. 56 (cit. AUERS).
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With regard to the citizens’ initiatives on creating a legal norm, the law states 
that only a fully elaborated draft law or a draft amendment to the constitution 
can be subject to a popular vote144. This means that general suggestions cannot 
be issued for  referendums.  It  should  be noted that  all  popular  initiatives  are 
legally binding and proceed – with the exception of the turnout-approval quorum 
and temporal conditions – according to the same rules and procedures.
Regarding  the  legality  and  constitutionality  of  a  citizens’  initiative,  there  is 
nothing  explicit  in  the  constitution  defining  which  authority  would  have  the 
competency to check the extent to which an initiative is in accordance with the 
constitution  of  Latvia.  The  missing  legal  basis  might  result  from  the  lack  of 
practical experience. According to DAUNIS AUERS, however, in practice any challenge 
would go to a decision by the Constitutional Court145.
4.1.3.1 The citizens’ constitutional initiative
According to article 78 CLv, ‘electors, in numbers comprising not less than one 
tenth of the electorate, have the right to submit a fully elaborated draft of an 
amendment to the Constitution [or of a law] to the President, who shall present it 
to  the  Saeima’146.  The  Saeima  is  obliged  to  consider  the  constitutional 
amendment,  and  if  the  parliament  does  not  adopt  it  without  change  to  its 
content, the original proposal shall then be submitted to a national referendum147. 
In other words, the parliament either adopts the citizens’ initiative without any 
change to its content or there is a referendum on the original proposal, to be held 
if  the parliament rejects  the citizens’  draft  or  adopts  it  with  changes.  For  an 
approval, at least half of the whole electoral votes in favour are needed148. As for 
mandatory  constitutional  referendums,  formally,  there  is  no  turnout  quorum 
requested to validate the ballot. But, factually, at least 50 percent of all eligible 
citizens who are at the same time in favour of the citizens’ initiative have to 
participate should the proposal be adopted149.
4.1.3.2 The citizens’ legislative initiative
In  addition to the constitutional  initiative,  Latvians can also trigger legislative 
initiatives.  Pursuant  to  article 78,  one tenth of  the electors  have the right to 
submit  their  formulated  draft  to  the  president,  who  then  forwards  it  for 
parliament’s consideration. Identical provision is also contained under article 65 
of the constitution, ‘Draft laws may be submitted to the Saeima by the President, 
the Cabinet or committees of the Saeima by not less than five members of the 
Saeima or, in accordance with the  procedures and in the cases provided for in 
[the]  Constitution,  by  one-tenth  of  the  electorate’150.  Similar  to  the  citizens’ 
constitutional initiatives, the referendum on the relevant draft law takes place 
only if the parliament rejects the citizens’ draft law or approves it with changes to 
its  content151.  But,  unlike  with  constitutional  initiatives,  a  draft  law  shall  be 
deemed adopted if ‘the number of voters is at least half of the number of electors 
144 Art. 22 LoNRLIaECI.
145 AUERS, p. 56.
146 see also Art. 1, par. 4 LoNRLIaECI.
147 Art. 78 CLv; Art. 11, par. 1; Art. 25, par. 2 LoNRLIaECI.
148 Art. 79, sec. 1 CLv.
149 see also UŠACKA, p. 96.
150 see also Art. 78 CLv.
151 Art. 1, par. 4 and Art. 11, par. 1 LoNRLIaECI.
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as participated in the previous parliamentary election and if  the majority has 
voted in favour of [it]’152.
4.1.3.2.1.1 A two-stage signature collection
Up to now it has been stated that not less than one-tenth of the electorate is 
needed to submit a formulated draft law or a fully elaborated draft amendment to 
the constitution to the president, who then presents it to the parliament for its 
consideration153. Here, the matter was the triggering of the popular vote. It has 
not  explicitly  been stated who formulates  the question  (asking)  and how the 
framing of the elaborated draft is to proceed.
It should be noted that Latvian citizen-initiated direct democracy to change the 
status quo bases on a double stage signatures collecting process. Submitting a 
popular draft to the president by at least one tenth of the electorate is, in fact,  
the second stage of triggering a referendum. Before the second stage can be 
achieved,  the formulated  draft  at  first  has  to  be  submitted  over  a  course  of 
twelve months by not less than 10,000 eligible citizens to the Central Election 
Commission  (CECLv)154.  Until  recently  the  law  did  not  mention  who  precisely 
forms the group of the citizens’ initiative for framing the issue. Nor did it say if 
there is a preliminary examination of the proponent’s proposal as to its content. 
After the last amendment of LoNRLIaECI on 8 November 2012, the law has finally 
clarified the rules of application for popular initiatives. According to a new article, 
an  initiative  group  can  either  be  a  political  party,  an  association  of  political 
parties or an association of at least 10 electors155.  Such a group is entitled to 
submit its application and the draft law or draft amendments to the constitution 
for which it plans to collect signatures of the electors156.
The  CECLv  is  responsible  for  the  registration  of  the  elaborated  draft  in 
question157. The commission can refuse the application of the proponents’ draft if 
the initiative group does not comply with the requirements for being an initiative 
group or if the draft is still incomplete as to form or content158: form, in the sense 
of a general suggestion instead of a fully elaborated draft, and content, in that no 
initiative is drafted on issues as stated in article 73 CLv159. It is rather a formal 
examination that CECLv carries out within this preliminary test. It does not do any 
legality checks of the initiative. In the case of a refusal of the application, the 
initiative  group  can  appeal  CECLv’s  decision  to  the  Administrative  Cases 
Department of the Supreme Court Senate, which examines the case as a court of 
first instance160. The court’s decision upon examining the application is final and 
cannot  be  subject  to  appeal161.  If  the  application  conforms  to  the  legal 
requirements,  then  the  first  stage  of  signature  collection  in  support  of  the 
initiated draft can begin. All 10,000 collected signatures must be certified  by a 
notary  public  or  a  local  government  authority  before  being  submitted  to  the 
152 Art. 79, sec. 2 CLv.
153 Art. 78 CLv; Art. 25, par. 1 LoNRLIaECI.
154 Art. 22 LoNRLIaECI.
155 Art. 23, par. 2 sec. 1 and 2 LoNRLIaECI.
156 Art. 23, par. 3 LoNRLIaECI.
157 Art. 23, par. 4 LoNRLIaECI.
158 Art. 23, par. 4, sec. 3 and par. 5, sec. 1 and 2 LoNRLIaECI.
159 see AUERS, p. 56.
160 Art. 231, par. 1 and 2 LoNRLIaECI.
161 Art. 231, par. 6 LoNRLIaECI.
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CECLv162. The second stage, namely the official collection of signatures of one-
tenth of the electorate, can only start if the initiative group has been able to 
collect 10,000 valid signatures in favour of its proposal at the initial stage. The 
second collection period is limited to 30 days, as article 7, par.  1 LoNRLIaECI 
prescribes.  During  this  time  the  signature  sheets  for  voters  to  sign  shall  be 
available at the places designated by city or municipality councils163. To gather 
signatures of one-tenth of the electorate each city and municipality must set up a 
collection station (at least one per 10,000 citizens)164. Also voters abroad can sign 
the signature sheets  that  are placed in the embassies or  other  diplomatic  or 
consular missions of Latvia165. Signatures of 10,000 citizens who have signed the 
submitted formulated draft at the first stage shall be included in the total number 
of supporters who have participated in the second stage166. After the expiration of 
30 days the CECLv counts the signatures and records the results.  And within 
three days the commission notifies the president about the results167. ‘If the draft 
law or the draft amendment to the constitution has been signed by not less than 
one-tenth of Latvian citizens who were eligible to vote in the previous Saeima 
elections, the President of Latvia shall submit to the Saeima the draft law or the 
draft amendment to the Constitution’168. The parliament has to consider the draft 
in question during the session in which the draft was submitted169.
With  regard  to  the  first  signature  collection  stage,  DAUNIS AUERS states  that 
collecting 10,000 signatures within 12 months would be quite a modest figure170. 
However, it should be noted that this is a large number of citizens, considering 
that  this  is  needed  just  for  activating  an  initiative  process  formally,  and  an 
additional 30 days for signatures from one-tenth of the electorate in the second 
collection stage is far from modest. Nevertheless, at this stage a large part of the 
logistical  burden  of  collecting  signatures  is  borne  by  the  state,  in  that  it  
prescribes that there must be at least one signing station per 10,000 voters171. 
Still,  it  remains ambiguous because,  on the one hand,  it  is  beneficial  for  the 
proponents of  an initiative to save financial  and personnel  resources.  On the 
other hand, they are not free to collect signatures for their request at just any 
public place. It has to be done at prescribed polling stations. Thus, proponents 
have to get people to turn up at these signing locations first. And this might not 
work so easily, especially if the level of political participation is low within a civil 
society and the initiative group does not have enough money to finance public 
campaigns. 
Besides logistical and temporal constraints at the second stage, there is another 
important  challenge,  namely  a  financial  one,  at  the  first  collection  stage. 
According to article 22 LoNRLIaECI, ‘each signature [at the first stage] must be 
certified  by  a  sworn  notary  public  or  a  local  government  authority’.  For  a 
162 Art. 22 second sentence LoNRLIaECI.
163 Art. 7, par. 1 LoNRLIaECI.
164 Art. 7, par. 2 LoNRLIaECI.
165 Art. 7, par. 6 LoNRLIaECI.
166 Art. 24, par. 2 LoNRLIaECI.
167 Art. 24, par. 3 LoNRLIaECI.
168 See Art. 25, par. 1 LoNRLIaECI.
169 Art. 25, par. 2 LoNRLIaECI.
170 see AUERS, p. 56.
171 see Art. 7, par. 2 LoNRLIaECI.
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signature the notary charges are around three Euros. To poor social segments or 
other minorities, this causes a considerable financial burden for either the citizen 
signing the initiative or for the committee of the initiative172.
4.1.3.2.1.2 An indirect initiative procedure
If an initiative group manages to overcome all these structural hurdles within the 
signature collection process, then the proposal – formulated draft law or the draft 
amendment to the constitution – is in the hands of public authorities. Therefore, it  
should  be  noted  that  submitting  a  popular  draft  to  the  president,  who  then 
forwards it to the parliament and parliament’s consideration of the proposal, is a 
central characteristic of an indirect initiative procedure.
In such a process the parliament generally gets the possibility to deliberate on 
the citizens’ draft before submitting it to the popular vote. The parliament is free 
to give its approval to the citizens’ proposal. It can further propose a counter-
proposal as an alternative to the proposal framed by the citizens and submit it to 
a referendum at the same time as the initiative. Or a counter-proposal may also 
lead the proponents of the popular initiative to withdraw their draft in favour of 
the parliamentary alternative draft.
In the Latvian case, an option of a counter-proposal or of a withdrawal clause is 
mentioned neither in the constitution nor in the LoNRLIaECI. The parliament can 
rather adopt, reject or even revise and adopt the corresponding draft formulated 
by the citizens173. In case of a rejection or revision, the citizens’ original proposal 
must be submitted to a popular vote, namely not earlier than one month before 
and not later than two months after parliament’s decision174. It should be noted 
that a legislative gap can arise should the parliament adopt a citizens’ draft with 
changes in its content and a popular draft be approved in the referendum at the 
same time. Neither the constitution nor the LoNRLIaECI contain a specific rule to 
determine which proposal comes into force as law. One can assume it is rather 
the referendum that will come into force.
Whether a citizens’ initiative has been approved directly or not, it has to be taken 
into account that its formal efficacy can vary. No legal success is achieved if an 
initiative has been rejected both by the parliament  and by the voters  in  the 
referendum. By contrast,  partial success is achieved by the proponents of the 
initiative  if  their  proposal  has  been  rejected  by  the  referendum  but  is 
nevertheless adopted, with changes to its original content, by the parliament. In 
this  respect  the  referendum  never  corresponds  to  its  original  content  as  its 
proponents suggested or initially intended, but at least it partially succeeds. And 
finally, a complete success is given if the corresponding draft on an amendment 
to the law or to the constitution has been adopted without any changes to its 
content by parliament, or if the citizens’ draft was rejected by the parliament but, 
nevertheless, accepted in the popular vote.
4.1.3.3 The citizens’ initiative on recalling parliament 
The citizens’ initiative on recalling parliament is the third citizen-initiated direct 
democratic institution in Latvia. However, instead of creating a legislative norm, 
172 see AUERS, p. 56 f.
173 Art. 1, par. 4 and Art. 11, par. 1 LoNRLIaECI.
174 Art. 11, par. 2 LoNRLIaECI.
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it  rather aims to remove the whole parliament from office if  one-tenth of the 
electorate proposes the dissolution of the parliament175. There is no right given to 
the citizens  to  recall  an  individual  member  of  the parliament,  as  the second 
section  of  article  14  CLv  states.  Until  2009  a  referendum  on  recalling  the 
parliament could be asked and triggered solely from top down by the president176, 
as outlined above (see Chapter IV-A-2-c). Since 2009 also Latvian people have the 
right to initiate the dissolution of the parliament and call for new elections. Within 
this procedure the citizenry is the sole actor in full control of the referendum.
According to JĀNIS IKSTENS, in 2009 the free fall of the Latvian economy continued 
and,  within  the  European  Union,  Latvia  was  to  suffer  most  from  the  global 
recession. The disaffection of Latvians over the Saeima's politics caused strong 
and  some  violent  protests,  not  seen  in  Latvia  within  the  two  last  decades. 
Consequently,  former state president  VALDIS ZATLERS,  ‘in  an extraordinary move, 
formulated an ultimatum to parliament and the government requiring a number 
of institutional changes: giving citizens a direct right to vote on the calling of 
extraordinary parliamentary elections; limiting the number of electoral districts in 
which a person can run for Parliament; setting up a council supervising the use of 
the international rescue loan; immediately drafting a plan of reorganisation of the 
system of  public  administrations;  recruiting  able  ministers  or  broadening  the 
coalition; and choosing the new head of the Anti-corruption Bureau’. Although the 
Saeima did not comply with the presidential ultimatum in full, under such heavy 
pressure from the public and the president, in 2009 it decided to fulfil a part of 
those presidential proposals. The parliament amended the parliamentary election 
law to allow each eligible citizen to run for the Saeima in only one of five electoral  
districts, as desired. Further it revised the constitution to enable a direct popular 
vote on the calling of extraordinary parliamentary elections from bottom up (see 
also Chapter IV-B-7)177.
According to the new wording of the article 14 of the constitution, the first section 
now establishes that ‘Not less than one tenth of electors have the right to initiate 
a  national  referendum regarding  a  recall  of  the  Saeima’.  Rules  for  gathering 
signatures  in  favour  of  parliament’s  dissolution  are  in  accordance  with  the 
procedures set out for citizens’ initiative as described above. Also here a double-
stage collection process is required. A deviation from described procedural rules 
arises for temporal and threshold hurdles. First, the right to initiate a recall of the 
parliament  cannot  be  exercised  within  one  year  after  the  convening  of  the 
Saeima and one year before the end of  the term of  office of  the parliament, 
during the last six months of the term of office of the President, as well as earlier 
than six months after the previous national referendum regarding the recall of 
the Saeima. And second, the parliament can be deemed recalled if the majority 
of voters and at least two thirds of the number of the voters who participated in 
the last parliamentary elections vote in favour thereof178.
Despite these restrictions, it has to be taken into account that today Latvia is the 
first EU country, in which a popular recall instrument to dissolve the parliament 
175 Art. 14, sec. 1 CLv; Art. 1, par 7 and Art. 11, par. 5 LoNRLIaECI.
176 see, Art. 48 CLv.
177 IKSTENS JANIS, Latvia, European Journal of Political Research 49/2010, p. 1054 f.
178 Art. 14 CLv.
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exists. How practicable this new direct democratic tool will be has yet to be seen. 
Until now it has not been implemented, but this might change if the Saeima and 
government fail to tackle the country's problems and crisis. 
To sum up, according to article 1 of LoNRLIaECI, in Latvia ‘a national referendum 
shall be held if: 1) the Saeima has amended the first, second, third, fourth, sixth 
or  seventy-seventh  Article  of  the  Constitution  [mandatory  constitutional 
referendum];  2)  the  President  of  Latvia  has  proposed  the  dissolution  of  the 
Saeima [presidential plebiscite on recalling parliament]; 3) the President of Latvia 
has suspended the proclamation of a law for two months, and during this period a 
petition by not fewer than one-tenth of the electorate has been received to put 
the suspended law to a national referendum [semi-plebiscite on repealing a law]; 
4) the Saeima has not adopted without changes as to its content a draft law or a 
draft amendment to the Constitution submitted by not less than one-tenth of the 
electorate [Citizens’  constitutional  and legislative initiative];  5) membership of 
Latvia in the European Union must be decided [mandatory referendum on EU-
Accession];  6)  substantial  changes in the terms regarding the membership of 
Latvia  in  the  European  Union  must  be  decided,  and  at  least  one-half  of  the 
members of the Saeima have requested a national referendum on this matter’ 
[parliamentary plebiscite for changes in EU-Membership].
After the amendment of the constitution in 2009, in which the parliament had 
decided to grant citizens the right to propose the dissolution of the parliament, a 
seventh paragraph was added to the LoNRLIaECI in November 2012. Therefore, a 
popular initiated national referendum [Citizens’ initiative on recalling parliament] 
shall be held as well if ‘at least one tenth of the electorate has proposed the 
dissolution of the Saeima’179.
179 Art. 1, par. 1–7 LoNRLIaECI.
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Table 2: Direct Democratic Institutions and their Use in Latvia (1991–2012)
MECHANISM OF 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY
NAME OF DD 
INSTITUTION SUBJECT MATTER
SUBMITTED 
DUE TO CHARACTER INTENTION
POL. ACTOR / VETO-PLAYER1 FORMAL RESTRICTIONS FOR USE









to alter articles 1, 
2, 3, 4, 6 and 77 
of the constitution
law binding proactive parliament(citizens) automatic
formally no, 
factually yes3 
>50% of total 








to join or leave
the EU law binding proactive
parliament / EU
(citizens) automatic
>1/2 of electors 
who participated 
in previous parl. 
Elections





































110 / 1 / 0
Semi-plebiscite 
on repealing a 
law








president or >1/3 of 
the
parliament4 and 





















to recall (dissolve) 
the parliament 
and to set new 
parl. elections









to initiate a 





association of pol. 
parties or >10 
electors 
1st stage: >10’000 
citizens (0.65%)




>50% of total 
electorate
1st stage: 10’000 
= >0.65%
2nd stage: >10% 
of total electorate 











to initiate a 




association of pol. 
parties or >10 
electors 
1st stage: >10’000 
citizens (0.65%)











1st stage: 10’000 
= >0.65%
2nd stage: >10% 
of total electorate
1st stage: 12 
months
















association of pol. 
parties or >10 
electors9 
1st stage: >10’000 
citizens (0.65%)
2nd stage: >10% of 
total electorate
no
>2/3 of electors 
who participated 
in previous parl. 
elections
1st stage: >0.65%
2nd stage: >10% 
of total electorate
1st stage: 12 
months





only to recall 
the 
parliament
0 / 0 / 0
Total Votes 10 / 3 / 5
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Remarks
1: The possibility of a referendum introduces the citizens as one additional veto player into public legislative process. A veto player is an individual or collective actor whose  
agreement is needed for a change in the legislative status quo. If  an existing or latent veto player controls  both the framing of the proposal and the triggering of the 
referendum, other veto players lose their ability to veto outcomes, the number of veto players decreases and potential of policy change increases (HUG/TSEBELIS, 2002)
2: q / a / ai = quantity of referendums / approved / approved but invalid due to precise formal restrictions
3: Depending on the approval quorum, it can range from 50 percent to 100 percent
4: The Latvian single chamber parliament is composed of 100 members (Art. 5 CLv) and there are around 1,545,000 eligible citizens (2012)
5: If 50% of votes are cast against the dissolution of the parliament, then the president shall be deemed removed from office
6: Issues according to Art. 73 CLv and also urgent laws (Art. 75 CLv) and no referendum shall be held if there is a second reading and a majority of 3/4 of all parliament’s  
members votes for the adoption of the law (Art. 72 CLv)
7: It is an indirect initiative procedure. A referendum on the citizens’ initiative only happens if the parliament rejects or adopts a citizens’ proposal with changes to its content.
8: Policy areas according to Art. 73 CLv are excluded from the popular initiative process
9: There are some time restrictions wherein the right to recall the parliament cannot be exercised (Art. 14 CLv)
10: This popular vote refers to referendum on independence on 3 March 1991. Indeed, at that time it was framed and triggered by the parliament. In the recent constitution a  
similar top-down direct democratic provision is only possible for issues related to the EU.
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4.2 Latvian direct democracy in practice
Since re-independence from Soviet occupation, ten national referendums180 have 
been held in Latvia (see Table 2), whereof the last one took place on 18 February 
2012181. Only three of these have been adopted and seven referendums failed the 
vote.  The  failure  of  the  seven  referendums  does  not  mean  that  they  were 
rejected by the people. On the contrary, five of these were clearly accepted by 
the voters who had participated in the ballot.  But,  due to the missed turnout 
quorum  that  is  required  formally  (or  factually),  the  ballot  result  had  to  be 
declared invalid. An invalidation of an approved referendum is often a result of 
the  opponents’  tactical  call  to  their  supporters  to  not  participate  in  a 
corresponding popular vote.
As  shown,  eight  different  direct  democratic  tools  divided  into  three  direct 
democratic mechanisms exist in Latvia. But, until recent times, not every tool has 
been used with the same frequency (see Figure 2).
Figure 2:
  
Top-down referendums are the leading mechanism of Latvian direct democracy. 
Six referendums were triggered by the authorities  or  by joint  action with the 
people.  The  first  referendum from above  (referendum on  independence)  was 
triggered by the parliament. In four other cases they resulted from a joint action 
of  the  authorities  and  the  citizens  to  veto  a  law  that  the  majority  of  the 
parliament  had  drafted  (4  semi-plebiscites  on  repealing  a  law).  The  sixth 
plebiscite  was  brought  forward  by  the  president  (presidential  plebiscite  on 
180 Including the referendum on re-independence that has been approved on 3 March 
1991.
181 see database c2d, http://www.c2d.ch/votes.php?
level=1&country=196&yearr=timeperiods&fromyear=1992&toyear=2012&speyea
r[]=2013&result=0&terms=&table=votes&sub=Submit_Query (accessed on 
03.12.2012).
44
C2D Working Paper Series 42 / 2012
recalling  parliament).  Within  two  decades  only  one  required  referendum 
(mandatory constitutional referendum) and three popular votes, which had been 
initiated  by  the  citizens  from  below  (2  citizens’  constitutional  initiatives,  1 
citizens’  legislative  initiative),  were  carried  out.  The  low  amount  of  citizen-
initiated  referendums  does  not  automatically  imply  a  low  popular  interest  in 
bottom-up  legislative  procedures.  Due  to  indirect  initiative  procedures,  some 
popular drafts have been adopted without any changes to the content by the 
parliament itself and, thus, succeeded completely as well (see Chapters IV-B-11 
and IV-B-12).
With regard to their political content, these ten referendums can be distributed to 
different policy areas as follows: The main political issue which has been dealt 
with  concerns  the  state  organisation  as  national  identity,  legal  and  political 
systems as well as fundamental rights. There were five referendums on this topic. 
Two other referendums concerned social policy; specifically, the social security 
system. In two other cases Latvian citizens had to come to a decision on security 
issues, namely on public security. And in one case the referendum referred to 
foreign policy, namely the accession to the EU182. The popular proposal that has 
been adopted by the parliament directly dealt with energy questions.
4.2.1 The referendum of 3 March 1991 on Latvia’s independence
By proposing a union referendum, Gorbachev had opened a  floodgate for  an 
independence referendum in Latvia. It was a parliamentary plebiscite framed and 
triggered  by  the  Latvian  Supreme,  but  according  to  Soviet  law183.  Around 88 
percent of eligible Latvians went to the polls and 74 percent of them voted in 
favour of independence. Calculated on the basis of all eligible voters this makes 
65 percent184. Indeed, like in Estonia, this amount was not enough to exceed the 
two-thirds  of  all  eligible  voters  that  the  Soviet  law  on  secession  required. 
Nevertheless,  that  did  not  worry  the  Baltics,  since  they  rejected  Soviet  law 
anyway185.
The referendum on Latvia’s independence does indeed not fit perfectly with the 
recent conceptualisation of direct democratic mechanisms in Latvia since there 
are no further parliamentary plebiscites that deal with issues of utmost national 
importance.
As in Lithuania and Estonia, the declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian 
Soviet  Socialist  Republic  (SSR)  on  the  Renewal  of  the  Independence  of  the 
Republic  of  Latvia  foresaw  the  adoption  of  a  new  constitution.  However, 
conditioned by a historical continuity discourse, the pre-communist constitution 
was  simply  reintroduced  on  6  July  1993  without  holding  a  referendum.  The 
Latvian  constitutional  structure  is  similar  to  that  of  Estonia,  namely  a 
parliamentary system with constitutional authority over the president, who has 
182 Results on http://www.c2d.ch/votes.php?table=votes (accessed on 30.06.2012).
183 BRADY/KAPLAN, p. 192 f.; Loser Gorbachev, The Economist [London, England], 9 March 
1991, p. 16.
184 c2d database, http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=39084 
(accessed on 10 July 2012).
185 The Referendum Scorecard, The Economist [London, England], 23 March 1991, p. 
62.
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more of a ceremonial role186. However, in contrast to Estonia and Lithuania, the 
Latvian  president  is  entitled  to  dissolve  the  parliament,  if  necessary,  by  a 
presidential plebiscite.
4.2.2 The  referendum  of  3  October  1998  on  the  repeal  of  the 
facilitated naturalisation amendment
Six years after the restoration of independence the first official referendum that 
was submitted to popular vote concerned the liberalisation of the regulations on 
naturalisation.  The  parliamentary  reform  aimed  to  facilitate  citizenship  for 
stateless  children  born  after  independence  and  to  abolish  the  limitation  of 
naturalisation per year (framing the question). To one part, the relevant new law 
was also passed due to pressure of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE). But, due to the Fatherland Party’s opposition, the reformed law 
had to be taken to a referendum to be finally binding187. As stated in article 72 
CLv, the proclamation of a law adopted by the parliament can be suspended for a 
period of two months if there is such a request by the president or by one-third 
(100/3) of the members of the parliament. The Fatherland Party, holding 38 seats, 
availed itself of this article and with the effect that within the given time frame an 
amount of one-tenth of signatures of all eligible citizens was gathered in order to 
submit the issue to a national referendum (semi-plebiscite on repealing a law 
based on a joint action). For the referendum, which had been held on the same 
day as the parliamentary elections, a participation quorum of at least 50 percent 
of  the  electors  who  participated  in  the  previous  Saeima  elections  was 
necessary188.  As the ballot  took place on the same day as  the parliamentary 
elections, the obstructive tactic towards referendum supporters was prevented 
and  the  turnout  was  19  percent  over  the  formally  requested  quorum. 
Nevertheless,  the  repealed  issue  put  to  a  popular  vote  did  not  get  enough 
support  by the  participants.  Only  46  percent  of  the  Latvian citizens  voted  in 
favour of the referendum to abolish facilitated naturalisation189. Thus, due to this 
negative outcome the reformed naturalisation law could not be repealed as the 
Fatherland Party had intended. In contrast, we can argue that the majority of the 
Latvians voted in the same sense as the rest of the parliament, which reformed 
the law to facilitate naturalisation.
4.2.3 The referendum of  13 November 1999 on the repeal  of  the 
pension system reform amendment
On 5 August 1999, the parliament approved a new pension law whose scope was 
to increase the retirement age for both men and women to 62 and to modify 
wage regulations for working pensioners (asking the question). The latter aimed 
to break off the payment of pensions to persons who continued to work after 
retirement age190. Once more, in accordance with article 72 of CLv, three parties 
186 MOLE, p. 97.
187 See c2d database, http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=39221 
(accessed on 13.07.2012); UŠACKA, p. 106 f.
188 see Art. 74 CLv.
189 c2d database, http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=39221 
(accessed on 13.07.2012).
190 UŠACKA, p. 101 ff.
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from the opposition acted to suspend the promulgation of the amendments on 
the retirement law for two months. During the given collection period of 30 days 
signatures of almost 14 percent of the electorate were collected (joint action on 
triggering the referendum) and the referendum (semi-plebiscite on repealing a 
law based on a joint action) was held on 13 November 1999. In spite of yes-votes 
of  almost 95 percent,  the referendum failed since the necessary participation 
threshold  of  50  percent  of  the  voters  who  participated  in  the  previous 
parliamentary elections had not been reached191. Hence, the amendments to the 
law on the pension system were not repealed and the new law, as requested by 
the majority of parliament, entered into force.
4.2.4 The referendum of 21 September 2003 on the accession to the 
European Union
The  only  mandatory  referendum  that  has  been  held  in  Latvia  is  related  to 
European Integration. For Latvia the referendum on joining the EU held on 21 
September 2003 was at the same time the single most important political event 
in that year192. As mentioned above, the Latvian constitution had not  contained 
any authorisation for referendums on such issues before. After the necessitated 
supplementation of  articles  68 and 79 of  the Satversme,  a formally  accurate 
procedure in the sense of automatic triggering had been opened for holding a 
referendum on EU accession. On the ballot, the required turnout of at least 50 
percent of the electors voting at the last elections to the parliament was cast by 
around 73 percent.  And Latvian electors voted by not less than 67 percent in 
favour of the accession to the European Union193.
4.2.5 The referendum of 7 July 2007 on the repeal of amendments to 
the law on state security services
The law on State Security Services and State Security Authorities (see Chapter IV-
B-6),  which  had  been  enacted  based  on  the  emergency  clause  of  the 
constitution194 by the governing parties, aimed at enabling the government to 
access data of the intelligence services office, the security police and the military 
secret service (asking the question). However, the former Latvian President VAIRA 
VĪĶE-FREIBERGA voiced clear resistance to the amendments and submitted her veto 
according to Article 72 of the constitution. Hence, the promulgation of the law 
was suspended for a period of two months.  VĪĶE-FREIBERGA did not want to give 
political actors extensive access to secret services and endanger Latvia's ties to 
NATO.  Consequently,  a  popular  referendum  was  launched  (joint  action  on 
triggering the referendum).
The president’s move put the coalition on the defensive. And as a consequence 
of this political pressure and to avoid a major public embarrassment, the two 
corresponding amendments were withdrawn by the parliament in March 2007. 
191 See, Art. 74 CLv; c2d database, http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=39220 
(accessed on 13.07.2012).
192 IKSTENS JANIS, Latvia, European Journal of Political Research 43/2004, p. 1056.
193 see c2d databae, http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=39219 
(accessed on 14.07.2012).
194 Art.  81 CLv.  On May 3,  2007 the emergency clause has been repealed by the 
parliament by a margin of 90 to 0 votes.
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Nevertheless, the initiated procedure of the presidential popular veto could not 
be stopped anymore and the referendums still went ahead195. The necessary 10 
percent of signatures to repeal the designed laws had been collected within given 
period of 30 days. And on 7th July the national ballot to repeal the amendments 
took place. The first referendum abolishing the amendment to the law on State 
Security Services had been accepted by 97 percent of the participants. But, the 
requested  turnout  of  half  the  number  of  those  who  had  participated  in  the 
previous national  parliamentary elections could not be reached and, thus, the 
final result did not count196. Nevertheless, the availability of the semi-plebiscitary 
referendum had demonstrated its efficacy ante, namely by forcing the parliament 
to withdraw its two amendments.
4.2.6 The referendum of 7 July 2007 on the repeal of amendments to 
the law on state security authorities
The second referendum repealing the amendment to the Law on State Security 
Authorities also followed according the same circumstances as described above 
(Chapter IV-B-5). And it was accepted by 97 percent of the participants in the 
ballot, too. Indeed, also this popular vote to veto the amendment failed to receive 
the qualified turnout quorum. However, it did not fail to show its full effect by 
forcing the parliament to a withdrawal of its initial draft on this issue197.
4.2.7 The  referendum  of  2  August  2008  on  the  dissolution  of 
parliament by popular vote
The first citizens' constitutional initiative submitted to referendum was asked by 
the Trade Union Confederation in November 2007. It was prompted by a growing 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the parliament, an overheating economy 
and a growing trade deficit. The initiative claimed the amendment of articles 78 
and 79 of the Satversme, enabling citizens to directly demand the dissolution of 
the parliament and thus to call extraordinary elections to it. Until this time only 
the president was entitled to trigger a popular vote on recalling the parliament 
and  to  set  preterm  national  elections,  as  contained  in  article  48  of  the 
constitution198.
To launch the initiative on recalling the parliament by popular vote (triggering the 
referendum), initially not less than 10,000 signatures by eligible citizens were 
necessary.  After  gathering  these  signatures  at  a  first  collection  stage,  the 
initiative group submitted their  corresponding formulated draft  amendment to 
the  constitution  to  the  Central  Election  Commission199.  After  the  CECLv  had 
ascertained 11,095 valid signatures, the official collection of signatures (second 
stage) in support of the initiated draft began. The necessary number of 151,521 
signatures (10 percent of the total electorate 2008) to submit the proposal to the 
195 IKSTENS JANIS, Latvia, European Journal of Political Research 47/2008, p. 1043; AUERS, p. 
64.
196 c2d database, http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=57318 
(accessed on 14.07.2012).
197 c2d database, http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=57767 
(accessed on 14.07.2012).
198 IKSTENS JANIS, Latvia, European Journal of Political Research 48/2009, p. 1016 f.
199 see Art. 22 LoNRLIaECI.
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Saeima  for  its  mandatory  consideration  and  eventual  adoption  was  easily 
collected from March 12 to April 10. In total, there were 217,567 voters who had 
signed for the proposal. According to procedures as stated in articles 76 and 78 
CLv, the president submitted the elaborated draft to the parliament200. For the 
initiated amendment to the constitution to be approved without any change as to 
its content by the Saeima, it had to be passed by a majority of not less than two-
thirds of members of parliaments. However, the citizens’ proposal failed to reach 
this margin with 44 to 37 votes and 17 abstentions. Consequently, a national 
referendum on this constitutional initiative was held on 2 August 2008. Around 97 
percent of the 629,064 voters who participated in the ballot voted in favour of the 
proposal, but due to the low number of participants – 41.5 percent of the total 
1,515,213  electors  –  the  referendum  missed  the  formally  required  approval 
quorum of 50 percent of the total electorate. Consequently, the adoption of the 
proposed  constitutional  amendment  failed  and  the  positive  result  had  to  be 
deemed void201.
This  outcome  was  mainly  caused  by  the  political  establishment’s  strong 
opposition. The majority of the parliament’s parties called the citizens to boycott 
the vote in order to prevent the necessary threshold202. The proponents of the 
amendment, on the other side, complained about a rigging of the contest. In their 
view, setting the ballot date to the beginning of August undermined the required 
minimum of 50 percent threshold because many people were on holiday at that 
time203.
Surprisingly, only one year after the citizens’ initiative on recalling the parliament 
by  popular  vote  there  was  an  important  institutional  change  to  this  matter, 
namely the amendment of  article  14 of  the constitution.  Due to the growing 
economic crisis in the country and the pressure from the population as well as 
from  the  former  President  VALDIS ZATLERS, the  Latvian  parliament  found  itself 
constrained to amend the constitution, giving the citizens the right to ask and 
trigger a national  referendum regarding the recall  of  parliament. Although the 
referendum on the dissolution of the parliament by popular vote had failed to be 
effective initially, we can assume that it had still achieved its purpose, namely by 
both bringing the issue onto the political agenda and by putting public pressure 
on the parliament204.
4.2.8 The referendum of  23 August 2008 on a limited increase of 
public pensions
Already  in  the  same  month  as  the  referendum  on  the  dissolution  of  the 
parliament by popular vote, Latvian voters had to vote on a second bottom-up 
initiated referendum. It is the unique legislative initiative that has been submitted 
to a referendum. The proposal by the Pensioner's Party and other organisations 
on the increase of public pensions was successfully supported by 11,898 voters 
200 see also Art. 25 LoNRLIaECI.
201 c2d database, http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=57768 
(accessed on 14.07.2012), IKSTENS, 2009, p. 1017 f.
202 AUERS, p. 64.
203 IKSTENS JANIS, European Journal of Political Research 48/2009, p. 1017.
204 see also explanations under Chapter IV-A-3-c ‘The citizens’ initiative on recalling 
parliament’.
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(quorum  10,000)  at  the  initial  signature  drive.  The  following  collection  of 
signatures of not less than one-tenth of the electorate in a second step could be 
successfully  accomplished  by  170,342  instead  of  the  necessary  151,610 
signatures as well. The proposed draft law to the parliament had been rejected 
with 6 to 44 votes and 46 abstentions. Therefore a national referendum on the 
proposed legislative initiative had to be held. Although the proposal had been 
supported by 96 percent of the participants, the law draft could not be adopted 
since the required turnout of at least 50 percent of the participants in the last 
parliamentary elections could not be reached205. Only 38 percent of the voters 
who voted in the 2006 parliamentary elections participated in the referendum on 
old-age  pensions  and,  hence,  the  referendum was  declared  to  have  no legal 
binding force.  This  low turnout  quorum was once again  a  result  of  a  tactical 
campaign of non-participation, which was used by the opponents of the proposal, 
namely by government coalition parties and the liberal media206.
4.2.9 The referendum of 23 July 2011 on the early dissolution of the 
Saeima
On 28 May 2011, approximately one month before the former president  VALDIS 
ZATLERS' term of four years was due to end, he called a referendum on recalling the 
parliament. This was the first dissolution referendum that a state president had 
triggered since a majority of parliamentary deputies had blocked a corruption 
inquest by the country's anti-corruption agency (KNAB) into one of the country's 
most notorious oligarchs and member of parliament, AINĀRS ŠLESERS207. According to 
president  ZATLERS, the  parliament  had  ‘showed  disrespect  and  mistrust  of  the 
competency of the judicial authorities’.
A few days after  VALDIS ZATLERS's dissolution decision on 2 June 2011 there were 
presidential elections in the parliament and ANDRIS BĒRZIŅŠ instead of VALDIS ZATLERS 
was elected as the new president of Latvia.  ZATLERS’S defeat in the contest was 
greeted  with  dismay  by  some  anti-corruption  protestors  and  the  previous 
president VAIRA VĪĶE-FREIBERGA.
Two  months  after  ZATLERS’s  dissolution  decision,  the  presidential  plebiscite  on 
recalling the parliament was upheld, on 23 July 2011. Approximately 45 percent 
of 1.5 million registered voters participated in the ballot and an overwhelming 
majority of these voters, namely 95 percent, pursued ZATLERS’s decision and voted 
in  favour  of  dissolving  the  Saeima208.  Consequently,  as  there  is  formally  no 
turnout  quorum  required  for  presidential  plebiscites  on  recalling  the 
parliament209, the parliament was dissolved. And almost one year after the last 
205 Art. 79 CLv and see comments and results on c2d database, 
http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=57769 
(accessed on 14.07.2012); IKSTENS JANIS, Latvia, European Journal of Political Research 
48/2009, p. 1018.
206 IKSTENS JANIS, Latvia, European Journal of Political Research 48/2009, p. 1018; AUERS, p. 
61.
207 A Long Hot Summer, The Economist [online], 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/06/latvian-politics/ 
(accessed on 15.07.2012).
208 Die Letten für baldige Wahlen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 25 July 2011, p. 2.
209 Art. 48 CLv.
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Saeima elections, in October 2010, new elections to the parliament were set for 
17 September 2011.
Although  ZATLERS’s  request  for  the  dissolution  of  the  parliament  led  to  the 
Saeima’s  retribution by refusing to grant him a second term,  now it  was the 
parliament  that  had  been  punished  in  turn.  Latvian  citizens  did  not  accept 
parliament’s refusal to deal with state corruption. It can be argued that direct 
democracy  from above  has  helped  the  people  to  protest  against  the  lacking 
transparency and to act as a corrective. Further, it was a tool to caution against 
corrupt  developments  in  the  establishment  and  to  combat  the  power  of  the 
oligarchs. Thus, it should also be noted that this presidential plebiscite was not 
used to secure special legitimacy for the president’s position, but much more to 
oblige the parliament to do its job correctly with respect to transparency. 
Indeed ZATLERS had been ruled out for a second presidential term, but his political 
career had not finished yet. In contrast, a few days after he had left office he 
announced the foundation of his new politically middle-right party: the ‘Zatlers's 
Reform Party’. And according to polls, his ZRP could expect enough support from 
the citizens on the extraordinary parliamentary election of 17 September 2011210. 
Indeed, his party straight away carried 22 of 100 seats in pre-term parliamentary 
elections and became the second largest political party in the Saeima after the 
winning party ‘Harmony Centre’ (31 mandates), which is mainly supported by a 
Russian-friendly electorate. Today ‘Zatlers’ Reform Party’, the ‘Unity’ party of the 
Prime Minister  VALDIS DOMBROVSKIS and the right nationalist ‘National Alliance’ form 
the  Latvian  government  coalition,  without  the  winner  of  the  parliamentary 
elections211. 
4.2.10 The referendum of 18 February 2012 on Russian as the second 
official language
Around 33 percent of the Latvians are ethnically Russian or Belarusian and about 
38 percent of the population declare Russian as their native language. And there 
are  also  plenty  of  mixed  marriages  and  bilinguals  among  the  population. 
However, in Latvia the language is more than a statistical matter. It has more of a 
historical  and  political  relevance  for  Latvians  because  during  the  Soviet 
occupation of over fifty years Latvian was systematically supressed212. And as a 
result  of  this  traumatic  experience,  after  re-independence  the  Latvian 
constituency recognized only Latvian as the official language of the country213. In 
recent times some Latvian nationalists wanted to go much further and launched 
a citizens’ constitutional initiative to amend article 112 of the constitution. The 
formulated draft claimed that Latvian should become the only official language at 
public schools, too. But, in May 2011, this initiative failed to collect one tenth of 
the electors’ signatures required at the second collection stage214.
210 Valdis Zatlers plant Comeback, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 23 July 2011, p. 7.
211 see,  Die  Linksopposition  siegreich  in  Lettland,  Neue  Zürcher  Zeitung,  19 
September  2011,  p.  3;  Dombrovskis  bleibt  im Amt,  Neue  Zürcher  Zeitung,  12 
October 2011, p. 7.
212 Lativia’s Failed Referendum, The Economist [online], 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/02/more-questions-
please (accessed on 20.11.2012).
213 Art. 4 CLv.
214 see Chapter IV-B-12.
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As a counter reaction to this failed constitutional initiative, the association ‘native 
language’ (consisting of predominantly Russian-speaking Latvians) triggered their 
own  constitutional  initiative,  intending  to  make  Russian  the  second  official 
language of Latvia. According to their formulated draft, articles 4, 18, 21, 101 and 
104  of  the  constitution  required  alterations.  In  contrast  to  the  nationalists’ 
initiative,  the  proposal  did  not  fail  the  second signature  collection  stage  and 
succeeded,  obtaining  187,378  signatures  (10%  quorum:  154,379)  from  the 
citizens  in  favour.  To  another  part,  the  success  of  the  second  citizens’ 
constitutional initiative that has been submitted to a popular vote stemmed from 
the  ‘Harmony  Centre’  electors’  disappointment  in  the  new  government.  As 
outlined under Chapter IV-B-9 above, after the pre-term parliamentary elections 
in September 2011, ‘Harmony Centre’ had been excluded from being part of the 
coalition despite the fact that it was the winner of the extraordinary elections. 
Officially, the ‘Harmony Centre’ itself did not support the initiative. However, this 
did not prevent its disillusioned supporters from signing the initiative ‘Russian as 
second official language’215.
After  the  successful  collection  of  one-tenth  valid  signatures,  the  proposed 
constitutional amendment was submitted to the President ANDRIS BĒRZIŅŠ to present 
it to the parliament216. During the session, the government parties rejected the 
proposal by a margin of 0 to 60 and they also attempted to have the provision 
declared  unconstitutional.  However,  the  Constitutional  Court  did  not  stop  the 
ballot. Even if the parliament had given its approval, a popular vote would have 
been inevitable, since the formulated draft also included an alteration of article 4 
of  the  constitution.  And  any  amendment  of  article  4  requires  an  automatic 
referendum, as article 77 CLv states217.
On the ballot day the turnout was cast by 71.10 percent of the total electorate, 
which  is  a  very  high  participation  level  indeed.  To  come  into  force,  a 
constitutional initiative has to be approved by at least half of the electorate218. 
But,  the  popular  initiative  was  clearly  rejected  by  around  75  percent  of  the 
participants219.  As  in  other  referendums,  the  opposition of  the  initiative could 
have voided the referendum result by staying away from the ballot. Nevertheless, 
the  mobilisation  was  very  high  and  many  Latvians  have  followed the  former 
President VAIRA VĪĶE-FREIBERGA’s appeal to go to the polls and show the international 
community  that  the  question  of  language  does  not  matter  exclusively  to  an 
ethnic minority, but to the whole population of the country.
Despite the high turnout and high rejection quota of ‘Russian as second official 
language’, the referendum still illustrates the existing ethnic division between the 
pro- and anti-Russian groups after the re-independence220. And it has pushed up 
the  political  agenda,  and  entrenched  Latvian  fears  of  assimilation  and 
215 «Es gibt kein stärkeres Mittel, um uns wütend zu machen», Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 
18 February 2012, p. 7; Russisch wird nicht zweite Amtssprache in Lettland, Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung, 20 February 2012, p. 3.
216 Art. 25, par. 1 and 2 LoNRLIaECI.
217 see also Art. 1, par. 1 LoNRLIaECI.
218 Art. 79, sec. 1 CLv.
219 c2d database, http://c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=13249
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intimidation by the big eastern neighbour. Latvian citizens still fear that Russia 
and  ethnic  Russians  in  Latvia  regard  Latvian  independence  as  a  temporary 
situation221.
4.2.11 Proposed and adopted initiatives without holding referendums
In April  2000 trade unions mobilised over 12,000 Latvian citizens to submit a 
draft law to the Central  Election Commission. The relevant amendment to the 
'Law on Electric Power Industry' aimed at prohibiting the privatisation of Latvian 
electricity monopolist ‘Latvenergo’. After the validation of  these signatures, the 
second collection stage started. Within 30 days a total of 307,330 signatures of 
the electorate  (23%) were collected,  and the draft  law was submitted to the 
parliament’s consideration. Due to huge popular support, the Saeima did not dare 
to reject the popular proposal and adopted the proposed law without substantial 
changes  to  its  content,  preventing  the  need  for  a  referendum.  The  popular 
initiative  on  the  energy  law  succeeded  fully  and  forced  the  government  to 
backtrack on its proposal concerning the privatisation of the national electrical 
utility222.
4.2.12 Initiatives without sufficient signatures
Besides the implemented initiatives above, in Latvia there have also been other 
attempts to initiate some proposals of amendments to the constitution or of a 
law, but they all failed due to an insufficient number of signatures, as formally 
stipulated by article 78 of the Satversme. Some other referendum launches failed 
already in the beginning because the necessary amount of 10,000 signatures to 
present a draft to the CECLv could not be collected at the first collection stage.
In 1995 the Farmer's Union of Latvia for instance aimed to reform the constitution 
and  formulated  a  new  draft  amendment  to  the  Satversme  which  contained 
several  proposals,  such  as  direct  election  of  the  president,  extension  the 
parliament’s  term to  four  years,  guaranteeing  provisions  for  the  dismissal  of 
deputies or even a chapter devoted to local governments. In order to submit the 
draft to the CECLv, 10,000 signatures were necessary. However, it could not be 
reached.
Although the necessary amount failed to  start  the second stage of  signature 
collection, in the following years the Latvian parliament adopted the mentioned 
amendments,  except  the  direct  election  of  the  president  by  the  Latvian 
citizens223. Hence, also here the popular initiative showed a long-term effect.
In 1995 another popular initiative had the aim of recalling single members of the 
parliament. Although over 10,000 notarised signatures were collected in favour of 
this proposal, this draft amendment to the constitution was never submitted to 
the CECLv. And in 1996, a citizens’ legislative initiative to make citizenship law 
more stringent failed the second signature collection stage224.
221 Latvia’s failed Referendum, The Economist [online], 
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Also, attempts after 2001, especially those by the Latvian Social Democrats to 
reform the constitution and provide for a popularly elected state president, failed 
to  gather  the  necessary  support  of  10,000  voters  to  initiate  a  relevant 
referendum. And the second attempt at a popularly elected head of state in 2009 
by ‘All for Latvia!’ also failed to achieve the threshold of 10,000 signatures225. 
Nevertheless,  the  later  adoption  of  some  other  stated  amendments  by  the 
Saeima shows that even if such referendum attempts fail to have a direct effect 
on the legislative process in the beginning,  they boost  the reform will  in  the 
legislation in the desired direction. In 2005, ‘All for Latvia!’ had also launched a 
citizens’ initiative with the aim that all amendments on the law on naturalisation 
should be put to  a referendum, however,  it  failed to collect  10,000 notarised 
signatures226.
In  June  2011  the  movement  ‘13  January’  tried  to  collect  signatures  for  an 
initiative to elevate the status of Russian, to make it the second official language, 
but it failed already at the first collecting stage to gather 10,000 signatures227. 
However, as mentioned above (see Chapter IV-B-10), the second attempt by the 
association ‘native language’ to make Russian the second official language was 
more  successful.  Though  successful  in  the  first  and  second  phase  of  the 
collecting  process,  it  missed  the  absolute  majority  in  the  voting  on  February 
2012.  Another  initiative  from  the  political  opposition,  namely  the  nationalist 
parties  (National  Alliance),  in  contrast,  aimed  at  making  Latvian  the  sole 
language  at  public  schools.  As  already  outlined,  it  failed  to  gather  sufficient 
signatures (10% of  electorate)  at  the second collecting stage in May 2011228. 
Once again, such attempts by nationalist parties illustrates that initiatives are 
mainly used to preserve the primacy of the Latvian culture and language229.
In addition to these initiatives, there were also some other signature-gathering 
exercises in 2008 and 2009 to influence the policy agenda. Some associations 
tactically gathered non-notarised signatures to increase political pressure on the 
political elite230.
4.3 Explanations for the Latvian practice
Ten referendums – six more than in the case of Estonia – have been held in Latvia 
since re-independence. And many others have failed to collect the mandatory 
number of signatures. Again a structural and informal approach has to be used to 
explain the causes of variations and of success in the use of referendums in these 
countries.  In  Latvia,  the success  and variation in  the number  of  referendums 
result  to a large part from the formal institutional  arrangements. The political 
elite and the citizens act within a framework of constitutional institutions that 
circumscribe and define their behaviour. According to ELLEN IMMERGUT, the different 
225 IKSTENS JANIS, Latvia, European Journal of Political Research 42/2003, p. 1008 f.; AUERS, 
p. 63, p. 65.
226 See AUERS, p. 63.
227 See explanations under Chapter IV-B-10.
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7 (accessed on 07.12.2012); «Es gibt kein stärkeres Mittel, um uns wütend zu 
machen», Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 18.02.2012, p. 7.
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230 For more detail see AUERS, p. 61 f.
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policy outcome is a result of different institutional designs of a country and not 
exclusively a result of the actors' decisions231. However, in Latvia there are some 
informal arrangements too. Within a constitutionally given framework, political 
parties and actors tend to use direct democratic instruments in different strategic 
ways and with different degrees of success. Insofar, it is the interaction between 
the formal arrangements and political players that define to what extend direct 
democracy is being used in Latvia.
4.3.1 Legal constraints
The most important difference to Estonian direct democracy concerns the degree 
of  direct  democratic  institutions that  are  constitutionally  given to  the Latvian 
people. Indeed, there exist eight different direct democratic tools that can either 
be started automatically, like mandatory referendums, or by the authorities, top 
down. And most importantly, also a citizen-initiated direct democratic mechanism 
to create new laws is available to Latvians. Recently, Latvians got an additional 
bottom-up  instrument  that  entitles  them  to  initiate  a  national  referendum 
regarding the recall of the parliament. And all types of referendums produce a 
legally binding result for all state institutions.
Due to a wide range of these direct democratic tools, one would expect that there 
is at the same time also a high frequency of use of direct democracy. However, 
there are several formal obstacles, which prevent Latvians from using these tools 
more effectively. Therefore, it is not only important to have different mechanisms 
of direct democracy, but also to ensure that it works practically. Otherwise any 
formal obstacle that rather favours the public elites than the people would cause 
a lack of interest and disappointment among the citizens.
The first legal constraint concerns policy areas of a referendum. Some political 
issues cannot be submitted to a national referendum. According to article 73 of 
the Latvian constitution, for instance, ‘loans, taxes, custom duties, railroad tariffs, 
military  conscription,  declaration  and  commencement  of  war,  peace  treaties, 
declaration  of  a  state  of  emergency  and  its  termination,  mobilisation  and 
demobilisation,  as  well  as  agreements  with  other  nations’,  or  urgent  laws 
pursuant to article 75 CLv are excluded from the referendum process.
A  second  constraint  concerns  signature  collection,  which  is  based  on  two 
collection stages. In Latvia there are nearly 1.5 Million registered voters. Article 
78 in conjunction with article 65 of the Satversme enables the people to ‘submit 
a fully elaborated draft of an amendment to the Constitution or of a law to the 
President, who shall present it to the Saeima’. But such a submission requires at 
least  10  percent  of  valid  signatures  of  the  whole  electorate,  which  shall  be 
gathered at  a second stage.  Compared to signature collection in Swiss direct 
democracy  for  instance,  wherein  nearly  2  percent  of  the  registered  voters  – 
within a period of 18 months – are needed to propose a total or partial revision of 
the Federal Constitution, the Latvian threshold seems to be very high. This can 
hamper the collection of required signatures, especially if the collection time is 
limited to 30 days and signatures can only be collected at designated collection 
231 IMMERGUT ELLEN,  The  Logic  of  Health  Policy-making  in  France,  Switzerland  and 
Sweden, in: STEINMO SVEN [et al.] (eds.), Structuring Politics. Historical Institutionalism 
in Comparative Analysis, (Cambridge 1992), p. 58, p. 85.
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places232. Also, for the semi-plebiscite on repealing a law as indicated in article 72 
CLv  or  for  the  citizens’  initiative  on  recalling  the  Saeima,  as  article  14  CLv 
establishes,  not  less  than  one-tenth  of  the  electorate  is  required  in  order  to 
initiate a national  referendum. One should also be aware of the fact that the 
referendum on repealing a law can only be triggered if the authorities suspend 
the proclamation of a law for period of two months in advance. Hence, to veto 
parliamentary laws, a joint action of authorities and citizens is needed.
The third obstacle for Latvian referendums results from both turnout and approval 
quorums that are required by the constitution. To be declared legally binding in a 
mandatory constitutional referendum, at least half of the eligible electorate has 
to vote in favour. The same criterion is also required for an adoption of a citizens’  
constitutional initiative233. Indeed, there is formally no turnout quorum required 
but,  in  fact,  to  reach  such  a  high  approval  quorum,  many  citizens  have  to 
participate in the ballot. In a semi-plebiscite on repealing a law or in a citizens’ 
legislative initiative, at least half of the number of electors that participated in 
the previous parliamentary election has to participate, and the majority of them 
have to vote in favour of the referendum. Another quorum pursuant to article 14 
CLv  is  required  when  Latvian  citizens  initiate  a  referendum  on  recalling  the 
parliament.  To dissolve the parliament and set new elections to it,  at  least a 
majority of two thirds of the number of the voters who participated in the last 
parliamentary elections are necessary.
Turnout quorums, whether formal or factual, may be the most significant factor to 
effect the adoption of a referendum. As mentioned above, in Latvia there were 
three  referendums  on  repealing  a  law,  one  citizens’  constitutional  and  one 
citizens’ legislative initiative that have been declared legally non-binding, despite 
the fact that they had all been accepted by the majority of the participants. An 
exception among these referendums is the presidential plebiscite on recalling the 
parliament; there neither a formal nor a factual turnout quorum is required.
4.3.2 Informal constraints
The  five  referendums  that  have  been  accepted  by  the  majority  of  the 
participants, but have been declared legally non-binding due to a low turnout, 
illustrate how the interaction between institutions and political actors matters. 
Knowing there is both formally and factually a minimum turnout required, the 
opposition parties of the referendum insofar act tactically to avoid the approval of 
it. They do not only oppose such proposals but they also urge citizens to ignore 
these and not participate in the corresponding ballots,  so that the decision is 
void.  An exception was the last  referendum on Russian as the second official 
language  in  February  2012,  and  this  because  of  its  cultural  and  historical 
significance  for  all  Latvians.  It  is  less  advisable  to  introduce  such  quorums 
because it does not only strongly decrease the potential of an approval, but also 
the potential of a constructive political discourse over the issue that is subject to 
a referendum. The opponents of a reform should seek to convince the majority of 
the citizens  with  arguments  and not  simply by  boycotting  the ballot.  Such  a 
232 Art. 7, par. 1 LoNRLIaECI.
233 Art. 79 CLv.
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mentality is neither a vital resource for the development of a critical civil society 
within a country, nor does it contribute to direct democracy.
A second informal aspect that influences the outcome of  direct democracy in 
Latvia is caused by the party system. In Latvia the parliament is elected based on 
proportional  representation. The formal rule of a proportional  electoral system 
causes an informal multi-party system, which, according  LUISE P. MØLLER, creates 
different incentives for political parties to use referendums234. She states that the 
Latvian party system is a fragmented system that has been characterized by 
large  coalition  governments235.  Considering  the  latest  developments  in  the 
Latvian party system since 2002 and the emergence of new parties or fractions, 
as it has been described by  JĀNIS IKTENS in his annual Latvian reports236, we can 
confirm that the Latvian party system is still very volatile and unstable. There is a 
continuing alteration of frequency and level. The former president VALDIS ZATLERS'S 
new political party, ZRP, established after his defeat in the presidential elections, 
does  not  promise  any  stabilisation  in  the  party  system  at  all.  In  such  a 
fragmented and loose constellation,  new parties  and their  electorate are  less 
equipped to organise and win a popular vote, either by collecting signatures to 
initiate a referendum or by mobilising the supporters to achieve the requested 
minimum turnout on the polling day237. Indeed, most attempts in this sense of 
triggering citizens’ initiatives have been investigated to attract political publicity 
for the parties and to increase popular support, especially in the lead-up to an 
election238.
Another informal constraining aspect results from the political culture itself. As far 
as the constitution is concerned, there is no lack of bottom-up direct democratic 
mechanism in Latvia. However, it still lacks a participatory culture. Twenty years 
after  independence,  participatory political  culture  within  the population is  still 
weak,  otherwise it  would  make it  easier  for  political  parties  to  mobilise  their 
supporters for their proposals or even to trigger a national referendum from the 
bottom up. And as mentioned above, turnout or approval quorums, in particular, 
are not conducive to strengthening such a participatory culture, which is why 
they should be either very low or totally inexistent.
234 MØLLER, p. 281 f.
235 MØLLER, p. 285.
236 IKSTENS JANIS, Latvia, European Journal of Political Research 42/2003, p. 1001; IKSTENS 
JANIS, Latvia, European Journal of Political Research 43/2004, p. 1055;  IKSTENS JANIS, 
Latvia, European Journal of Political Research 44/2005, p. 1077; IKSTENS JANIS, Latvia, 
European Journal of Political Research 48/2009, p. 1019.
237 similar MØLLER, p. 290.
238 see AUERS, p. 59.
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5 Legal framework and practice of direct democracy in Lithuania
5.1 Direct democratic instruments in Lithuania
Lithuania is  a  unitary state  with  a parliamentary  system. The single-chamber 
parliament is composed of 141239 deputies, who are elected for a four-year term. 
The president of the state is also elected through a popular vote, but for a term of 
five years240. Direct election ensures the president a great degree of legitimacy as 
head of the state. This is also apparent in the presidential functions, which are 
more  than  representative  ones.  In  particular,  the  president’s  strong  position 
becomes  clear  in  foreign  policy241,  which  is  why  some  scholars  characterize 
Lithuania  as  a  parliamentary-presidential  system242.  However,  the  president’s 
decision-making  competencies  are  dependent  on  the  consensus  of  the 
government and on a strong parliament (Seimas)243. Therefore, Lithuania could 
also be referred to as a semi-presidential system dominated by parliament244.
Besides the government and parliament, there is an additional important political 
body  that  can  be  involved  in  the  legislative  process,  namely  the  Lithuanian 
people.  As article  4  of  the constitution245 states,  ‘the nation shall  execute its 
supreme  power  either  directly  or  through  its  democratically  elected 
representatives’. Insofar, the Lithuanian representative democracy is completed 
by a system of decision-making on public issues in which citizens over 18 years 
can get involved directly246. The translation of the Lithuanian supreme power into 
the legislative process can occur in three ways. According to our classification, it 
can be required by the constitution,  from above and,  most  importantly,  from 
below, as provided for by the constitution. There are around 2,588,400 eligible 
citizens in Lithuania247. The current ‘Law on Referendum’ distinguishes between 
referendums that are mandatory and those that are consultative248. As in Estonia 
and Latvia,  binding referendums enable  Lithuanians to  become a veto  player 
within  a  decision-making  process.  Mandatory  referendums  are  binding  and 
designed  to  deal  primarily  with  constitutional  issues249,  including  Lithuania’s 
239 Art. 55, sec. 1, Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania of November 25, 1992 
(CLt).
240 A second term is possible.
241 Art. 84, sec. 1 CLt.
242 KRUPAVICIUS/ZVALIAUSKAS, p. 120.
243 TAUBER JOACHIM,  Das  politische  System  Litauens,  in:  ISMAYR WOLFGANG (ed.),  Die 
politischen Systeme Osteuropas, 3rd edition, (Wiesbaden 2010), p. 176 f., p. 179 
(cit. TAUBER).
244 For more information on competences between the institutions of the parliament 
and the president:  SAULIUS ARLAUSKAS, Sovereignty of a Nation in the Parliamentary 
System of Lithuania. Problems and Proposals, Limes 3(2)/2010, p. 99–109.
245 Adopted by citizens of the Republic of Lithuania in the Referendum of 25 October 
1992.
246 Art. 2, par. 2, Law on Referendums (LoR) passed by the Lithuanian Parliament on 4 
June 2002.
247 see  The  Central  Electoral  Commission  of  the  Republic  of  Lithuania  (CECLt), 
http://www.vrk.lt/2012_seimo_rinkimai/output_en/referendumas/referendumas.html 
(accessed on 05.11.2012).
248 Art. 3 LoR.
249 According  to  Art.  168  of  Seimas,  statute  laws  provided  in  Art.  150  of  the 
constitution, constitutional amendments, laws which are directly specified in the 
constitution, as well as other laws which give specific expression to constitutional 
norms and are  set  forth in  the  Law on the  List  of  Constitutional  Laws can be 
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membership in international organisations in certain respects, or to amendment 
the constitutional act of 8 June 1992250. But, legally it is also possible to hold a 
mandatory referendum on issues that might refer to other national issues or to 
legal  norms  below  the  constitutional  level251.  And  any  issue  below  the 
constitutional normative level, which has not been deliberated in a mandatory 
referendum, is consultative. Although they are advisory, the parliament has to 
hold  a  debate  on  the  issue,  but  the  final  say  is  vested  in  the  parliament252. 
Contrary to Estonia and Latvia, in Lithuania there is no restriction on the range of 
issues for top-down and bottom-up referendums. However, a serious weakness of 
the  Lithuanian  referendum  rights  arises  from  other  legal  obstacles.  The 
constitution requires a very high threshold for participation and approval,  and 
prescribes a short time for the collection of a large number of signatures. 
All specific rules and procedures are established by the ‘Law on Referendum’253 
(LoR),  which  had been passed by the Supreme Soviet  of  the Soviet  Socialist 
Republic  of  Lithuania  in  1989.  Even  at  that  time  the  article  3  of  the  LoR 
guaranteed Lithuanian citizens,  political  parties,  and other political  and public 
organisations the right to campaign without any restrictions for the proposal to 
call  a  referendum or  for  the  adoption  of  legal  provisions,  as  well  as  for  the 
settlement of issues of utmost significance. In the following years, the ‘Law on 
Referendums’  was  amended  by  the  Seimas  several  times,  whereby  some 
amendments have been found to be inconsistent with the constitution by the 
constitutional  court254.  But a real  discussion on new proposals to the law had 
started  in  1999,  evidently  caused  by  the  forthcoming  referendum  on  EU 
accession255. Finally, on 4 June 2002, the LoR was substituted by a totally new 
law. And the last amendment to the new ‘Law on Referendums’ was made on 10 
April 2008256.
Today, depending on the categorisation made in this paper, nine different direct 
democratic tools can be applied in Lithuania (for an overview see Table 3). The 
form and complexity of their procedure is determined by three mechanisms of 
direct democracy that have been characterised in the beginning. Although the 
complexity also results from numerous and often controversial changes that were 
made  to  the  Lithuanian  legislation257.  Referendums  are  being  organised  and 
carried out by the Central Electoral Committee.
deemed to be constitutional laws.
250 KRUPAVICIUS ALGIS, Lithuania, European Journal of Political Research 42/2003, p. 1017.
251 The constitution does not  make any  clear  specifications.  An advice  for  such  a 
distinction can be derived from Art. 4, par. 2 and Art. 7, par. 4 of the LoR. See also 
KRUPAVICIUS ALGIS,  Citizens’  Initiatives  in  Lithuania:  Initiative  Institutions  and  Their 
Political Impact in a New Democracy, in:  SETÄLÄ MAIJA/SCHILLER THEO (eds.), Citizens’ 
Initiatives in Europe. Procedures and Consequences of Agenda-Setting by Citizens 
(Basingstoke 2012), p. 136 (cit. KRUPAVICIUS, Citizens’ Initiatives).
252 KRUPAVICIUS, Citizens’ Initiatives, p. 136.
253 see also Art. 9, sec. 2 CLt.
254 KRUPAVICIUS/ZVALIAUSKAS, p. 113.
255 MAZYLIS LIUDAS/UNIKAITE INGRIDA, The Lithuanian EU Accession Referendum 10–11 May 
2003. Referendum Briefing No. 8 for European Parties Elections and Referendums 
Network EPERN, p. 1 in: 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/research/europeanpartieselectionsreferendumsnetwor
k/epernreferendumbriefings (accessed on 14.12.2012) (cit. MAZYLIS/UNIKAITE).
256 HOFFMANN, Baltikum, p. 320.
257 MAZYLIS/UNIKAITE, p. 2.
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5.1.1 Referendums required by constitution
According to article 9 CLt, ‘most significant issues concerning the existence of the 
state and the nation shall be decided by a referendum’. An issue can be deemed 
as  important  if  the  constitution  or  law  explicitly  demands  its  decision  by  a 
referendum.  In  the  Lithuanian  case,  there  are  three  different  mandatory 
referendums  that  are  required  by  the  constitution  or  the  law:  mandatory 
constitutional referendums, the mandatory referendum on the amendment of the 
Constitutional  Act,  and  the  mandatory  referendum  on  participation  in 
international  organisations258.  All  three  instruments  are  proactive  and  aim  to 
change the status quo.  In  most  cases,  these referendums are framed by the 
parliament and triggering follows automatically, as required by the constitution. 
But, framing of referred issues can also be done from the bottom up, namely, if 
citizens propose a policy  change on  the issue individually259.  Another  framing 
actor can also appear if the proposal submitted to vote deals with international 
treaties.  Here the framing is  mostly  a result  of  a  joint  action of  the national 
parliament and the other state or the international organisation.
5.1.1.1 The mandatory constitutional referendum
In general, amendments of the majority part of constitutional provisions must be 
considered and voted on twice in the parliament. To be deemed adopted, a draft 
law on the alteration of the constitution has to be approved in both sessions by a 
qualified majority of not less than two-thirds of all members of the parliament 
and no referendum is required260. However, in case of an alteration of provisions 
of Chapter I and Chapter XIV of the constitution, a popular vote is mandatory, 
otherwise  these  provisions  cannot  be  changed261.  Chapter  I,  ‘The  State  of 
Lithuania’, covers the first 17 articles of the constitution that determine the form 
and  governing  rules262 of  the  Lithuanian  political  system,  including  other 
fundamentals, such as territorial integrity, citizenship, language, the state flag 
and the capital. Chapter XIV, consisting of articles 147-154 CLt, refers to these 
legal provisions that concern the ‘Alteration of the Constitution’. It is forbidden to 
amend the constitution during a state of emergency or martial law263.
5.1.1.2 The mandatory referendum on the Constitutional Act
The  mandatory  referendum  on  the  constitutional  act  is  a  further  direct 
democratic tool, which is triggered automatically if there is any alteration to the 
Constitutional  Act  of  8  June  1992  ‘on  the  Non-Alignment  of  the  Republic  of 
Lithuania to Post-Soviet-Eastern Alliances’264.
5.1.1.3 The mandatory referendum on participation in an International  
Organisation
Any  decision  concerning  the  Lithuanian  membership  in  international 
organisations  that  requires  a  ‘partial  transfer  of  the  scope  of  competence  of 
258 Art. 4, par. 1, sec. 1, 2, 3, 4 LoR.
259 see Chapter V-A-3 Citizen-initiated referendums.
260 Art. 148, sec. 3 CLt.
261 Art. 148, sec. 1 and 2 CLt; Art. 4, par. 1, sec. 1–3 LoR.
262 Including the referendum rights as indicated under Art. 9 CLt.
263 Art. 147, sec. 2 CLt.
264 Art. 4, par. 1, sec. 4 LoR.
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government  bodies  to  the  institutions  of  international  organisations  or 
jurisdictions thereof’ has to be submitted to a popular vote as well265.
5.1.1.4 The procedure of referendums required by the constitution
All three ‘automatic referendums’ are binding and conducted by almost the same 
procedures.  Any referendum on the amendment of  chapters  I  and XIV of  the 
constitution, on the Constitutional Act of 8 June 1992, as well as on participation 
in international organisations in certain respects, as indicated above, require both 
a  high  turnout  and  approval  quorum.  According  to  article  7,  par.  1  LoR  ‘A 
mandatory referendum shall be deemed to have taken place if over one half of 
the citizens, who have the right to vote and have been registered in electoral 
rolls, participated in it’. If a participation quorum fails to reach 50 percent of the 
total electorate, an automatic referendum is deemed void, even if approved.
For an approval of a ‘mandatory constitutional referendum’ the support of more 
than half of registered electorate is required266. One deviation from this approval 
provision concerns the alteration of  the first  article of  the constitution,  which 
states that ‘the state of Lithuania shall be an independent, democratic republic’. 
The first provision of the constitution can ‘only be altered by  referendum if not 
less than three-fourths of the citizens of Lithuania with electoral rights vote in 
favour thereof’267.
The  same  wide  approval  quorum  is  also  asked  for  an  amendment  of  the 
Constitutional Act of 8 June 1992, as described under ‘mandatory referendum on 
constitutional act’268. The approval quorum for the third compulsory referendum, 
the ‘mandatory referendum on participation in international organizations’, can 
vary. Depending on the content of the international treaty, which may require an 
alteration of articles of chapters I and XIV CLt, the quorum will be at least 50 
percent  of  the  registered  electorate.  If  not,  the  referendum  can  be  deemed 
approved if more than half of the participants in the vote, but at least one third of 
the citizens having the right to vote and having been registered on electoral rolls, 
have accepted it269. 
After the vote, the Central Electoral Committee has to establish and announce 
the final results in the official gazette ‘Valsytybes zinios’270. In case of an approval 
it has also to present the text of the resolution adopted by referendum to the 
president271. The president has to sign and officially proclaim the law and other 
legal enactments or resolutions passed by referendum no later than within five 
days after. Should the president fail to sign and proclaim such a law, then the 
signing and proclaiming must be fulfilled by the chairman272.  A law passed by 
referendum on an amendment to the constitution enters into force no earlier than 
one month from the date of its approval273. Other laws that pass an automatic 
265 Art. 4, par. 1, sec. 5 LoR.
266 Art. 7, par. 3 LoR.
267 Art. 148, sec. 1 CLt and Art. 7, par. 2 LoR.
268 Art. 7, par. 2 LoR.
269 Art. 7, par. 4 LoR.
270 Art. 71 and 73 LoR.
271 Art. 73, par. 2 LoR.
272 Art. 78, par. 2 and 3 LoR.
273 Art. 78, par. 4 LoR.
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referendum shall enter into force on the day of their publication in the official 
gazette or on the day stipulated in them274.
5.1.2 Referendums from above
In addition to Estonia and Latvia, the right to trigger a referendum from above is 
also  given  to  the  Lithuanian  authorities.  The  Lithuanian  top-down  direct 
democratic  mechanism  is  composed  of  two  instruments,  namely  the 
‘parliamentary  constitutional  plebiscite’  and  the  ‘parliamentary  plebiscite  on 
other issues, laws and provisions’. Considering the wording of article 9, par. 3 
LoR,  ‘a  group comprising of  at  least  one-fourth  of  the Seimas members  may 
submit to the Seimas a proposal to call a referendum’, it can be suggested that a 
parliamentary plebiscite whether constitutional or not can either be proactive or 
reactive.
A  proactive policy change supporting a parliamentary plebiscite may occur if a 
reform wing in the parliament is afraid that it may not receive the support of the 
required parliamentary majority and thus wants to get the needed approval of 
the people (framing and asking by the same actor). And a  reactive status quo 
supporting a parliamentary plebiscite may be held if a part of the parliamentary 
members trigger a referendum on a resolution that has been framed by the other 
part of the parliament (different actors for framing and triggering). Certain that 
the majority of parliament would approve the issue, they then attempted to veto 
it by a popular decision. In both cases the necessary threshold for triggering a 
referendum stands at least at one-fourth of all parliaments members275. But, it is 
also possible that a parliamentary majority triggers a referendum.
The  threshold  for  calling  a  parliamentary  plebiscite  has  been  decreased  two 
times since 1992. In the beginning more than half of the parliamentary members 
and after 1996 one-third of the deputies were asked to initiate the calling of a 
referendum276. It can be seen that the right to initiate a plebiscitary referendum 
has become somewhat more an instrument of the parliamentary minorities. But, 
still it is a high obstacle for small parties in the parliament. This means, in the 
beginning the proposal  of  the parliamentary group has to be deliberated and 
considered in the parliament277.
5.1.2.1 The parliamentary constitutional plebiscite
According to article 9, par. 1 LoR the right to initiate the calling of a referendum is 
given  to  the  citizens,  but  also  to  the  Lithuanian  parliament278.  As  mentioned 
above, such referendums can either be proactive or reactive. The procedures on 
submitting  the  issue  to  popular  vote  are  the  same.  The  proposal  of  the 
parliamentary group to call a referendum has to indicate the type of referendum 
(mandatory or consultative: resolutions on constitutional issues are mandatory) 
and the text of the resolution that should be adopted by a referendum279. The 
resolution can either concern a motion to alter or supplement the constitution, 
which has been submitted by a parliamentary minority consisting of a group of 
274 Art. 78, par. 5 LoR.
275 Art. 9, par. 3 LoR.
276 KRUPAVICIUS, Citizens’ Initiatives, p. 136 f.
277 Art. 12, par. 1 LoR.
278 Art. 9, par. 1 LoR.
279 Art. 12, par. 1 LoR.
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not less than one-fourth of all members of the parliament280, or an issue framed 
by a parliamentary majority that should be blocked by popular decision. For both 
types of constitutional plebiscites (proactive or reactive), a group comprising of at 
least one-fourth of the members of parliament is needed to submit a proposal to 
parliament calling for a referendum281.
It should be noted that no policy area is excluded from the referendum process. 
The parliamentary group can propose resolutions for any constitutional issue that 
it deems significant for the existence of state and the nation282. The parliament’s 
decision on the proposal to call a referendum has to be made in accordance with 
the procedure set forth by the Seimas Statute283 and the referendum must be 
held ‘no later than in three months and no sooner than in two months from the 
day of passing the Seimas Resolution on the date of calling the referendum’284.
As in other referendums, parliamentary plebiscites also require a turnout quorum 
of 50 percent of the total electorate285. A constitutional plebiscite fails if fewer 
than 50 percent of the electorate have taken part in it. Depending on the issue 
submitted  to  referendum,  the  procedure  on  approval  can  vary.  If  it  refers  to 
provisions of chapters I and XIV of the constitution, then the approval quorum 
ranges from at least one-half to three-fourths of the whole electorate. And if it 
refers to other constitutional provisions than those of chapters I and XIV, then the 
parliamentary constitutional plebiscite shall  be deemed adopted if it has been 
approved by at least one-third of the electorate286. Before the total revision of LoR 
in 2002, the minimum approval quorum for such referendums was at least 50 
percent of all eligible voters. With the new law that had partially lowered some 
approval quorums, direct democracy became a bit more citizen-friendly. But, it is 
still  a high obstacle in the procedure of direct legislation. If  the law passes a 
referendum on an amendment to the constitution,  it has to enter into force not 
later than after one month from the day it was passed by the referendum287.
5.1.2.2 The parliamentary plebiscite on other issues, laws, provisions
As par. 3 of article 9 CLt states, the right of calling a referendum belongs, besides 
to the citizens, also to a parliamentary group comprising of not less than one-
fourth (141:4) of the members of parliament288. Here, the article does not make 
any difference as to whether such a referendum is applicable to constitutional or 
other issues. In conjunction with article 3; article 4, par. 2; article 5; article 7, par. 
1, sec. 4; article 12, par. 1 LoR, as well as with article 67, par. 3 and article 69, 
sec. 4289 CLt, we can assume that a parliamentary plebiscite is possible for other 
issues  and  laws  than  what  is  provided  by  the  constitution.  Once  the 
parliamentary  minority  considers  an  issue  fundamental  to  the  State  and  the 
280 Art. 147, sec. 1 CLt.
281 Art. 9, par. 3 LoR.
282 consider Art. 4, par. 2; Art. 9, par. 3 LoR.
283 Art.  9, par.  3 and Art.  12, par.  1 LoR, see Chapters XIX–XXVI of Seimas of the 
Republic of Lithuania Statute of February 17, 1994.
284 Art. 15, par. 1 and 2 LoR
285 Art. 7, par. 1 LoR.
286 Art. 7, par. 1–4 LoR.
287 Art. 78, par. 4 LoR.
288 Art. 9, par . 1 and 3 LoR.
289 Provisions of laws of Lithuania may also be adopted by referendum, Art. 69, sec. 4 
CLt.
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Nation  as  important,  it  can  become  subject  to  a  referendum,  too290.  As  for 
parliamentary constitutional plebiscites, also for these referendums, formally, no 
restriction on policy areas is prescribed. Such authorities’  referendums can be 
held with regard to any other issues and laws291. Also here, both intensions of the 
referendum are possible: a proactive parliamentary plebiscite to alter the law and 
a reactive parliamentary plebiscite to veto it. As with constitutional plebiscites, 
the minority proposal on other issues must also be deliberated by the parliament.
One  distinction  with  regard  to  constitutional  plebiscites  is  the  character  of  a 
referendum.  Here,  as  far  as  the  proposal  does  not  deal  with  constitutional 
matters, it can either be consultative or  binding. The parliamentary group must 
indicate the type of referendum, and, according to the procedure set forth in the 
‘Seimas Statute’, the parliament adopts a decision on it. For the validation of the 
results, a turnout quorum of 50 percent of the total electorate is required also 
here292.  To  be  adopted  at  ballot,  a  consultative  minority  resolution  has  to  be 
favoured by at least one half (=25% of total electorate) of the participants293. 
Even if  approved by the citizens,  the final  decision on advisory parliamentary 
plebiscites  to  come  into  force  still  depends  on  the  volition  of  the  whole 
parliament.  It  is  up to  the parliament whether  or  not  to  consider  the voters’ 
decision294. By contrast, a resolution regarding other issues that has been framed 
as a binding referendum can be deemed as approved and legally binding for all 
state authorities if at least one-third of the electorate favours it295, and it enters 
into force on the day of its publication in the official gazette296.
5.1.3 Citizen-initiated referendums
Citizen-initiated  referendums  belong  to  the  bottom-up  mechanism  of  direct 
democracy.  It  can  either  be  a  ‘citizens’  facultative  referendum’  to  refuse  an 
amendment to a specific law or public issue that has been adopted by the public 
authorities or a ‘citizens’ initiative’ to change the status quo by creating a law 
from below. In both cases a collection of a certain number of signatures of eligible 
citizens is needed. However, due to its popular framing and triggering features, 
the second type of citizen-initiated referendum – the citizens’ initiative – complies 
much more with the sense of direct democracy.
Currently, the Lithuanian constitution does not distinguish very clearly between 
the  citizens’  facultative  referendum and  citizens’  initiative.  But,  following  the 
wording of article 9 of the constitution, which states that ‘a referendum shall be 
announced if not fewer than 300,000 citizens with electoral rights so request’297, 
we  can  assume  that  citizen-initiated  referendums  can  either  be  reactive,  to 
refuse parliamentary decisions (citizens’ facultative referendum), or proactive, to 
enact  or  amend  legal  provisions.  Policy  changing  citizens’  initiatives  can  be 
subclassified into ‘citizens’ constitutional  initiative’,  ‘citizens’  initiative on laws 
290 Art. 9, sec. 1 CLt.
291 consider Art. 4, par. 2; Art. 7, par. 4 and Art. 9, par. 3 LoR.
292 Art. 7, par. 1 and Art. 8, par. 1 LoR.
293 Art. 8, par. 1 and 2 LoR.
294 Art. 8, par. 3 LoR.
295 Art. 7, par. 4 LoR.
296 Art. 78, par. 5 LoR.
297 see also Art. 3 and Art. 9, par. 1 LoR.
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and other issues’ and ‘citizens’ consultative initiative’298. All three instruments are 
proactive, to create new laws, and all are framed and triggered by the citizens. 
However,  the citizens control  only the first  and second popular initiative fully 
since the outcome of the third instrument is consultative and not binding, unlike 
the first and second instrument. Therefore, due to the third instrument’s non-
binding  character,  the  people  cannot  be  introduced  into  the  decision-making 
process as one additional veto player.
In Lithuania, also a further instrument, the so-called ‘citizens’ agenda initiative’ 
persists299. But, it is important to note that the Lithuanian agenda initiative does 
not form part of referendum rights since it works rather like a petition. It contains 
a proposal addressed to the parliament that has to consider but not submit it to a 
popular vote.
5.1.3.1 The citizens’ facultative referendum
The Lithuanian constitution does not clearly state whether the people are entitled 
to  veto  parliamentary  decisions.  Nevertheless,  following  article  9,  par.  2  (A 
referendum shall also be announced if not fewer than 300,000 citizens with the 
electoral right so request) it can be said that the citizens are also empowered to 
trigger  a  binding  or  consultative  referendum  on  any  kind  of  parliamentary 
decision300.  As  for  citizens’  initiatives,  three  months  are  given  to  collect  the 
minimum number of signatures301. For an approval, at least half of the electorate 
has to participate and, depending on the issue, the necessary quorum for turnout 
can vary302.
5.1.3.2 The citizens’ constitutional initiative
Besides most significant issues that are established to automatically be put to a 
referendum (required referendums)  by the constitution303,  there are  additional 
important subjects  concerning core state and the national  issues that  can be 
decided  by  a  mandatory  referendum,  if  no  fewer  than  300,000  citizens  so 
request304.  This  instrument  refers  to  changes  to  the  constitution,  which  is 
supposed to contain most significant principles and procedures of the state and 
the nation.  And there is  no restriction on  subject  matter.  Any issue,  whether 
political, economical or societal, can be adopted or altered or supplemented by 
such a tool if it is considered as essential by the people305. 
5.1.3.3 The citizens’ initiative on laws and other issues
Although most  significant  issues  are  framed  in  the  constitution,  it  has  to  be 
considered that legally it is not prohibited to use the citizens’ initiative to create a 
new law306. The possibility of referendums on laws is also evident if we consider 
section 4 of article 69 CLt. It emphasises that ‘provisions for laws of the Republic 
298 Art. 9, sec. 2, Art. 147, sec. 1 CLt and Art. 4, par. 2, Art. 5 LoR.
299 Art. 68, sec. 2 CLt.
300 see also Art. 9, par. 2 LoR.
301 Art. 11, par. 5 LoR.
302 Art. 7, par. 1 and Art. 8, par. 1 LoR.
303 Provisions of Chapter I and XIV of the Constitution, participation in international 
organisations, amendment to the Constitutional Act of June 8, 1992.
304 Art. 9, sec. 2 CLt, Art. 147, sec. 1 CLt and Art. 4, par. 2 LoR.
305 see Art. 9, sec. 1 and 3 CLt.
306 see Art. 9 CLt and also KRUPAVICIUS, Citizens’ Initiatives, p. 136.
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of Lithuania may also be adopted by referendum’307. A referendum might also be 
triggered for an adoption of a specific public issue if over 300,000 citizens deem 
it important. Also here, legally no restriction on subject matter is foreseen308.
5.1.3.4 The citizens’ consultative initiative
Consultative referendums can be held  with  respect  to  other  issues of  utmost 
importance to the state and the people. However,  also here at least 300,000 
signatures  are  needed  to  trigger  a  consultative  initiative309.  According  to  the 
provisions  of  the  constitution  and  LoR,  it  is  not  always  possible  to  clearly 
distinguish the kinds of issues that can be subject to such an initiative. If  we 
follow ALGIS KRUPAVICIUS’ argumentation, we can say that no consultative referendum 
can be held on constitutional issues310. 
5.1.3.5 Procedures of citizens’ initiatives
The  Law  on  Referendums  (LoR)  establishes  the  procedures  of  initiation, 
announcement organisation and execution of  referendums.  The procedures of 
‘citizens’ constitutional  initiative’, ‘citizens’ initiative on laws and other issues’ 
and  ‘citizens’  consultative  initiative’  are  subject  to  almost  the  same  legal 
requirements311. Unfortunately, in many cases the LoR does not always make a 
clear distinction between the different types of citizen-initiated referendums.
To launch (framing) an initiative from below at least 15 eligible citizens have to 
form an initiative group312. The proponents have to file their application to the 
Central  Electoral  Commission of  Lithuania (CECLt).  The initiative group has to 
indicate the referendum type (mandatory or consultative) and if their resolution 
for adoption by referendum consists of a preliminary or final text313. The formal 
distinction  between  preliminary  and  final  text  illustrates  that  Lithuanians  are 
entitled to frame their proposal in both legal forms of an initiative. It can either be 
proposed as a general suggestion (preliminary text) or as a formulated draft (final 
text). In case the proposed text is preliminary, the Seimas Office has to render 
assistance in drafting the final text of the resolution by enlisting legal experts314. 
Once  all  the  members  of  the  initiative  group  have  signed  the  text  of  the 
resolution, it shall be deemed final and any alteration of the text is prohibited315. 
Thereafter the collection of citizens’ signatures for the initiative to call a citizens’ 
referendum begins. A three-month time limit (two months before 1996) is set to 
collect not fewer than 300,000 signatures316. This high signature quota to trigger 
a  popular  initiative,  which  already  existed  in  the  LoR  of  1989,  remains 
unchanged.
307 Art. 69, sec. 4 CLt.
308 see Art. 9, sec. 1 and 3 CLt.
309 Art. 5 LoR.
310 KRUPAVICIUS, Citizens’ Initiatives, p. 136 f.
311 It is assumed that the citizens’ facultative referendum follows the same procedural 
steps.
312 Art. 10, par. 1 LoR.
313 Art. 10, par. 2 LoR.
314 Art. 6, par. 2 sec. 3, Art. 10, par. 4 LoR.
315 Art. 10, par. 4 and 6 LoR.
316 Art. 11, par. 5 LoR.
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At least, there is no restriction on collection locations. Signatures can be collected 
in any public place317. After the time limit, all signature collection lists have first to 
be verified by the CECLt within 15 days. The committee, having determined that 
the documents meet the requirements of the LoR, gives to the parliament the 
final  act  along  with  the  citizens’  petitions  and  its  own  conclusions318.  One 
exception is made if up to 0.5 percent of signatures are lacking. In such cases the 
CECLt informs the initiative group and sets an additional  15-day time limit to 
make up for this shortfall319. In case of a violation of the time limit or of other 
principles of the collection set forth in the law, the CECLt refuses the proponents’ 
petition  to  call  referendum.  The  initiative  group  has  the  right  to  appeal  the 
committee’s decision to the Superior Administrative Court of Lithuania320.
If there is no violation of the principles, the CECLt transmits the final act of the 
citizens’  group  along  with  citizens’  valid  signatures  and  the  committee’s 
conclusions to the parliament for deliberation. Within one month the parliament 
has to pass the resolution on the date of calling the referendum321. As in Latvia, 
there is no formal provision allowing the parliament to draft a counter-proposal to 
a  citizens’  initiative.  Regardless  of  whether  mandatory  or  consultative,  a 
referendum has to be announced322. The referendum has to be held no later than 
three and no sooner than two months from the day of passing the parliamentary 
resolution on the date of calling the referendum323. But a referendum may be not 
held if the group of experts formed in the Seimas conclude that the citizens’ text 
may not be in keeping with the Lithuanian constitution324. For such cases the law 
does not state whether there is a possibility to appeal parliament’s decision to 
the  constitutional  court.  If  not,  the  Lithuanian  procedure  with  regard  to  the 
legality check is quite similar to the initiatives procedure in Switzerland, wherein 
the Swiss parliament, as a final instance, checks the constitutionality of citizens’ 
initiatives325.
To be deemed as having taken place, in all three citizen-initiated referendums at 
least one half of the registered electorate has to take part326. After the end of the 
referendum vote,  all  counting  records  are  to  be  delivered  to  the  CECLt.  The 
committee  is  responsible  for  establishing  and  announcing  the  final  results 
officially327.
The  main  difference  between  ‘citizens’  constitutional  initiative’,  ‘citizens’ 
initiative on laws and other issues’ and ‘citizens’ consultative initiative’ concerns 
the approval  quorum and to their  legal  character.  The approval  quorum for a 
‘citizens’  constitutional  initiative’  depends  on  the  constitutional  issue  that  is 
submitted  to  a  vote.  If  it  refers  to  the  same  issues  for  which  a  mandatory 
referendum is required by law, the approval  quorum can vary.  At least three-
317 Art. 11, par. 4, 5, 6, 9 LoR.
318 Art. 13, par. 1 LoR.
319 Art. 13, par. 2 LoR.
320 Art. 13, par. 3 LoR.
321 Art. 14, par. 1 LoR.
322 Art. 9, sec. 3 CLt.
323 Art. 15, par. 1 and 2 LoR.
324 Art. 14, par. 2.
325 Art. 139, par. 3 of the Swiss Federal Constitution of April 18, 1999 (Cst-CH).
326 Art. 7, par. 1 and Art. 8, par. 1 LoR.
327 Art. 70; Art. 71 par. 1; Art. 73, par. 1 LoR.
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fourth yes-votes of the registered electorate are asked for an amendment of the 
provision  of  article  one  of  the  constitution328.  And  for  an  amendment  of  a 
provision of chapter I329 and XIV of the constitution, more than 50 percent support 
from the whole registered electorate is required330.  Other constitutional  issues 
can  be  deemed  approved  if  more  than  one  half  of  the  participants  in  the 
referendum, but at least one-third of the registered electorate has voted in favour 
thereof331. The same approval quota of one-third of the total electorate is also 
required for an adoption of a ‘citizens’ initiative on laws and other issues’332. Until 
2002  to  pass  such  citizen-initiated  proposals  the  LoR  required  a  very  high 
approval  quorum (50  percent  of  the  electorate);  the  new LoR,  however,  has 
lowered this quorum333.
A  law  passed  by  referendum  on  an  amendment  to  the  constitution,  as  the 
‘citizens’ constitutional referendum’ demands, is binding and, hence, has to enter 
into  force  no  earlier  than  after  one  month  from  the  day  it  was  passed  by 
referendum334.  Also  a  law  according  to  ‘citizens’  initiative  on  laws  and  other 
issues’ that has been approved by a referendum is binding. It enters into force on 
the day of its publication in the official gazette, provided that a later entry into 
force date is not stipulated in it335. 
For a ‘citizens’ consultative initiative’ over one half of the participants (at least 25 
percent  of  the  registered  electorate)  is  needed  to  approve  the  resolution336. 
However, due to its advisory character, the decision on the referendum is not 
binding and the issue has to be deliberated in a parliamentary session, according 
to the procedure established by the Seimas Statute, within one month from the 
announcement of its results, and it may come into force if the parliament votes 
accordingly337.
5.1.3.6 The citizens’ agenda initiative: something between referendum 
and petition
Besides the institutions of the referendum338 and the right of petition339, there is a 
further  democratic  instrument  in  Lithuania,  namely  the  ‘citizens’  agenda 
initiative’340. It is a tool somewhere between the two political rights of referendum 
and  petition.  It  allows  a  certain  number  of  citizens  eligible  to  vote  to  set  a 
particular issue on the parliament’s agenda, however, without any legal force to 
bring it  to  a  popular  vote.  Also,  for  this  instrument  there is  no issue that  is 
prohibited from being presented. But, it does not belong to the referendum rights 
category  because  it  does  not  necessarily  trigger  a  referendum,  nor  does  it 
328 Art. 7, par. 2 LoR and Art. 148, sec. 1 CLt.
329 with exception of Art. 1 of the Constitution.
330 Art. 7, par. 3 LoR.
331 Art. 7, par. 4 LoR.
332 Art. 7, par. 4 LoR.
333 KRUPAVICIUS, Citizens’ Initiatives, p. 137.
334 Art. 78, par. 4 LoR.
335 Art. 78, par. 5 LoR.
336 Art. 8, par. 2 and 3 LoR.
337 Art. 8, par. 2 and 3 LoR.
338 see Art. 4 and Art. 5 LoR.
339 Art. 33 CLt.
340 Art. 68, sec. 2 CLt.
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entirely fit  the description of  a  petition341.  In  contrast  to  a petition,  it  can be 
forwarded to the parliament merely in order to propose a new legislation to be 
voted on. Further, only Lithuanian citizens over 18 years and eligible to vote are 
entitled to apply this  instrument342,  whilst  initiating a petition is  accessible to 
everybody who has reached the age of 16 years and a petition can be forwarded 
to all public authorities343.
The right of legislate initiative also differs from a procedural point of view. At least 
ten citizens with the right of vote are requested to form the steering group of 
such  an  idea344.  They  have  to  submit  their  proposal  to  the  CECLt  to  its 
consideration345. Thereafter, not fewer than 50,000 signatures within two months 
to propose a draft law and not fewer than 300,000 signatures within four months 
to suggest a constitutional proposal (adoption, amendment, supplementation) to 
the parliament are needed346. The nature of the Lithuanian agenda initiative is a 
proposing and not an abrogative one.  Which means that  it  is  not possible to 
repeal an existing law347. After the collection, signature collection sheets have to 
be  submitted  to  the  CECLt  for  verification348,  the  commission  transmits  the 
signatures  and  citizens’  proposal  to  parliament  for  its  presentation  and 
consideration349.  The  majority  of  the  parliamentarians  present  are  needed  to 
decide whether a citizens’ agenda initiative should be accepted350. Due to its non-
binding character, the Seimas is free to refuse or accept the entire or some parts  
of the proposal. In case of an acceptance, the proposed law or alteration to the 
constitution has to be adopted, according to the procedure established by the 
Seimas Statute351.
It is reasonable to exclude a citizens’ agenda initiative from the realm of direct 
democracy because it  does not  provide a referendum process with a binding 
result. A referendum may occur if the agenda initiative refers to a constitutional 
issue  that  has  to  be  submitted  automatically  to  a  referendum,  and  if  the 
parliament’s majority was willing to further consider the citizens’ motion at its 
session. Nevertheless, it is very unlikely that a part of the citizens would collect 
300,000 signatures to start an advisory procedure to amend such provisions of 
the constitution. They would rather trigger the direct procedure for amending the 
constitution, namely through a ‘citizens’ constitutional referendum’. It might be 
that  a  ‘citizens’  agenda  initiative’  places  strong  public  pressure  on  the 
parliament. Nevertheless, in addition to the referendum and petition rights, this 
kind of political instrument, without any legal binding force and with relatively 
restrictive legal  barriers,  seems – compared with referendums – to be a little 
341 According to IRI, a petition is a written submission with no particular form that any 
person may send to an authority. It can contain a proposal, a criticism or a request, 
and the subject matter may be any state activity, IRI, p. 238.
342 Art. 2 of the Law on citizens’ legislatives of the Republic of Lithuania of December 
22, 1998 (LoCLt); There are also procedural differences.
343 Art. 2, par. 2 Law on Petitions of the Republic of Lithuania of July 7, 1999 (LoP).
344 Art. 5, par. 1 LoCLt.
345 Art. 6, par. 1 LoCLt.
346 Art. 2, par. 1 and 2, Art. 9, par. 1 and 2 (LoCLt); see also Art. 68, sec. 2 CLt.
347 KRUPAVICIUS, Citizens’ Initiatives, p. 138.
348 Art. 11 and Art. 12 LoCLt.
349 Art. 13, par. 1, Art. 17 and Art. 19 LoCLt.
350 Art. 19 LoCLt.
351 Art. 20 LoCLt.
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superfluous. As the right of petition, it remains a blunt political right. This might 
also become obvious if  we consider the use and efficiency of this democratic 
instrument. According to  ALGIS KRUPAVICIUS, seven attempts have been made since 
1999, and in only one case the parliament passed the proposed changes to the 
law.  In  six  other  cases  the  initiators  (mainly  political  parties)  either  failed  to 
collect the required number of signatures or the Seimas did not deliberate the 
initiative352. 
352 For more detail see KRUPAVICIUS, Citizens’ Initiatives, p. 145 f.
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NAME OF DD 
INSITUTION SUBJECT MATTER
SUBMITTED 
DUE TO CHARACTER INTENSION
POL. ACTOR / VETO-PLAYER1 FORMAL RESTRICTIONS FOR USE











to alter the provisions of 
chapter I and XIV of the 
constitution
law binding proactive parliament(citizens) automatic
>50% of total 
electorate3
>1/2 of electorate, 
exception for first 
article: >3/4 of 
electorate




to alter the provisions of 
the constitutional act of 
8 June 1992
law binding proactive parliament(citizens) automatic
>50% of total 
electorate
>3/4% of total 
electorate – – –
yes only for 
referred act 0 / 0 / 0
Mandatory 
referendum acc. to 
International 
Organizations
to access Int. Org. that 
involves partial transfer 
of state competencies
law binding proactive parliament / Int. Org.(citizens) automatic
>50% of total 
electorate
either >1/3 or >1/2 of 










to alter and supplement 
the constitution parliament binding
proactive / 
reactive
>1/4 of the 
parliament4 in case of 
proactive otherwise 
parliament
>1/4 of the 
parliament
>50% of total 
electorate
either >1/3 or >1/2 or 
>3/4 of total electorate – – – no 5 / 0 / 4
Parliamentary 
plebiscite on other 
issues, laws, 
provisions
to adopt or amend or a 





>1/4 of the parliament 
in case of proactive 
otherwise parliament
>1/4 of the 
parliament
>50% of total 
electorate
if binding >1/3 of total 
electorate if 
consultative >1/2 of 
participants (>25% of 
total electorate)









= 11.6% of total
electorate
>50% of total 
electorate
either >1/3 or >1/2 or 
>3/4 of total electorate
>300’000
= 11.6% of total 
electorate




to initiate a general 
suggestion or a 
formulated draft to alter 
the constitution
citizens binding proactive >15 eligible citizens
>300’000
= 11.6% of total
electorate
>50% of total 
electorate
either >1/3 or >1/2 or 
>3/4 of total electorate
>300’000
= 11.6% of total 
electorate
3 months5 public places no 0 / 0 / 0
Citizens’ initiative 
on laws and other 
issues 
to initiate a general 
suggestion or a 
formulated draft to adopt 
a law or another issue
citizens binding proactive >15 eligible citizens
>300’000
= 11.6% of total
electorate
>50% of total 
electorate >1/3 of total electorate
>300’000
= 11.6% of total 
electorate




to initiate a general 
suggestion or a 
formulated draft to adopt 
a law or another issue
citizens consultative proactive >15 eligible citizens
>300’000
= 11.6% of total
electorate
>50% of total 
electorate
>1/2 of participants 
(>25% of total 
electorate)
>300’000
= 11.6% of total 
electorate
3 months5 public places no 0 / 0 / 0
Total Votes 20 / 4 / 14
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Remarks
1: The possibility of a referendum introduces the citizens as one additional veto player into the public legislative process. A veto player is an individual or collective actor  
whose agreement is needed for a change in the legislative status quo. If an existing or latent veto player controls both the framing of the proposal and the triggering of the 
referendum, other veto players lose their ability to veto outcomes, the number of veto players decreases and potential of policy change increases (HUG/TSEBELIS, 2002)
2: q / a / ai = quantity of referendums / approved / approved but invalid due to precise formal restrictions
3: There are around 2,588,400 eligible voters in Lithuania (2012).
4: The single-chamber parliament consists of 141 deputies (Art. 55 CLt).
5. If up to 0.5% of the signatures are lacking an additional 15-day time limit is set to eliminate these deficiencies (Art. 13 par. 2 LoR)
6. One of them refers to the approved referendum on independence, which was held on 9 February 1991.
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5.2 Lithuanian direct democracy in practice
Among the Baltic States Lithuania is the leading country with regard to frequency 
of  using  direct  democratic  tools  in  national  politics..  Since  1991  twenty 
referendums including the referendum on independence have been held  (see 
Table 3  and Figure 3).  However, only four referendums succeeded in full  and 
came into force. Others have either been rejected (2) or did not become legally 
binding due to lack of turnout and qualified approval (14)353.
Figure 3: 
According to our conceptualisation, in Lithuania we can distinguish between nine 
different  direct  democratic  tools  divided  into  three  direct  democratic 
mechanisms. With regard to these three mechanisms of direct democracy, there 
were only two required referendums (1 mandatory constitutional referendum and 
1 mandatory referendum on participation in International  Organisations)  in 20 
years. They were both approved by the people and became legally binding. A 
major part (9) of the referendums that have been held in Lithuania belong to the 
category of referendums from above (five parliamentary constitutional plebiscites 
and four parliamentary plebiscites on other issues and laws).  They have been 
framed  and  triggered  by  public  authorities.  Indeed,  seven  of  nine  top-down 
referendums have been approved. But, due to formal restrictions, such as turnout 
or approval quorum, five did not become legally binding. Only two referendums 
from above could overcome these two obstacles and succeeded in full, and two 
referendums were rejected by the people. 
Besides  required  and  top-down  referendums,  there  were  nine  citizen-initiated 
referendums.  All  nine belong to citizens’  initiatives on  laws and other  issues. 
353 c2d database, http://c2d.ch/votes.php?
level=1&country=202&yearr=timeperiods&fromyear=1990&toyear=2013&speyea
r[]=2013&result=0&terms=&table=votes&sub=Submit_Query (accessed on 
12.12.2012).
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However,  the launching was rather by political  parties  than by the people.  A 
citizens’  facultative referendum to refuse parliamentary decisions has not  yet 
been carried out. Indeed, there were attempts, but they missed the necessary 
minimum number of signatures. As one can see, all nine referendums from below 
have been adopted by the citizens participating in the ballot, but due to high 
turnout or approval quorum they failed to come into force.
Besides these direct democratic tools that have been used in practise, it should 
be noted that some instruments have not been applied yet. It is not surprising 
since there was no mandatory referendum on the constitutional act, as foreseen 
by article 4, par. 1, sec. 4 of LoR354. And neither is it surprising if there was no 
citizens’  consultative  initiative.  But  one  may  expect  that  there  were  some 
citizens’  facultative  referendums to  veto  parliamentary  resolutions  or  popular 
constitutional initiatives intending to alter the constitution. However, due to high 
collection obstacles many citizens failed to collect enough signatures to trigger 
such referendums.
With regard to subject matter, we can say that for the most part referendums 
have  been used to  resolve  questions  on  state  organisation,  such  as  national 
identity or the political system. Another big part dealt with issues on economic 
policy and public finances. And some few referendums referred to foreign policy 
issues, such as EU accession or to issues on energy and the environment. 
5.2.1 The  referendum  of  9  February  1991  on  Lithuania’s 
independence
In 1940 the secret deal between  STALIN and  HITLER cleared the way for  STALIN to 
annex the Baltic States. With regard to the illegality of this deal, as was the case 
for the Estonians and Latvians, also the Lithuanians subsequently achieved the 
right  to  self-determination  and  independence  on  reasonable  terms.  Lithuania 
declared that its sovereignty had continued to exist  de jure despite the Soviet 
occupation.  Before  the  declaration  of  independence,  the  Lithuanian  Supreme 
Council  (parliament)  had  enacted an  interim constitution,  a  ‘provisional  Basic 
Law’ that was to regulate the powers of the government until a new constitution 
had been written  and approved by  referendum355.  According  to  article  3,  the 
Supreme Council of Lithuania was entitled to frame and trigger a referendum. 
The parliamentary plebiscite (on other issues) was a sign of resistance against 
Gorbachev’s initiated sovereignty referendums that aimed to preserve the Soviet 
Union and hold the country together356. Since the Baltic States did not want to co-
operate with Gorbachev and remain part of the Soviet Union, they had scheduled 
their special ‘opinion polls’ on independency just before Gorbachev’s referendum 
on  the  future  of  the  Soviet  State  could  take  place  in  17  March  1991357.  The 
referendum on Lithuanian independence was not a real decision on independence 
since the act on the restoration of the Lithuanian state had already been passed 
by the Lithuanian Supreme Council on 11 March 1990358.
354 Art. 4, par. 1, sec. 4 LoR.
355 The Grip on Lithuania, The Economist [London, England], 21 April 1990, p. 13; MOLE, 
p. 93.
356 BRADY/KAPLAN p. 186–201.
357 Backdown,  The  Economist  [London,  England],  2  February  1991,  p.  50; 
Thunderballot, The Economist [London, England], 16 February 1991, p. 54.
358 KRUPAVICIUS, Citizens’ Initiatives, p. 135.
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Around 85 percent of the citizens participated in the ‘opinion poll’ and around 93 
percent  of  the  participants  (76  percent  of  total  electorate)  were  in  favour  of 
Lithuania  becoming  an  independent  democratic  republic359.  Although  the 
Lithuanian opinion poll on Lithuanian independence had no legal consequences, 
based on existing formal rules,  its  positive outcome left  Gorbachev with even 
more problems than reforming the Soviet Union politically and economically. And 
after the failed Moscow coup in August 1991, the outcome of the referendum was 
confirmed  not  only  in  Lithuania,  but  also  in  Estonia  and  Latvia360.  Thus,  the 
referendum outcome enabled Lithuanian authorities  to  enhance the republic’s 
legal sovereignty. To secure its position against the Soviet Union, the Lithuanian 
parliament  further  added  a  clause  to  its  draft  constitution  saying  that 
independence  can  be  overturned  only  by  another  referendum,  not  by 
parliament361. 
5.2.2 The  referendum  of  23  May  1992  on  the  restoration  of  the 
presidential institution
After  Lithuania  broke  free  from  the  Soviet  Union,  its  fledgling  democratic 
institutions became paralysed by growing divisions and infighting between the 
right-wing conservative ‘Sajudis’ – the former Lithuanian Restructuring Movement 
–  and  the  opposition  block  of  the  formerly  communist  Lithuanian  Democratic 
Labour  Party  (LDDP)  in  the  parliament,  and  between  parliament  and  the 
government. Both political groups had agreed on the need of a new constitution, 
but disagreed about the form of the political structure the system should take362. 
To  break  the  political  gridlock,  the  ‘Sajudis’  initiated  a  parliamentary 
constitutional  plebiscite  to  establish  a  strong  presidential  system.  The 
movement’s leader  VYTAUSTAS LANDSBERGIS, who was the chairman of the Supreme 
Council,  was at  the same time  de facto the head of  state.  This  was formally 
possible  since  the  ‘Provisional  Basic  Law’  had  retained  such  an  institutional 
structure from the Soviet era. LANDSBERGIS hoped that the plebiscite would expand 
and legitimise his own authority by giving the chairman of the parliament new 
sweeping powers as the republic’s first chief executive. A creation of a strong, 
American-style presidency with powers to act independently of the parliament 
was  the  aim  in  empowering  the  president  with  the  right  to  dissolve  the 
government and with the right of veto363.
According to the Referendum Law of 1989, for the amendment of the constitution 
at least 50 percent of the eligible voters needed to participate. Nearly 70 percent 
of the voters (41 percent of the whole electorate) who had cast ballots voted yes.  
However, the referendum failed since too few voters had turned out (59 percent 
of total electorate), thus not achieving the approval quorum of 50 percent of the 
359 c2d database, http://c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=37911 
(accessed on 12.12.2012)
360 The  Ex-Communists  Ahead  in  Lithuanian  Elections,  The  New  York  Times,  27 
October 1992, p. 10.
361 Thunderballot, The Economist [London, England], 16 February 1991, p. 55; Art. 2 of 
the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the State of Lithuania of 
February 11, 1991.
362 MOLE, p. 93 f.
363 MØLLER, p. 284.
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total electorate364. The low turnout was indeed not a result of chance, but rather 
an  outcome  from  the  tactical  behaviour  of  the  rest  of  Lithuanian 
parliamentarians, who were against a strong presidential system. Knowing that 
the other parliamentary plebiscite, namely the referendum on the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops (see Chapter V-B-3 below), would be supported by a large part of 
the Lithuanian citizens, they separated the two referenda dates. And the tactics 
of lowering the first referendum’s turnout succeeded, with many voters avoiding 
the polls365.
5.2.3 The referendum of 14 June 1992 on the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops
Only  one  month  after  the  referendum  on  the  restoration  of  the  presidential 
institution,  Lithuanian voters  faced another  referendum. This time Lithuanians 
were asked to go to the polls and to vote on whether they want Russian troops to 
pull out of Lithuania by the end of 1992. All three Baltic States had wrested back 
their  independence  after  the  collapse  of  the  coup  in  Moscow.  But  this 
independence  was  precarious  so  long  as  more  than  100,000  Russian  troops 
remained on  their  soil,  with  30,000 thereof  in  Lithuania.  And to  have  Russia 
withdraw  its  troops,  Lithuanians  endorsed  that  position  in  a  referendum366. 
Indeed, by early March 1992 Russian troops had slowly begun to leave Lithuania. 
But,  VYTAUSTAS LANDSBERGIS and his government were still anxious that Russia would 
delay the withdrawal of its troops should, in the coming general elections that 
autumn, ALGIRDAS BRAZAUSKAS’ LDDP come to power. It was thought that BRAZAUSKAS, as 
former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania (CLP) during the Soviet 
period, might not interpret the Russian troops as an occupying force and hence 
be  more  conciliatory  towards  Russia.  To  avoid  such  a  potential  risk,  the 
government  authorities  triggered  the  referendum  on  the  complete  and 
unconditional withdrawal of the troops, which was also supported by the other 
parties in the Supreme Council.  The parliamentary plebiscite (on other issues) 
further demanded that Lithuania be compensated for damages resulting from the 
Soviet  occupation.  As  with  the  referendum  on  independence,  also  this 
referendum served to strengthen popular resistance in Lithuania and reaffirm the 
political course already set367.
Around 76 percent of 2.5 million eligible voters turned out and an overwhelming 
91  percent  of  these  voted  in  favour  of  the  referendum,  which  is  indeed  69 
percent of the total electorate and thus over 50 percent of the eligible voters 
needed  for  an  approval.  The  popular  endorsement  had  legitimised  the 
government’s  claim,  which  Russia  could  no  longer  ignore.  It  agreed  to  a 
withdrawal, however, it maintained that a complete withdrawal from the Baltic 
364 Leader  Fails  to  Win  Vote,  The  New  York  Times,  25  May  1992,  p.  5;  The  Ex-
Communists Ahead in Lithuanian Elections, The New York Times, 27 October 1992, 
p. 10; BRADY/KAPLAN, p. 203.
365 I  am very gratefull  for  Mr.  Prof.  LIUDAS MAZYLIS’  helpful  notes,  Faculty  of  Political 
Sciences and Diplomacy, Vytautas Magnus Univerity Lithuania.
366 Why are the  Baltics  Still  Occupied,  The New York Times,  15 June 1992,  p.  18; 
Lithuania Backs Quick Pullout of Ex-Soviets, The New York Times, 16 June 1992, p. 
11.
367 KRUPAVICIUS/ZVALIAUSKAS, p. 111; MOLE, p. 120–122.
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States would take up to five years due to housing shortages.  The last  troops 
finally left Lithuania on 31 August 1993368.
5.2.4 The referendum of 25 October 1992 on the constitution
Together with the first round of parliamentary elections to replace the Supreme 
Council of Lithuania by a new parliament (Seimas), Lithuanians were also asked 
to  vote  on  their  new constitution  (mandatory  constitutional  referendum).  The 
constitution  was  indeed  a  compromise  between  LDDP  and  Sajudis  after 
LANDSBERGIS’S defeat  in  the  presidential  referendum  five  months  before.   Both 
parties agreed on a semi-presidential structure, wherein both the president and 
parliament should be elected directly. Thus, a sophisticated system of checks and 
balances was put in place. It should ensure that the president’s authority was 
matched by parliamentary countervailing powers369. 
The necessary quorum of 50 percent was achieved with a participation rate of 75 
percent.  Around 56 percent  of  the  whole  electorate  approved the  mandatory 
referendum on the new constitution. By adopting the referendum Lithuanians had 
also approved their  right to the popular initiative and the right to mandatory 
referendums for specific constitutional provisions370.
And, as  LANDSBERGIS had feared, the parliamentary elections were won by  ALGIRDAS 
BRAZAUSKAS’S (former communist) Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party, LDDP (73 of 
141 seats), the challenger of the ‘Sajudis’, which merely gained 37 seats.
5.2.5 The  referendum  of  27  August  1994  on  the  law  revoking 
privatisation I–VIII
On  27  August  1994  Lithuanian  citizens  had  to  decide  on  a  referendum  on 
economic  measures  regarding  the  privatisation  (illegal  privatisation, 
compensation of banking savings and distorted justice).  For legal  reasons the 
referendum on the law revoking privatisation was divided into eight parts: I. Law 
on illegal  privatisations,  devalued accounts,  shares,  and the failure to respect 
protective  legislation,  II.  Law  on  illegal  privatisation,  III.  Abolition  of  the 
consequences of illegal privatisation and future privatisations of State property, 
IV. Re-establishment and reimbursement of devalued private bank accounts, V. 
Recording the value of long-term capital investments, VI. Restoring the value of 
devalued  assets  belonging  to  the  State,  VII.  Unification  and  transparency  in 
protective  legislation,  VIII.  Implementing  the  law  on  illegal  privatisations, 
accounts, shares and the failure to respect protective legislation.
The  referendum  was  initiated  as  a  citizens’  initiative  by  VYTAUTAS LANDSBERGIS’S 
emerging party ‘Fatherland Union’, an offshoot of ‘Sajudis’, which had lost the 
last  parliamentary  elections.  The  party’s  proposal  intended  to  change  the 
economic policy by stopping privatisation. But in fact, it was also an attempt to 
advance its  campaign for  the mobilisation of  voters,  although many of  these 
368 c2d database, http://c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=37926 
(accessed on 12.12.2012).
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eight proposals were impossible to implement371. The ‘Fatherland Union’ was able 
to collect more than 560,000 signatures over the short time of two months. The 
proposed law was to set a new political and economical course of the country by 
preventing and fighting economic crime. A further aim was to enable Lithuanians 
who had suffered in the new market economy after re-independence to benefit.
Besides  the  government,  also  other  oppositional  parties  such  as  the  Social 
Democrats and Liberals encouraged voters to reject all or some of the proposals 
to avoid the bankruptcy of the nation. The World Bank and International Monetary 
Found (IMF) had said that a realisation of LANDSBERGIS’S measures would cause costs 
of  2  billion  US  Dollars,  a  huge  amount  and  enough  to  unhinge  the  national 
household and to thrust Lithuania’s weak economy into chaos372. 
On referendum day only 37 percent of the eligible voters had cast ballots, but 
according to the LoR, more than half of the country’s registered voters needed to 
take part for the referendum to be valid. 84 percent of those who participated in 
the ballot voted yes. But, since the turnout quorum could not be reached in any 
of these eight proposals, the referendum on the law on economic measures was 
deemed invalid and thus failed373.
5.2.6 The referendum of 20 October 1996 on the compensation for 
lost assets prior to 1990
After  the  defeat  in  eight  referendums,  the  ‘Fatherland  Union’  (Lithuanian 
Conservatives) triggered another citizens’ initiative (a citizens’ initiative on laws 
and other issues) to restore the savings and pensions that were used up by the 
Soviet government before 1990. Over 300,000 valid signatures were collected in 
favour of the draft. After the validation of the signatures by the CECLt, the final 
act  of  the  proponents,  along  with  the  citizens’  valid  signatures  and  the 
committee’s conclusions, were transmitted to the parliament for its deliberation. 
The parliament declared the initiative valid and submitted it to a popular vote on 
the same date as the first round of parliamentary elections.
Also here, a turnout and approval quorum of 50 percent of eligible voters was 
formally necessary for such a referendum on a law. Indeed, around 52 percent of 
the eligible voters  were not  deterred by the turnout  obstacle.  But  it  was not 
enough to overcome the approval quorum. Although the majority of the voters 
had approved the referendum, it was only 38 percent of the total electorate and, 
at that time, this was not sufficient to validate the referendum374.
371 MAZYLIS LIUDAS/JURGELIONYTE AUSRINE,  The  Lithuanian  Referendum  on  Extending  the 
Working of  the Ignalina Nuclear Power Station:  The Rationality of  Actors within 
(Un-)changing Structures, Baltic Journal of Law & Politics 5(1)/2012, p. 133 (cit. 
MAZYLIS/JURGELIONYTE); MØLLER, p. 287.
372 Economic Referendum in Lithuania Fails, The New York Times, 28 August 1994, p. 
16; Kein Privatisierungsstopp in Litauen. Fiasko für Rechtsopposition, Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung, 29 August 1994, p. 9.
373 see any single result for these 8 referendums on c2d database, 
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5.2.7 The referendum of 20 October 1996 on parliamentary elections 
on the second Sunday of April every four years
On the same day as the referendum on the compensation for lost assets prior to 
1990, there were three further questions that were put to a popular vote.  All  
three referendums dealt with constitutional provisions (Art. 55, Art. 57 and Art. 
131 CLt), such as state organisation, the political system and the state budget. 
But, these did not belong to the constitutional provisions of chapters I and XIV, 
for  which,  in  the case of  any alterations,  a mandatory referendum had to be 
triggered automatically375.
In contrast to the referendum on the compensation for lost assets, which was 
asked  and  triggered  from  ‘below’,  these  three  proposals  were  parliamentary 
constitutional plebiscites that had been framed and triggered by the governing 
party,  the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP)376.  Thus,  a collection of 
signatures was not necessary. The proposals to be submitted to a popular vote 
had been adopted in parliament by the governing LDDP, with a total number of 
73 seats. At that time not less than half of the members of parliament (141:2) 
were  necessary  to  trigger  a  parliamentary  constitutional  plebiscite.  LDDP’s 
referendums were rather a direct response to the ‘Fatherland Union’, since at that 
time the LDDP was in decline and, hence, afraid to lose the elections377. It was a 
desperate effort of the LDDP to mobilise its electorate378.
The  first  measure  of  these  three  questions  aimed  to  alter  article  57  of  the 
constitution. The parliament was to be elected every four years on the second 
Sunday of April,  instead of in two rounds on varying dates. 52 percent of the 
eligible voters participated in ballot, which was higher than the required turnout 
minimum of 50 percent. And around 65 percent of those who take part in the 
ballot said yes to governmental proposal. However, once again the referendum 
failed since only 33 instead of the required 50 percent of the total electorate 
favoured this policy change379.
5.2.8 The  referendum  of  20  October  1996  on  the  reduction  of 
parliamentary seats from 141 to 111
In  addition  to  the  first  parliamentary  constitutional  plebiscite  on  parliament’s 
term of  four  years,  as  outlined  above,  the  governing  LDDP also  intended  to 
reduce parliament’s seats from 141 to 111. On 19 September 1996 it ratified the 
proposal by 62 to 25 and with 14 abstentions, and submitted it to a popular vote. 
The proposal in favour of the reduction of parliamentary seats was supported by 
65 percent of the participants. And also here the mandatory turnout quorum was 
reached by 52 percent of all eligible voters, but due to the low approval quota of 
375 see Art. 148, sec. 2 CLt.
376 KRUPAVICIUS, Citizens’ Initiatives, p. 143.
377 MØLLER, p. 287.
378 MAZYLIS/JURGELIONYTE, p. 133.
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33 percent of the total electorate, this reform failed to come into force, too380. 
Today, Lithuanian parliament still consists of 141 representatives.
5.2.9 The referendum of 20 October 1996 on social spending
The third parliamentary reform that was submitted to a vote aimed to alter the 
constitution on social spending (article 131 CLt). This parliamentary constitutional 
plebiscite  required  that  the  annual  state  budget  must  be  deliberated  by  the 
parliament  and  be  adopted  each  year  by  legislative  decree.  The  parliament 
further should be able to decide on new expenditures if it specifies the source of 
capital. The proposal additionally foresaw that at least half of the revenue of the 
public  budget  should  be  allocated  to  social  security,  medicine,  education, 
science, culture and other social  needs of the citizens. Over 50 percent of all 
voters had turned out, and 63 percent of these participants voted in favour of the 
question. But once again, at the time, this quota was not enough to reach the 
mandatory approval quorum of 50 percent of the total electorate381. If this and 
another  three  votes  of  20  October  1996  had  been  held  after  2002,  all  four 
referendums  would  have  been  valid.  Because,  due  to  the  new  LoR,  binding 
referendums on laws or other issues, or constitutional referendums that refer to 
other  provisions  than  those  of  chapter  I  and  XIV  of  the  constitution,  can  be 
deemed as approved if not less than one-third of the total electorate approves 
them382.
5.2.10 The  referendum  of  10  November  1996  on  the  purchase  of 
agricultural land by certain legal bodies
The referendum on the purchase of agricultural land by certain legal bodies that 
was held simultaneously with the second round of parliamentary elections dealt 
with an amendment to the article 47 of the constitution. The issue set to popular 
vote intended to give foreign corporations the right to acquire agricultural land in 
Lithuania.  In  addition  to  other  three  referendums,  the  LDDP  was  also  the 
proponent of this referendum. A collection of signatures was not necessary since 
the triggering of the referendum in favour of the proposal was supported by the 
governing majority. At that time not less than half of the parliament’s members 
(141:2) were required to trigger a parliamentary constitutional plebiscite.
The Law on Referendum required a turnout quorum of at least 50 percent of the 
eligible electorate and the same quota for an approval. But, both requirements 
failed  since  participation  was  much  lower.  Only  around  40  percent  of  the 
electorate went to the polls and only 43 percent of them (17 percent of the total  
electorate) voted in favour of LDDP’s proposal. The governing LDDP, insofar, lost 
all four plebiscites that it had launched before the elections in 1996383. But the 
loss was not only limited to these referendums; the LDDP, controlling the Seimas 
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381 c2d database, http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=57237 
(accessed on 13.12.2012).
382 Art. 7, par. 4 LoR.




C2D Working Paper Series 42 / 2012
since April 1992, had also lost the parliamentary elections on the same day. Its 
number of seats fell from 73 to 12, while the ‘Fatherland Union’ could celebrate 
its comeback by winning 70 of 141 seats.
Six years after the referendum the right of foreigners to purchase agricultural 
land was approved by a vote of 90 to 17, with six abstentions by the parliament. 
The  amendment  permitted  physical  and  legal  entities  from  EU  and  NATO 
countries to purchase farmland in Lithuania after the seven-year transition period 
stipulated in the Lithuanian EU accession treaty384.
5.2.11 The referendum of 10 and 11 May 2003 on the accession to the 
European Union
The EU Accession Treaty was signed in Athens on 16 April 2003. Some months 
before,  on  24  February  2003,  leaders  of  all  main  parliamentary  factions  had 
decided  to  establish  a  coordinating  council  to  organise  a  referendum  on 
Lithuania’s future membership in the EU. The decision on the popular vote was 
supported by 105 of 141 members of parliament. Three days later the parliament 
passed  a  decision  to  hold  a  mandatory  constitutional  referendum  on  the 
country’s entry into the EU in 2004 on 10–11 May 2003385. It was a special version 
of mandatory constitutional referendums (mandatory referendum on participation 
in international organisations), as the newly adopted LoR (June 2002) required. 
According to par. 1, sec. 5 of article 4 of the LoR, a mandatory popular vote had 
to be held, should Lithuania participate in international organisations and ‘should 
this participation be linked with the partial transfer of the scope of competences 
of government bodies to the institutions of international organisations and the 
jurisdictions thereof’.
A positive decision on such a mandatory referendum normally required more than 
a 50 percent turnout and at least one third of the eligible voters to be in favour386. 
Although the LoR 2002 was designed to facilitate a positive result by being less 
restrictive than the LoR 1989, it was still restrictive, especially when compared 
with the corresponding laws in other EU accession candidate countries. On 27 
February,  to  avoid  a negative  outcome on  the EU accession  referendum,  the 
parliament  introduced  two  amendments  to  the  LoR.  Firstly,  it  abolished  the 
requirement of a qualified majority of one third of the electorate for a positive 
decision.  But,  the  required  50  percent  turnout  still  appeared  to  be  a  major 
problem. Therefore, various measures were included in the legislation to facilitate 
a  higher  turnout,  without  changing  the  turnout  quorum itself.  In  all  previous 
referenda,  voting  was  allowed  only  for  one  day.  During  the  EU  accession, 
referendum voting was extended to two days. And polls were to stay open from 6 
am to 10 pm, instead of 7 am to 8 pm. In addition, the parliament decided to 
extend postal voting to 11 instead of 5 days prior to a referendum. Besides these 
formal changes, the political establishment had also conducted a well-organised 
campaign with intensive and innovative information and agitation to mobilise the 
voters387.
384 KRUPAVICIUS ALGIS, Lithuania, European Journal of Political Research 43/2004, p. 1062.
385 KRUPAVICIUS ALGIS, Lithuania, European Journal of Political Research 43/2004, p. 1063.
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On  the  ballot,  around  63  of  the  total  electorate  went  to  the  polls  and  an 
overwhelming 91 percent of the voters (57 percent of the total electorate) voted 
in favour of an accession to the EU388. A record level of support that would have 
been valid under all three versions of the LoR: 1989, 2002 and 2003.  One can 
assume the high level was not only result of formal changes and well-organised 
campaigns but also the wish of Lithuanians to be part of the West, and not of the 
East389.
Indeed, it is to be welcomed that direct democracy becomes more citizen-friendly 
when  such  facilitation  of  procedures  is  enacted  by  the  parliament.  But,  it  is 
important to note that all  changes were promoted by the political elites since 
they  expected  positive  effects  resulting  from  an  accession  to  the  EU. 
Nevertheless, one should take into account that it is also the same political elite 
that would reject any other reforms, such as lowering the amount of signatures 
for citizens’ initiatives or extending the collection time that would constrain the 
elite’s capacity to act. So, to avoid any lowering of the turnout, the parliament 
took other little measures to make a EU accession possible. It should be noted 
that there it is still a risk of misuse as long as some important provisions on direct 
democratic procedures are framed at a level below the constitution, where no 
qualified majorities are required for their alteration. And that such a misuse can 
occur  is  made  possible  by  the  Lithuanian  parliament  itself.  Today,  all  these 
changes to the LoR that had been enacted have been reset.  The euphoria on 
citizen-friendly procedures lasted for only a short time.
5.2.12 The consultative referendum of 12 October 2008 on the service 
extension for the nuclear power plant ‘Ignalina’
The  Ignalina  nuclear  power  plant  was  in  operation  since  1983.  It  was  built 
according to a similar construction design as Chernobyl. Despite the fact that the 
plant had another reactor type and was upgraded several times, for the EU it was 
still too risky and, hence, had to be closed down. The decommissioning of the 
Ignalina nuclear power plant in 2009 was also one condition to be part of the EU, 
as specified in Lithuania’s Treaty of Accession to the EU which was signed in 
Spring 2003.
With  the  global  rise  in  energy  prices,  a  new  wave  of  public  discussion  to 
renegotiate  a  possible  extension  for  keeping  the  Ignalina  plant  in  operation 
started390. Also, to avoid a complete dependency on Russian gas, even President 
VALDAS ADAMKUS believed that Lithuania might be able to convince the EU of the 
need to extend the lifespan of the Ignalina nuclear power plant. Although he was 
initially against such a referendum, he changed his opinion and asked Lithuanians 
to voice their support for remaining a nuclear powered state and thus to secure 
extra time for the construction of a new plant.
Initially,  the  non-parliamentary  Lithuanian  Social  Democratic  Union  actively 
promoted an idea to pass special legislation to keep the Ignalina nuclear power 
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plant  open  and  also  to  hold  a  national  mandatory  referendum on  extending 
Ignalina’s operation together with the parliamentary elections in October 2008391. 
From 7 March to 7 June 2008 signatures for a corresponding citizen’s initiative 
were  collected.  However,  only  47,000,  instead  of  the  required  300,000 
signatures, were gathered in favour of the service extension. Indeed, the popular 
initiative failed392, but not the idea to put the issue to a popular vote. In 2008 
some oppositional parties, among them the Liberal Movement, decided to trigger 
a  referendum  that  should  be  held  at  the  same  time  as  the  October  12 th 
parliamentary elections. In contrast to the failed citizens’ initiative, which was 
binding,  parliament’s  proposal  (parliamentary  plebiscite  on  other  issues  and 
laws) should be consultative. To note, triggering was a tactical choice to increase 
voter mobilisation during the oncoming general elections that was set for the 
same date as the referendum, on 12 October 2008393.
As for binding referendums, the LoR requires also for consultative referendums a 
turnout threshold of at least half of all eligible voters394. More than 48 percent of 
all the electorate took part in the referendum and 91 percent of those who voted 
in the referendum were in favour of prolonging the Ignalina nuclear power plant’s 
lifespan. But,  48 percent of the eligible voters who had participated were not 
enough to validate the referendum and, thus, it failed395.  Subsequently, on 31 
December 2009 the Ignalina nuclear power plant was closed down as required by 
Lithuania’s entry treaty to the EU. Thereafter, due to the lack of relatively cheap 
energy  that  Ignalina  had  generated,  Lithuania  became  largely  dependent  on 
imported  electrical  energy396 and,  consequently,  particularly  vulnerable  from 
Russia.
5.2.13 The consultative referendum of 14 October 2012 on building of 
a new nuclear power plant ‘Visaginas’
Before the closure of the Ignalina nuclear power plant the parliament tried to find 
new ways to diversify its energy sources, enhance energy security and also to 
become less  dependent  on  gas  from Russia.  One option  was  to  build  a  new 
nuclear power plant at the same location as the old Ignalina nuclear power plant.  
The new nuclear power plant,  ‘Visaginas’,  was to be a regional  project – with 
Estonia and Latvia – and to replace the old one, which was closed down at the 
price of joining the EU. Most importantly, it was to make Lithuania less dependent 
on Russia, which was not only delivering gas but also electricity to Lithuania397. 
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(accessed on 13.12.2012); Litauen vor einem Regierungswechsel, Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung, 14 October 2008, p. 3.
396 KRUPAVICIUS ALGIS, Lithuania, European Journal of Political Research 49/2010, p. 1072 f.
397 Steht Litauen vor einem «Energie-Infarkt»?, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19 November 
2008, p. 7; Litauen lässt sich seine Energie etwas kosten, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 
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The relevant law on building a new atomic power plant had already been in force 
since 2007, but it was controversially discussed by society and finally recalled by 
the new parliamentary majority398. 
Due  to  discussions  in  the  society,  the  Green  Party  and  some  environmental 
associations started to collect signatures for a popular vote to veto the plans of 
the new power plant.  However, they failed to collect the minimum number of 
signatures399. Although the citizens failed to bring the issue to the popular arena, 
on July 2012 the parliament decided by a vote of 62–39 to hold a consultative 
referendum on the construction of  the new plant (parliamentary plebiscite on 
other issues and laws). Once again the referendum was set on the same day as 
the  elections  to  the  parliament.  The  governing  parties  ‘Fatherland  Union  and 
Lithuanian Christian Democrats’  that were in favour of the new atomic power 
station had opposed the proposal by accusing the opposition parties of seeking to 
make a political profit out of the issue prior to the elections.
On ballot day, 52 percent of all eligible voters went to the polls, and the required 
turnout quorum of 50 percent of the total electorate was reached. But around 65 
percent of the voters and, thus, 32 percent of the total electorate said no to the 
government’s  plans  of  building  a  new  nuclear  plant400.  Due  its  consultative 
character, however, the parliament is not obliged to follow the people’s opposite 
decision.
The  Social  Democrats,  the  winners  of  the  parliamentary  elections  2012  and 
initially sceptical of a new nuclear power plant, have made less of an effort to 
uphold the voters’ decision these days. Indeed, for the new government, avoiding 
any energy dependency from abroad, namely from Russia, seems to have more 
priority than a total moratorium of a possible new nuclear power plant. 
5.2.14 Referendums without sufficient signatures
There  is  no  systematic  information  available  for  citizen-initiated  referendums 
from before 1994 because until then a directly responsible institution, such as the 
CECLt, did not exist. From 1994 until 2010, a total of 16 proposals were triggered 
by the citizens, but they all failed to collect the required 300,000 signatures401. 
For instance, in 1995 a group collected only 200,000 signatures for their initiative 
on  an  election  law.  An  interesting  case  refers  to  a  citizens’  initiative  of  the 
Lithuanian National Progress Party on soil policy. It intended to allow foreigners 
and international organisations to own Lithuanian land. The proponents narrowly 
missed  collecting  300,000  signatures  in  favour  of  their  proposals.  However, 
65,000  signatures  were  stolen  from  the  headquarters  of  the  referendum 
organisers. In addition, the initiative committee met with the intensive opposition 
of  other  political  parties  and from 600 individuals  who had started to  collect 
398 MAZYLIS/JURGELIONYTE, p. 120.
399 This  example  proves  that  Lithuanians  are  also  entitled  to  use  their  right  of 
referendum according to article 9 of the constitution to veto parliamentary decision 
in favour of the status quo.
400 c2d database, http://c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=13271
7 (accessed on 14.12.2012); Machtwechsel in Litauen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 16 
October 2012, p. 5.
401 KRUPAVICIUS, Citizens’ Initiatives, p. 140.
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signatures,  only  around  30  were  left,  since  they  were  openly  terrorised  and 
threatened.
One year later another initiative on the privatisation of infrastructure of state-
owned strategic companies by the Lithuanian Social  Democrats gathered only 
180,000  signatures.  And  also  the  initiative  of  a  group  of  people  to  reform 
parliamentary elections failed to gather enough signatures in 1999402.
Also,  the  initiation  of  a  referendum on extending  the running  of  the  Ignalina 
nuclear  power  station  by  non-parliamentary  Lithuanian  Social  Democratic,  as 
stated above, failed. The same initiative group had also tried to collect signatures 
for a constitutional amendment enabling citizens to dissolve the parliament by a 
referendum, but once again without success403. In 2010 the New Union (Social 
Liberals) started to collect signatures to organise a referendum forcing pre-term 
elections to the parliament, but they fell short of the 300,000 required signatures, 
by 50,000  404. After the parliamentary agreement on the construction of a new 
nuclear  power  station,  a  citizens’  facultative  referendum  to  stop  the  new 
construction  plans  was  initiated  in  2012,  but,  as  mentioned  above,  the 
proponents of the referendum failed to gather the necessary minimum amount of 
signatures405.
5.3 Explanations for the Lithuanian practice
5.3.1 Legal constraints
One  of  the  most  influential  factors  that  determine  the  use  and  outcome  of 
Lithuanian referendums stems from the institutional settings that are stipulated 
by the constitution and the LoR. The Lithuanian law on referenda is after twenty 
years  experience  still  not  favourable  enough  to  the  development  of  direct 
democracy. At first, with regard to citizen-initiated referendums, it is the formal 
obstacle of collection time and number of signatures that make the use of such 
democratic  tools  very  difficult.  Only  three  months  for  300’000  signatures, 
representing about 11.5 percent of the electorate, is not an easy initial position 
for the common people to launch a popular initiative. In contrast to the citizens, 
mainly  large  political  parties  such  as  the  ‘Fatherland  Union’  or  the  LDDP 
succeeded  in  collecting  signatures  for  a  particular  issue  or  to  trigger  a 
referendum through the parliament406. 
Decisive with regard to the outcome of referendums are obstacles for the turnout 
and approval. The high turnout quorum of 50 percent of all eligible voters for all 
kinds of referendums and the high threshold of yes votes that is necessary (from 
one-fourth to three-fourth) to pass a decision by referendum obstructs the will of 
the people.  For  Lithuanians it  might be understandable that  a vote by three-
quarters of citizens is needed to amend the article of the constitution, but is an 
absolute  majority  as  two-half  of  the whole  electorate  really  needed for  other 
issues too407? Regarding the success of twenty referendums that have been held 
402 KRUPAVICIUS/ZVALIAUSKAS, p. 116 f. 
403 MAZYLIS/JURGELIONYTE, p. 121 f.
404 KRUPAVICIUS ALGIS, Lithuania, European Journal of Political Research 50/2011, p. 1055.
405 MAZYLIS/JURGELIONYTE p. 120.
406 see also KRUPAVICIUS, Citizens’ Initiatives, p. 139.
407 DAGYS REMANTAS, Participatory Democracy in the Baltic States, before and after the 
Communist Regime, in: COUNCIL OF EUROPE (ed.): Seminar on Participatory Democracy 
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in Lithuania since 1990 this question can be answered in the negative. Fourteen 
of twenty referendums that were supported by the majority of voters had to be 
invalidated since they failed to fulfil formal restrictions on turnout or approval.
Due consideration must be given to the provisions that regulate the turnout and 
approval quorums. It is surprising that these are framed at statutory level and not 
in the constitution. This implies that they can be changed more easily, since no 
qualified majority is needed for an alteration. It is possible that the parliament 
tend to impede the direct legislation if results of referendums do not serve their 
interest.
It might be that framers of the constitution wanted to consolidate the country 
after the re-independence by enacting high obstacles for policy change through 
citizens.  But,  nowadays fewer hurdles would  be helpful,  in  strengthening civil 
society  by  encouraging  a  participatory  culture  and  promoting  the  people’s 
participation in referendums. Otherwise, any further hurdle is a source of distrust 
towards these direct democratic institutions that rather undermine beliefs in the 
possibilities of the people to influence politics.
5.3.2 Informal constraints
Besides the institutional framework, there are also informal procedures defining 
the use and outcome of popular votes. In many cases it is caused by the tactical  
manoeuvres of the Lithuanian elites themselves. One of the most used tactics is 
opposing  a  referendum.  No chance  of  success  a  referendum can  have  if  the 
opponents encourage electors to abstain. Another strategy refers to the ballot 
day. It is not surprising that referendums have often been held simultaneously 
with parliamentary elections. They became a complementary tool to the most 
important campaigns in order to mobilize the party electorate. They were often 
an effort by some political parties to mobilise their electorate408. To avoid the mix-
up of party-politics and issue-politics, a referendum should not be held on the 
same day as general elections to the parliament.
Merely  in  few  cases  have  referendums  (referendum  on  independence, 
referendum on withdrawal of the Soviet troops, referendum on the accession to 
the  EU)  been  used  to  solve  domestic  political  deadlocks  or  to  consolidate 
Lithuania’s statehood. In other cases referendums have mostly been initiated for 
political mobilisation of the supporters of one party or another. They became an 
instrument of party politics409. And the role of political parties in the triggering of 
referendums is still prevalent in Lithuania. According to LUISE PAPE MØLLER, it is the 
Lithuanian polarised party system that gave rise to party incentives framing and 
triggering referendums. She notes that a high degree of polarisation between the 
parties  makes  it  difficult  to  reach  an  agreement  through  negotiation,  and 
consequently parties would rather trigger referendums to reach their goals, by 
putting pressure on the other political wing410. As the authors ALGIS KRUPAVISCIUS and 
GIEDRIUS ZVALIAUSKAS correctly  note,  no  single  successful  referendum  has  been 
implemented without the active role of political parties. Twenty referendums were 
in Central and Eastern Europe Today: Challenges and Perspectives (Vilnius 1997), 
p. 10.
408 MAZYLIS/JURGELIONYTE, p. 119, p. 132.
409 KRUPAVICIUS/ZVALIAUSKAS, p. 111 f.; KRUPAVICIUS, Citizens’ Initiatives, p. 149.
410 MØLLER, p 282, p. 284–289.
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held in Lithuania between 1991 and 2012 and none of them was in effect citizen-
initiated. They were framed and triggered by political parties and mainly through 
the parliamentary way. These facts do not confirm the conventional notion that 
the referendum is an instrument of policy-making which allows citizens to take 
political decisions directly and over the heads of their representatives411.  Until 
now  Lithuanian  direct  democracy  could  not  fulfil  its  function  of  expressing 
popular sovereignty and political equality. It did not bring new decisions on which 
political elites would disagree. In some extent this outcome can be explained by 
the lack of practice on the part of Lithuanian civil society. However, it should also 
be  noted  that  framing  and  triggering  a  referendum  and  reaching  a  positive 
outcome of it is costly to undertake, and not every citizen can afford it.
411 KRUPAVICIUS/ZVALIAUSKAS, p. 123.
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6 The quality of direct democracy in the Baltics
6.1 A comparison of use and success of Baltic referendums
To illustrate the use and performance of direct democracy in the Baltic States, all 
34 referendums held between 1991 and 2012 have been put into one figure (see 
Figure 4 and also Table 4). A timeframe of about twenty years is a solid period to 
make a judgement about the practical value of Baltic popular rights. As one can 
note,  within  two  decades  there  were  only  four  required  referendums.  Most 
referendums (18) held in the Baltics were triggered from above – by the public 
authorities.
Figure 4
Despite  the  large  number  of  top-down  referendums,  it  should  be  noted  that 
authorities’ referendums in the Baltics were almost never used to empower (in 
the  sense  of  extending  the  term,  altering  the  balance  between  the 
government/president and parliament) governing majorities or the president, as 
is  the  case  in  less  democratic  societies  (e.g.  Belarus)412.  Baltic  top-down 
referendums were rather  used strategically  for  partisan purposes,  in  order  to 
strengthen  the  parties’  public  image  before  parliamentary  elections.  Within 
twenty years there was one referendum that might be considered critical, namely 
the Lithuanian failed plebiscite on the restoration of the presidential institution 
(see  Chapter  V-B-2).  Indeed,  there  are  three  main  reasons  that  explain  the 
absence  of  empowering  referendums.  As  previously  stated,  at  first  it  is  the 
criteria  of  a  controlling  feature  of  a  referendum.  In  the  sense  of  checks  and 
balances, referendums from above are mainly framed and triggered by different 




C2D Working Paper Series 42 / 2012
political actors, or they depend on a joint action413. And secondly, as in citizen-
initiated referendums, further procedural settings, such as restriction on subject 
matter  (Latvian  presidential  plebiscite  only  for  recalling  the  parliament)  or 
turnout and approval quorums, diminish the effect of referendums from above, 
too. A further reason for the absence of empowering referendums results from 
the  party  system  (e.g.  Estonia  and  Latvia’s  volatile  multi-party  system, 
Lithuania’s polarised party system) in the Baltic republics. Volatile and polarised 
party systems make it difficult to reach agreements on such critical resolutions.
Citizen-initiated referendums are the second largest group of referendums held in 
the Baltics, but in all twelve cases political parties played a prominent role in the 
triggering  of  citizen-initiated  referendums.  As  with  referendums  from  above, 
citizen-initiated referendums were also a strategic tool to by-pass the parliament 
in order to get eventually the necessary popular support.  But,  more than the 
required popular support for a specific issue, the citizens’ initiatives were also an 
important tool to promote party campaigns, especially by holding them on the 
same day as the elections.
Figure 5
With regard to the performance, required referendums were the most efficient 
referendums since all four succeeded in full. Less formal effect (one-third) has 
been achieved in referendums from above and no formal success at all has been 
achieved  through  citizen-initiated  referendums.  Indeed,  as  illustrated  above, 
almost  all  (11 of  12)  citizen-initiated referendums have been adopted by the 
413 The  Latvian  presidential  plebiscite  on  recalling  the  parliament  is  framed  and 
triggered  by  the  president.  Nevertheless,  he  or  she  is  constrained  by  other 
institutional  settings  regulating  the  referendum:  a  negative  outcome  causes  a 
removal of the president from office.
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people.  Nevertheless,  they  failed  to  fulfil  the  minimum  turnout  or  approval 
quorum  and  were  thus  not  passed  into  law.  Similar  cases  happened  in 
referendums from above.
Regarding policy areas, it is not surprising that most referendums that have been 
held in the Baltics dealt with issues on state organisation (e.g. national identity, 
legal  and  political  systems  and  citizens’  rights)  as  the  Figure  5 illustrates. 
Especially in the transition period referendums were helpful tools to overcome 
the Soviet trauma and re-establish a country’s crucial legal framework. However, 
as  in  Estonia  and  Latvia  the  re-establishment  happened  at  the  expense  of 
Russian  minorities.  A  second  topic  for  referendums  concerned  questions  on 
economics.  Other  policy  areas  were  seldom  or  never  subject  to  Baltic 
referendums.
6.2 Policy change through referendums
34 referendums within twenty years is a relatively moderate quantity for these 
three new democracies. However, more important than the number of popular 
votes is the way in which they come about and the formal effect they finally 
cause.
As shown Baltic States are rich in direct democratic instruments that are being 
called  automatically,  by  public  authorities  or  even  by  citizens.  Evidently  the 
majority  of  the  popular  votes  held  in  the  Baltics  belong  to  the  top-down 
mechanism of direct democracy, which is in fact the least citizen-friendly direct 
democratic mechanism of all. Public authorities decide both the issue and time of 
a  referendum,  and  citizens  cannot  take  public  decisions  directly.  The  second 
major group of popular votes held is that of referendums from below. But,  as 
already stated, they have been derived from political parties rather than from 
citizens.
Among 34 referendums held  in  the Baltics  30 (88%) intended to  change the 
status quo (see Table 4). Independently of their proponents this is indeed a large 
number of referendums that have been used rather for a policy change than a 
status quo. In four cases the citizens did not follow the proponents and voted for 
the legislative status quo. On the contrary, in 26 cases (86%) the voters agreed 
with the policy change submitted to vote and voted in favour thereof. Whilst ten 
of them (33%) succeeded in full by becoming legally binding, more than a half 
(16) failed to pass into law and did not cause any formal effect due to procedural 
requirements.
Considering these results, we can argue that direct democracy in the Baltics did 
not show the desired effects of empowering the citizens and spreading the power 
more widely. In the beginning of this paper it was stated that direct democratic 
mechanisms  with  binding  results  theoretically  introduce  the  people  as  one 
additional  veto  player  into  public  legislations  and  any  additional  actor  would 
diminish the potential for a policy change. At first sight the results confirm this 
assumption.  A  closer  look  at  Figure  4,  however,  illustrates  that  most  policy 
changes were made through provisions allowing required referendums, indeed, 
within a direct democratic mechanism where many actors with veto player status 
prevail.  This  is  contrary  to  the  predictions  of  veto-player  model.  However,  it 
should  be  noted  that  the  number  of  cases  here  (4  required  referendums)  is 
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relatively  small  to  be  significant.  Also  contrary  to  the  assumption,  these 
referendums that  were under full  control  of  the citizens  remained completely 
ineffective. In fact, according to the theory of HUG/TSEBELIS, under such institutional 
provisions  where  the  citizens  control  both  the  asking  of  the  question  of  the 
popular vote and the triggering of the process of the referendum, it is expected 
that  citizens individually  determine the outcome of  the referendum. Because, 
such  referendums cancel  out  the  other  veto  players,  and,  as  the  number  of 
political actors decreases, the potential of policy change that is preferred by the 
citizens should increase414. Factually, as one can see, there was a strong popular 
effort towards a new policy. But, in 11 of 12 cases (all of them citizens’ initiatives) 
citizens failed to form the veto player and thus policy outcomes favoured the 
status quo.
414 HUG/TSEBELIS, p. 477–492.
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Table 4: Overview of Baltic referendums 1991–2012 
COUNTRY NAME OF REFERENDUM MECHANISM
OF DD







Referendum on Estonia’s independence top-down parliamentary plebiscite
for
polity change yes yes





policy change yes yes






policy change no no





policy change yes yes
LATVIA
Referendum on Latvia’s independence top-down parliamentary plebiscite
for
polity change yes yes





status quo no no





status quo yes no
Referendum on the accession to the EU required mandatory referendum on EU-Accession
for
policy change yes yes





status quo yes no





status quo yes no
Referendum on the dissolution of parliament by popular vote bottom-up citizens’ constitutional initiative
for
policy change yes no
Referendum on a limited increase of public pensions bottom-up citizens’ legislative initiative
for
policy change yes no
Referendum on the early dissolution of the Saeima (Parliament) top-down presidential plebiscite on recalling parliament
for
polity change yes yes
Referendum on Russian as the second official language bottom-up citizens’ constitutional initiative
for
policy change no no
LITHUANIA





polity change yes yes





policy change yes no





policy change yes yes





policy change yes yes
Referendum on the law revoking privatisation I–VIII (8 parts) bottom-up citizens’ legislative initiative
for
policy change yes no
Referendum on the compensation for lost assets prior to 1990 bottom-up citizens’ legislative initiative
for
policy change yes no
Referendum on parliamentary elections on the second Sunday of  





policy change yes no





policy change yes no





policy change yes no






policy change no no
Referendum on the accession to the EU required mandatory referendum on particip. in Int. Org.
for
policy change yes yes
Consultative referendum on the service extension for the nuclear 





policy change yes no
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6.3 Quality of direct democracy
The  reasons  for  a  low  performance  have  been  evaluated  for  each  republic. 
Generally spoken, there are many procedural hurdles diminishing the will of the 
people and affecting the nature of the popular veto player, so that in most cases 
citizens fail to form the veto player. What thereafter follows is disappointment 
and distrust  in  direct  legislation.  In  order to  avoid such developments and to 
establish a citizen-friendly direct democracy, a number of formal factors have to 
be taken into account when a direct democratic mechanism has to be drawn up. 
The IRI names some important criteria such as signature thresholds, collection 
period,  collection places,  turnout and approval  quorums, restriction of  subject 
matter,  kind of  authorities’  involvement and legal  consequences of  initiatives, 
where  attention  should  be  paid  to  get  a  reasonable  well-designed  direct 
democracy that  encourages rather  than prevents the people’s  participation415. 
But,  it  has  to  be  taken  into  account  that  improving  the  quality  of  direct 
democracy by designing citizen-friendly procedures is not the only solution for a 
better performing direct democracy. A well-functioning direct democracy is also 
dependent on a well-motivated and self-confident  demos. The role of the civic 
society  and  of  civic  education  cannot  be  neglected.  Further  aspects  such  as 
finances and transparency in ballot campaigns are also essential to achieve a fair 
procedure of direct democracy and to realise its full potential. In the following 
table (Table 5)  there is  a  selection of  the most  fundamental  institutional  and 
procedural criteria of direct democracy listed.
Without  making  the  claim  to  be  exhaustive,  according  to  these  elements  a 
tentative judgment of the quality of direct democracy in the Baltic States has 
been undertaken416.  The quality-check list  is  not definite;  nevertheless,  it  is  a 
useful tool with which to make a comparison between the three models of direct 
democracy in the Baltics.  To explain the deficiencies of  the direct democratic 
system better, also a summary reference to the institutions and procedures of 
direct democracy in Switzerland has been made.
As is well known, the Federal State of Switzerland has the longest, most detailed 
and most comprehensive experience of  citizens’  lawmaking in the world. This 
also becomes obvious when we consider the referendums that have been held 
between 1991 and 2012. Within the same time period as in the Baltic States, 
Swiss  citizens  were asked to  decide  on  a total  of  201 different  referendums, 
around one half (98) of which succeeded in full and became legally binding417.
The table on quality of direct democracy consists of two parts that is divided into 
‘institutional’  and  ‘procedural  provisions’.  For  each  part  there  are  certain 
fundamental ‘factors’ that are required so that a direct democratic system can 
work. Derived from IRI’s recommendations418 and theoretical and even practical 
415 IRI, p. 92–94.
416 The  criteria  to  judge  the  quality  of  Baltic  direct-democratic  design  are  mostly 
derived  from  IRI’s  conceptualisation  that  is  recommended  to  asses  a  better 
performing direct democracy, see IRI, Monitor, p. 26–29.
417 c2d database, http://c2d.ch/votes.php?
level=1&country=1&yearr=timeperiods&fromyear=1991&toyear=2012&speyear[]
=2013&result=0&terms=&table=votes&sub=Submit_Query (accessed on 
03.12.2012).
418 IRI, Monitor, p. 26–29.
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explanations under Chapters II-V, for each factor there is a maximum number of 
ticks distributed. The more ticks a factor has the more essential it is for direct 
democracy. And the more ticks a country gets, the better designed and citizens-
friendly is its direct democracy.
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Table 5: Quality of direct democracy in the Baltic States in comparison with Switzerland




























Obligatory referendum on 
other issues
yes, but there should be no
exclusions on issues, ✔✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔✔
TOP-DOWN
from parliamentary minority no recommendation, ✔ X (✔) ✔ X
from parliamentary majority or 
president
no recommendation,




referendum yes, should be available, ✔✔
X (✔) ✔ ✔✔
Citizens’ constitutional and 
legislative initiative yes, should be available, ✔✔✔
X ✔✔✔ ✔✔✔ ✔✔(✔)

























Procedure of signature 
collection
Number of signatures
in order to force a referendum the entry 
hurdles should not exceed 5 % of the 
electorate, ✔
X X X ✔
Collection time a minimum of 6 months should be allowed, ✔
X X X ✔
Collection place should be free at every public place, ✔ X X ✔ ✔
Validation of the vote
Turnout quorum
participation quorum higher than 25% 
should be avoided, much better no 
participation quorum at all ✔
✔ X X ✔
Approval quorum
approval requirements as a proportion 
of the whole electorate should be 
avoided, ✔
✔ X X ✔
Character binding results, ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Initiative procedure
Direct or Indirect
indirect: parliament should be obliged 
to debate all popular initiatives and 
have the right to present a counter-
proposal, ✔
X (✔) (✔) ✔
Restriction on
subject matter
there should be no exclusion on issues 
in direct democratic
process, ✔
X X ✔ ✔
Central Electoral / 
Referendum
Commission
a referendum electoral body should be 
available to advise the initiative 
committees, make a preliminary 
examination of the proposal, verify 
signatures, supervise the campaign, 
monitor and evaluate
a referendum, ✔
✔ ✔ ✔ (✔)
Number of ticks / «points» Max. = 18.5 5.5 9 11 15.25
Remarks
✔ fulfilled (1), if a factor is of great significance to direct democracy then it is valued with more ticks
(✔) partially fulfilled or constrained by other provisions and consequently less citizen-friendly element (0.5)
x not fulfilled, not available (0)
(x) not fulfilled, but to some part available (0.25)
Max = the more ticks (points) a country gets, the more citizen-friendly and well designed is its direct democracy
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6.3.1 Estonia
As one can note, none of the Baltics States fulfil the institutional and procedural 
regulations in full. Estonia has the lowest grade (5.5 points) of ‘direct democratic 
quality’. Considering the availability of institutional provisions, it can be stated 
that  Estonia  is  weak  in  direct  democratic  instruments.  The  most  serious 
shortcoming of the mechanisms is that there are no citizen-initiated referendums. 
Indeed,  as  already  described  in  detail,  there  is  a  mandatory  constitutional 
referendum but it can be applied only for few issues (to alter the provisions of 
Chapters I and XV of the Estonian constitution) and the parliamentary plebiscite 
remains an exclusive right of a majority in parliament. A specialty here is that any 
negative  outcome  of  a  parliamentary  plebiscite  for  draft  acts  causes  the 
dissolution of  the parliament itself.  Thus,  this additional  restriction makes the 
right of parliament to submit referendums on draft acts superfluous.
Regarding  procedural  provisions,  Estonia  still  lags  behind  the  IRI’s 
recommendations. Some of the procedural deficiencies result from the missing 
bottom-up mechanism itself.  The most positive procedural  factor that is to be 
appreciated  is  the  majority  requirement  for  participation  and approval  of  the 
vote. There is no turnout quorum that would put the validity of the referendum 
vote into question. The referendum becomes legally binding if the majority of the 
voters approves it. These theoretical aspects are also compatible with Estonian 
practice. Within twenty years, only four referendums have been held. However, 
the performance of these was very high, as three referendums became legally 
binding and no referendum had to be invalidated.
6.3.2 Latvia
Moving  to  Latvia  (9  points),  one  can  see  that  almost  all  direct  democratic 
institutions  including  the  right  of  popular  initiative  for  constitutional  and 
legislative  initiatives  are  available  to  the  Latvian  citizens.  But,  there  is  a 
weakness in the restrictions on subject matter here. Issues regarding the budget 
and  laws  concerning  loans,  taxes,  custom  duties,  railroad  tariffs  or  military 
conscription are excluded from the process of direct legislation. In addition to the 
citizens’ initiatives, Latvians also have the citizens’ right to veto a parliamentary 
resolution. But, it has to be valued as low since it needs a joint action with the 
president or one-third of the members of parliament. Without a first action by the 
authorities, the popular veto to repeal a law cannot be triggered. This is also the 
reason  why this  tool  has  been classified  rather  as  a  top-down instrument.  A 
special and unique institutional feature that is recently given to Latvians is their 
right to recall parliament and set new elections to it. But, it must be noted that 
such a right allows for making decisions about a public body, rather than public 
issues.
Despite  the  availability  of  several  direct  democratic  tools,  Latvia  scores  very 
poorly in procedural provisions. For all types of referendums there are restrictive 
rules,  excluding  certain  issues  from direct  legislation.  Also  a  high  number  of 
signatures (10% of the total electorate) within a very short time period (1 month) 
are required in order to force a citizen-initiated referendum. And the options for 
signature  gathering  are  limited  since  the  collection  cannot  be  done  at  every 
public place.  At  least,  the initiative procedure is  indirect,  wherein the Latvian 
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parliament is obliged to debate all popular initiatives. It is free to adopt a citizens’ 
proposal directly without submitting it to a referendum. At this stage a link is 
made between representative democracy and direct democracy, wherein citizens 
and representatives come closer. However, there are no provisions for counter-
proposals or withdrawals, which is why only half of the possible ticks is given to 
Latvia. In the matter of turnout and approval quorums Latvia does not perform 
very well either. To validate a popular vote for almost each kind of referendum, a 
different  majority  requirement  is  asked.  For  a  mandatory  constitutional 
referendum and a citizens’ constitutional referendum, indeed, no formal turnout 
requirement is asked. But, factually, a high turnout quorum nevertheless occurs, 
since for an approval of such a referendum more than a half of all eligible voters 
are  needed.  Other  approval  quorums are mostly  coupled with  the number of 
electors  who participated in the previous parliamentary elections.  The unique 
positive aspect on procedural  criteria is  that  the outcome of  a  referendum is 
binding. Nevertheless, this provision alone did or does not actually enable the 
people to become a veto player within the decision-making process, nor does it 
particularly facilitate their use of these direct democratic tools in practice. As 
stated before, 10 referendums of almost all  possible types have been held in 
practice. But, only three votes succeeded in full and five others failed to become 
legally binding, despite their adoption by the people.
6.3.3 Lithuania
Lithuania, the western neighbour of Latvia, performs a bit better in terms of the 
quality of direct democracy (11 points). Citizens of the third Baltic republic can 
participate  in  referendums  that  are  triggered  automatically,  whether  by  a 
minority of the parliament or by the citizens themselves. Required referendums 
can  only  be  applied  for  those  issues  that  are  explicitly  determined  by  the 
constitution (therefore only one tick).  In  contrast,  there are no restrictions on 
subject matter for parliamentary plebiscites and citizens’ initiatives.
Despite  the  wide  range  of  direct  democratic  institutions,  Lithuania  does  not 
perform very well on procedural conditions. Regarding the procedure of signature 
collection, neither the criteria of signature numbers nor time limits to gather the 
required signatures are met. Signatures of nearby 12 percent of the electorate 
have  to  be  collected within  three  months.  At  this  stage the proponents  of  a 
citizens’  initiative  are  at  least  free  to  collect  signatures  in  support  of  their 
proposal everywhere. Nevertheless, it is not surprising that all citizens’ initiatives 
that were held in Lithuania were rather products of established political parties 
than of groups of citizens. A major deficiency that is inherent in Lithuanian direct 
democracy stems from the validation of the votes. To get valid results at first a 
minimum of  50  percent  of  the  whole  electorate  has  to  participate.  This  rule 
applies to all referendum types. In addition to turnout quorums, there are also 
high approval requirements demanded by law. These two criteria have produced 
bad practice, since 14 of 20 referendums that were adopted by the people had to 
be invalidated.  As  mentioned before,  turnout  and approval  quorums not  only 
cause  invalidations  but  also  false  incentives,  so  that  some  parties  and  their 
supporters do not contribute in political  dialogues that  would be vital  for  the 
success  of  a  direct  democratic  process.  Another  negative  criteria  that  the 
Lithuanian practice  has  revealed is  the  combination of  referendum days  with 
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parliamentary elections. Referendums were mostly used for particular interests 
before general elections. To avoid a mix-up of party politics and issue politics, 
new democracies should avoid such voting days. One positive aspect, besides the 
absence of restrictions on subject matter and binding referendum results, is the 
indirect procedure of initiatives and the central role of the parliament in it. The 
parliament is obliged to deliberate the citizens’ final act, but also in Lithuania 
there are no legal provisions to present a counter proposal, nor does the initiative 
procedure include a withdrawal clause. As in the two other republics, in Lithuania 
referendums  are  also  supervised  by  a  central  elections  commission.  An 
independent committee can fulfil an informative and supportive function for the 
citizens and keep direct  democratic  procedures from being dominated by the 
parliament or government.
6.4 More than instruments
No matter how many direct democratic instruments are available to the citizens, 
a direct democratic mechanism cannot work within a poorly designed framework, 
nor can it encourage the people to participate in direct legislation. To illustrate 
the  importance  of  direct  democracy’s  design,  we  make  a  short  excursion  to 
Switzerland. Swiss direct democracy contains instruments for referendums that 
are derived automatically or from citizens (without citizens’ legislative initiative). 
At national level the absence of referendums that are triggered by authorities is 
not  seen  as  a  deficiency.  The  quality  of  Swiss  direct  democracy  and  its 
performance  (201  referendums  within  the  last  two  decades)  are  determined 
rather by its procedural than institutional provisions (15.25 points).
As illustrated in the table, in the procedural  section Switzerland performs the 
best; all criteria that are listed are fulfilled. There is enough time (18 months for 
citizens’ initiatives and 100 days for citizens’ facultative referendums) to collect 
100,000 signatures (2 % of the whole electorate) in support of citizens’ initiatives 
and  50,000  signatures  (1  %  of  the  whole  electorate)  to  veto  parliamentary 
decrees.  And  signatures  can  be  collected  everywhere.  No  special  majority 
requirements are applied to referendum decisions. A referendum becomes legally 
binding  if  the  majority  of  the  participants  approves  it.  For  constitutional 
amendments, however, a qualified approval quorum – double majority of people 
and cantons – is required since Switzerland is a federal state. Here, in order to be 
adopted, besides the majority of participants, also the majority of cantons must 
have voted in favour. And decisions that have been approved by the people can 
be altered by the parliament later. This is not necessarily a disadvantage. On the 
one hand, any constitutional amendment that is launched by the parliament has 
to  be submitted to  popular  vote  and,  on  the  other  hand,  in  other  cases  the 
amendment might be favourable to promoting a functional legal setting, instead 
of a legal deadlock.
In Switzerland there is no exclusion of any policy areas from being subject to a 
popular vote. Another citizen-friendly procedure results from the manner in which 
initiatives  are  treated  before  they  are  placed  on  the  ballot.  Swiss  initiative 
procedure is an indirect process where popular initiatives must be considered by 
the government and parliament. The parliament is entitled to accept the initiative 
or to present a counter proposal as an alternative to the proposal contained in a 
citizens’  initiative.  The  proponents  of  an  initiative  can  also  withdraw  their 
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proposal if they agree with the alternative proposed by the parliament. If not, the 
counter proposal and citizens’ initiative are placed on the ballot simultaneously, 
and citizens have a choice between these two alternatives. The advantage of an 
indirect  initiative procedure,  wherein  representative and direct  democracy are 
linked, lies in the fact that initiatives are debated longer and citizens and their 
representatives  come  closer  to  each  other.  In  many  cases  the  parliament 
recognises the need for legal action and enacts counter-proposals that can also 
increase the efficiency of  citizens’ initiatives.  As  GABRIELA ROHNER proves,  almost 
half of citizens’ constitutional initiatives have caused a change in the legislative 
status,  resulting either  from the direct  adoption  of  citizens’  initiatives,  or  the 
adoption of counter-proposals419.  Nevertheless, in spite of these citizen-friendly 
provisions a major imperfection subsists as regards the procedures on the validity 
check of Swiss initiatives.
Considering these aspects, it can be stated that direct democracy is more than its 
instruments.  In  order  to  assess  a  qualitative  and  citizen-friendly  direct 
democracy, several procedural provisions have to be taken into account. Not to 
be underestimate are the time allowances that are given for each stage of the 
direct  democratic  process.  Solutions  adopted  through  direct  democratic 
procedures should not be hastily made decisions. The collection of signatures, 
responses  from authorities,  campaign and public  debate  need an appropriate 
period of time to develop interactivity and enact functional laws. And it does not 
matter how many people have turned out in the last stage of direct democratic 
legislation to achieve a final decision that is considered as legitimate. As long as 
the procedural design is legitimate (citizen-friendly provisions, accessibility) it will 
also  generate legitimate outcomes,  whether  the popular  decision is  wrong or 
right.
7 Conclusions
7.1 Rich in instruments, moderate in use, poor in performance
Independently  of  the  grade  of  direct  democracy,  in  all  three  Baltic  States 
referendums were helpful tools to overcome political deadlocks and to legitimise 
nation-building decisions in the beginning of 90s. All three countries showed how 
democracy could be restored peacefully and in accordance with international law 
through various forms of direct democracy. After the Soviet trauma, the people 
not only elected their representatives but also decided on fundamental  policy 
issues with regard to independence, constitution, re-establishment of statehood 
and accession to a supranational organisation, such as the EU. One may note that 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are as yet the only EU-member states that were 
formerly republics of the Soviet Union.
Currently, Baltic States have a large set of direct democratic instruments that 
were set up in difficult  circumstances.  Thanks to direct  democratic  tools  with 
binding results, the citizens are partly introduced into the legislative process as 
one  additional  veto  player,  whose  agreement  is  needed for  a  change in  the 
legislative  status  quo.  Following  the  conceptualisation  of  direct  democratic 
mechanisms, many different types of referendums have been determined that 
are constitutionally provided for in these three republics. Required referendums 
419 ROHNER, p. 282.
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exist in all three Republics. However, in all three countries the subject matter that 
is  applied  for  such  mandatory  referendums  is  very  restricted.  Several 
constitutional  issues do not make up a part  of required referendums. Besides 
automatic referendums, in each country also referendums that are derived from 
the authorities exist. But, they are considered as less democratic since they are 
fully subject to the control of the authorities. Here, the citizens are only asked to 
go to polls and cast their votes for a proposal that has been framed and triggered 
by the public authorities. Top-down referendums can have somewhat more of a 
democratising effect, even if, as is the case in Lithuania, a parliamentary minority 
triggers the referendum. Without doubt, the largest effect that the people can 
have is through referendums that are from below. In contrast to the Estonians, 
the  Latvians  and  Lithuanians  are  entitled  to  initiate  referendums  in  order  to 
amend  the  constitution  or  the  law.  Since  recently,  Latvians  are  also  able  to 
trigger a referendum on recalling the parliament.
Despite the fact of many direct democratic tools, the Baltic States perform only 
moderately well  in terms of their application. Within the last two decades, 34 
referendums have been held in these three republics: 20 in Lithuania, 10 in Latvia 
and 4 in Estonia. Among 34 referendums 30 intended to cause a policy change in 
the  legislative  status  quo.  Referendums  from  above  are  the  leading  group, 
followed by citizens’  initiatives and automatic  referendums. In all  three direct 
mechanisms, political parties were the most active users. But, referendums have 
seldom been applied to reach solutions for deadlocked policies. On the contrary, 
in order to promote partisan interests and campaigns, parties often set them on 
the  same  day  as  parliamentary  elections.  Despite  the  active  partisan  use, 
however, it should be noted that direct democratic instruments have not been 
exploited  to  enlarge  political  power  in  favour  of  governing  majorities  or  the 
president.
In terms of performance, the results show that the Baltic States do not rank well.  
Only one-third of the referendums passed into law and more than the half that 
were approved by the citizens were deemed to be invalid since they failed to 
achieve turnout or approval requirements. It should also be noted that none of 
citizen-initiated referendums became legally  binding.  Here,  the model  of  veto 
player did not work at all. Despite the fact that citizens were in full control of the 
referendums (framing/triggering) they failed to reach political decisions on issues 
in which they were in disagreement with the political elite. And citizens were not 
able to determine the outcome of public decisions individually.  These findings 
clearly challenge the general assumptions of the veto-player approach.
7.2 A better design for a better balance
The weak performance of direct democratic mechanisms in the Baltics can be 
explained by two main factors: First, the informal settings, such as the political 
culture and behaviour of the elites within the given contextual settings. All three 
republics  are  new democracies  that  had  a  difficult  path  ahead  of  them.  The 
Soviet regime, lasting over 40 years, was enough to suppress any development 
of  individual  and  self-confident  people.  Consequently,  an  adequate  time  is 
needed to develop a strong civil society that places its trust in direct legislation. 
Thus, each referendum that is held in these countries may contribute to promote 
collective learning and trust in direct democratic procedures. Another informal 
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reason for the poor performance of referendums originates from the elites. They 
still interact within a legal framework that favours their interests, and in some 
cases referendums have been part of their strategic calculations. In addition to 
the informal  aspects,  the weak performance is  also a result  of  a  less  citizen-
friendly procedural design of direct democracy. It is true that the implementation 
of direct democratic provisions was made within volatile economic, social, and 
technical circumstances. But, it is also true that until now less effort has been 
made by the elites to make participatory democracy more citizen-friendly. In each 
republic there are the same formal constraints, such as restrictions on subject 
matter,  high  signature  numbers,  short  collection  periods,  high  turnout  and 
approval quorums, that diminish the sovereignty of the people. 
The introduction of direct democratic tools into constitutional law in order to give 
citizens the means to play an active role in politics is indeed a big step. But, 
regarding the settings and results outlined in this paper we can conclude that 
Baltic  States  have  not  risen  to  the  challenge  of  striking  a  balance  between 
representative  and  direct  democracy  yet.  To  reach  this  goal,  it  is  not  only 
important which direct democratic mechanism is available in one country but 
also how these mechanisms are framed. Many obstacles and high hurdles are 
less helpful  to  develop a strong civil  society and to encourage the people to 
participate  in  direct  legislation  more  actively.  Such  constraints  rather  impede 
deliberative dialogs and cause distrust in direct democratic polities.
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